trade. within the Brazilian dominions after the passing of the The slave Act of Geo. IV. was illegal before that of Victoria, a English contract for the sale of such slaves and their offspring law. was illegal also'. The Exchequer Chamber, however, reversed this judgment; the majority of the court deciding that the contract was legal and might be enforced in this country, on the ground that the statute 6 & 7 Vic. c. 98, s. 5, permitted the sale of slaves, the holding of whom was not prohibited by any Act of Parliament, and that no statute prohibited the holding of the slaves in Brazil, even though the purchasing of them there might be a felony in a British subject.] La Jeune and the Antelope. The final decision of the question in the United States Cases of has been the same as in the case of the Le Louis. In the Eugenie case of the La Jeune Eugenie3 it was decided in the Circuit Court of the United States, in Massachusetts, after a masterly discussion, that the slave trade was prohibited by universal law. But, subsequently, in the case of the Antelope', the Supreme Court of the United States declared that the slave trade had been sanctioned in modern times by the laws of all nations who possessed distant colonies; and a trade could not be considered as contrary to the law of nations which had been authorized and protected by the usages and laws of all commercial nations. It was not piracy, except so far as it was made so by the treaties or statutes of the nation to which the party belonged. It might still be lawfully carried on by the subjects of those nations who have not prohibited it by municipal acts or treaties. It would not be proper in a work on International Law to close the subject just examined without a few words upon a topic with which it is in some points connected, viz. the Right of Search. It is not our intention to examine this matter at any length, the main object of introducing it here is to draw attention to some valuable discussions upon it in both the British Houses of 1 Mr Justice Willes delivered the judgment of the Court, and cited as authorities, R. v. Zulueta, 1 Carr. and Kirwan, 215, Pinner v. Arnold, Cro, Mee, and Roscoe, 613, and Esposito v. Bowden, 7 Ellis and Blackb. 763. 2 From this view the Lord Chief Baron (Pollock) and Mr Justice Wightman dissented, upholding the judgment above. 4 10 Wheaton, 66. 32 Mason, 409. trade and the Right of Search. English law. The slave Parliament in the year 1858. These discussions were caused partly by "the language and demonstrations of resentment on the part of the United States of America owing to the alleged outrages committed on American vessels by British cruisers," and partly by the case of a French vessel, called the Regina Cali, which had been taken as a prize by the British steamer Ethiop, near the coast of Liberia, with several hundred negroes on board, who, though according to French representations free emigrants lawfully enlisted, were, it was stated in other accounts of the transaction, really slaves. In both Houses these matters were fully gone into, and as to each transaction it would appear that satisfactory explanations were given, as well to the government of the United States as to that of France. Our reason for noticing them is to take the opportunity of citing the words of one of the ablest lawyers and most powerful orators of whom Great Britain can boast-the late Lord Lyndhurst-by whom the law on this important topic is thoroughly examined and tersely stated. In asking the Foreign Secretary (Lord Malmesbury) whether he was prepared to lay on the table of the House the correspondence of the American Government with respect to the right of visit, Lord Lyndhurst went on to say, "Some persons think we have surrendered a valuable right. The answer which I make to that is this-that we have surrendered no right, that in point of fact no such right as that contended for has ever existed. We have abandoned the assumption of the right, and in doing so we have, I think, acted wisely, prudently, and justly. No writer on international law has ever asserted the right, and there is no decision of any court of justice having jurisdiction to decide that question, in which this right has been admitted." After citing the opinion of Lord Stowell, Mr Wheaton, and Mr Justice Story, he goes on, "It is said that the flag of America may be fraudulently assumed by another power. How can that by any possibility affect the rights of any third power? Take a case. By an English Treaty we have the right of visiting Spanish vessels, in order to prevent the slave trade. But how can that agreement between us and Spain affect the rights of America? But then what are our cruisers to do? They are placed in a most difficult position, because it is quite clear and plain trade and English if one of our cruisers sees a vessel bearing the American The slave flag, and has reason to believe that that flag is assumed, the Right he must examine and inquire into her right to carry that of Search. flag as well as he can. If it be suspected that a vessel law. has no right to use the American flag there may be an examination of her papers, and if it is found that the suspicions are correct that vessel may be dealt with in the same manner as in the case of a search between England and the country to which the vessel belongs. America would have no right to interfere, it would be a right existing between the English cruiser and the vessel that was seized. The flag would give no right to America to interfere in a case of that kind, but if it should turn out that it was an American vessel, justified in using the American flag, then this country would have to apologize, and make ample compensation. There is no distinction between the right of visit and the right of search. You visit for the purpose of ascertaining the nationality of the vessel, but you cannot ask to examine the papers for the purpose, because that would be a search; so that when you visit to ascertain the nationality of a vessel it is in effect a visit to search." In agreeing to lay the correspondence on the table Lord Malmesbury stated that the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown had been taken, and coincided with the views expressed by Lord Lyndhurst, adding, "As the question now stands the English Government has abandoned the right of search and visit, and the American Government has agreed to entertain and consider in a fair spirit any suggestion to obtain security against the fraudulent adoption of the American flag1." 1 See Annual Register for the year 1858; History, pp. 185— 197. APPENDIX I. AN ACT FOR REGULATING NAVAL PRIZE OF WHEREAS it is expedient to enact permanently, with amendments, such provisions concerning naval prize, and matters connected therewith, as have heretofore been usually passed at the beginning of a war; Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same as follows: Preliminary. Short title. 1. This Act may be cited as The Naval Prize Act, 1864. The term "the High Court of Admiralty" means the High The term "any of Her Majesty's ships of war" includes The term "officers and crew "includes flag officers, Com- The term "ship" includes vessel and boat, with the tackle, The term "goods" includes all such things as are by the tation of terms, |