Recogni- towards European States have ever been uniform: thus tion. Mr Monroe, in his Seventh Annual Message', says, "Our doctrines. policy in regard to Europe, adopted at an early stage of American the wars which so long agitated that quarter of the globe, remains the same, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers, to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us, and to cultivate and preserve friendly relations with it." And thus too we find Mr Fillmore denouncing the expedition. of Lopez and his companions to Cuba, and saying, "No individuals have a right to hazard the peace of the country, or to violate its laws upon vague notions of altering or reforming governments in other states; this principle, reasonable in itself and in accordance with public law, is engrafted into the codes of other nations as well as our own;" and in strict accordance with these views are the doctrines laid down and maintained by the American Jurists. Thus Mr Wheaton, in his admirable treatise, insists strenuously upon the rigid adherence to the principle of non-intervention, and points to the numerous interferences of the European States before the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in the affairs of each other, as cases not to be referred to any fixed and definite principle of International Law, and not furnishing any general rule fit to be observed in other apparently analogous cases3. General Halleck too, in his excellent 1 Statesman's Manual, Vol. I. p. 537. 2 Statesman's Manual, Vol. III. p. 1935. See also President Jackson's message, 21 Dec. 1836; and President Polk's fourth message, Dec. 1848; and the vigorous language and measures of President Taylor in putting down attempts at armed naval assistance by citizens of the United States to the Germans in the Schleswig-Holstein business of 1848. Statesman's Manual, Vol. 111. p. 1864. 3 Wheaton's Elements, ed. 1863, by W. Beach Lawrence, Vol. I. pp. 117-139. The reader is also referred to a valuable note by the learned Editor for modern American views upon the subject of interventions, or probable interventions, of England and France in any portion of territory which, according to President Monroe's views, forms part of the American continent. Wheaton, Vol. 1. Part II. Chap. 1. note 53, pp. 144-150; Calvo, T. 1. Liv. iii. § 101; where the reader will find not only a very good criticism of the Monroe doctrine, but in a note at the foot of the section (101) all the authorities, American, British and Foreign, on the subject. The Monroe doctrine itself, and the controversy it gave rise to, will be found at full length in the preceding section (100). tion. work on International Law, examining the numerous Recogniexceptions to the rule, that no state has a right to American interfere in the domestic concerns and internal govern- doctrines. ment of another state, comes to the conclusion that this is the only true rule, the so-called exceptions to it being specious attempts upon its integrity, which ought to be at once rejected as unsubstantial and unjustifiable'. Nor are the American authorities, whether they be the declarations of statesmen, or the well-weighed opinions of Jurists, one whit less decided in their tone with reference to the subject of Recognition. Thus we find Mr Wheaton holding that, until the revolution is consummated,—whilst the civil war lasts,-other states may remain indifferent spectators of the controversy, still continuing to treat the ancient government as sovereign, and the government de facto as a society entitled to the rights of war against its enemy; but until the independence of the new state has been formally acknowledged, courts of justice and private individuals are bound to consider the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered; General Halleck too is even more explicit in stating the rule by which a neutral nation is to be governed in the event of a revolution in a neighbouring "Whilst the civil war continues," he says, state: 66 or while a colony or province is shaking off the bonds of its former government, a foreign state should either remain a tacit spectator, or, if its relations require diplomatic intercourse with the revolted society, it should treat it as a de facto government only, and not as an independent state. But when the contest is virtually determined, and the revolted province or colony has firmly established its independence, foreign powers, without any just offence to the metropolitan country, may recognize that independence, and enter into full diplomatic and commercial relations with the new state as a separate and distinct sovereignty." United States It was in strict accordance with these principles that the Government of the United States, although at an and the earlier period than the action of the British Government, American 1 Halleck, International Law, ch. iv. §§ 4-96. 2 Wheaton, Elements of International Law, Vol. 1. Part I. Chap. II. § 7 and § 10. 3 Halleck, International Law, Chap. III. § 21. South Colonies, 1822. tion. of the Spanish America. Recogni- after carefully weighing all the circumstances, in the The revolt year 1822 resolved to consider the Spanish provinces in South America as legitimate powers, which had attained provinces sufficient solidity and strength to be entitled to the in South rights and privileges belonging to independent States'. Nor can it be said that, in the war between Mexico and Texas, when, after a long and at times severe struggle, the latter threw off her dependence upon the former, there was any disregard of the principles enunciated and acted upon in former times by the government. The debates in the two Houses of Assembly, in the United States, on the subject of the Recognition of Texas, are an excellent commentary on the doctrines hitherto maintained. It was not without strong opposition and after many discussions, and an adverse expression of opinion by the then President (Jackson), that Congress came to the determination of recognizing Texas. The subject required and received more than ordinary caution3. United and 1849. But if we do admit that in this matter the decision of the American Government was not otherwise than justifiable and legal, it is impossible to say the same of its conduct in the Austro-Hungarian war of 1849. Those who may wish to read the elaborate and able defence of the executive will find it set out at full length Hungary, in the 6th volume of Webster's Works (pp. 488-506), and into abler hands it could not have fallen than those of Mr Webster; but the following language of President Taylor on the occasion, especially in the parts italicized, does seem so contrary to the true principles of recognition, and so opposite to the policy displayed by the United States authority on other events of a similar nature, that however vigorous the defender, his position is a difficult one:-"During the conflict between Austria 1 President's message, 8th of March, 1822, Statesman's Manual, Vol. I. p. 518, and Act of Congress, 4th of May, 1822, Chap. LII. American Statutes at large, Vol. 1. p. 678. 2 The History of the Texan question is so fully explained in the debates in Congress, that the reader is referred to the following volumes of the Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, New York, 1860, Vols. XII, XIII, XIV. (see the Index). See Webster's Works, Vol. VI. p. 414. With the question of its subsequent annexation we have nothing to do here. Mr Everett says of it, "As a question of public law there never was an extension of territory more naturally or justifiably made.” Wheaton's Elements, Vol. 1. p. 49, ed. 1863, note 19. tion. Hungary, and Hungary there seemed to be a prospect that the latter Recognimight become an independent nation. However faint that United prospect I thought it my duty, in accordance with the States and general sentiments of the American people, who deeply 1849. sympathized with the Magyar patriots, to stand prepared, upon the contingency of the establishment by her of a permanent government, to be the first to welcome independent Hungary into the family of nations. For this purpose, I invested an agent then in Europe with power to declare our willingness promptly to recognize her independence in the event of her ability to maintain it1." Is it necessary to criticize a document in which two faults at all events are visible, the delegacy of sovereign powers to an agent, and the victory of sympathy and sentiment over reason and law? What would have been thought of an English minister who should have directed an agent in the Confederate States, to declare the willingness of England promptly to recognize their independence in the event of their ability to maintain it? Such are the tests which two great nations have tacitly agreed to adopt ere they proceed to recognize the independence of a revolted colony or member of a state, and such the history of the events in which those tests have been applied; it is only necessary to add a few words upon the mode in which that recognition may take place, and upon a topic which is not out of place here, viz. the recognition of belligerent rights in a revolted colony or portion of a state. Sir Robert Phillimore says there are two modes of recognition, the virtual and the formal, the former preceding the latter, and taking place through the acknowledgment of the revolted state's commercial flag, or the appointment of consuls to its ports. This he asserts gives no just cause of offence to the old state, and is in no way inconsistent with the continued observance of neutrality between the contending parties. The latter, the formal, is evidenced by the sending of ambassadors, and the entering into treaties with the new state; but with this distinction, and with this view, it is impossible to agree. If the time has come for recognition upon the tests above specified, and if that recognition is to be one of independence, of the 1 President Taylor's First Annual Message, Dec. 1849. Statesman's Manual, Vol. 1. p. 1835. Mode in which tion takes place. Recognition generally. Recognition of Belligerent rights. establishment in fact of a new state, it surely cannot matter in what form the recognition is made, whether by entering into treaties of commerce, as in the case of England with the Spanish colonies and the United States with Texas, or by an absolute declaration of independence, as in the case of Greece, or by sending ambassadors and consuls; nor, on the other hand, can it be said that the recognizing a commercial flag, or the sending consuls to a country still in revolt, and whose independence is not achieved, is either consistent with the duties of neutrality or void of offence to the old state; for to grant recognition in any way, virtual or formal, while the issue is at all doubtful or the contest not wholly abandoned, is as decidedly an offence against International Law as to refuse it under such circumstances is no offence at all. What then is the duty of neutral nations in the event of a war between two portions of a state? Are they justified in putting both parties on an equality and conceding belligerent rights to one and the other, or are they bound to treat the contest as a rebellion and the revolted province as rebels? Most certainly they are justified in putting them on an equality, for the recognition of belligerent rights, says Mr Lawrence', in a colony or a portion of a state in revolt from or in opposition to the metropolis, is not to be confounded with the acknowledgment of the independence of such province or colony. It has been the constant practice of European nations and of the United States to "look upon belligerency as a fact rather than a principle," holding with Mr Canning, "that a certain degree of force and consistency acquired by a mass of population engaged in war entitled that population to be treated as belligerent." Instances too are numerous from the time when the North American colonies threw off the yoke of England down to the period when at an early stage of hostilities between the United States and the Confederate States, it was resolved by the Governments of England and France to treat the Southern Confederacy in accordance with 1 Wheaton's Elements, Vol. 1. ed. 1863, p. 40, n. 16, by Mr W. B. Lawrence. 2 Mr Secretary Canning in answer to a remonstrance of the Porte, cited by Lord John Russell in the House of Commons, 6 May, 1861, Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXII. p. 1565. |