plete code of rules and regulations drawn up, based upon the provisions of the 6 and 7 Vict. c. 94. The last of these Orders, bearing date the 30th November, 1864', however, having repealed the two that immediately preceded it, and having made further provision for the more effectually carrying out the objects of the Act of Parliament, and the Orders consequent upon it, a short analysis of its contents will exhibit the actual extent and condition of Her Majesty's jurisdiction in the Ottoman dominions.

I. All the jurisdiction exerciseable under the Order, both civil and criminal, is to be exercised in conformity with the Common Law, the Rules of Equity, the Statute Law, and other law in force in England, and pursuant to the course of procedure observed in England.

II. The constitution of Her Majesty's consular courts is as follows:

(1) There is to be a supreme consular court sitting at Constantinople, or at any other place within the Ottoman dominions approved of by one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State, presided over by a judge, and having attached to it one law-secretary, and as many officers and clerks as shall seem good to one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State.

The business of the law-secretary, who also is to hold the office of vice-consul, being to act as registrar of the court, to prosecute in criminal matters under the direction of the judge, to determine certain criminal charges in a summary way, and to settle certain suits and pro-.. ceedings under the reference of the judge.

(2) In addition to this supreme court, provincial consular courts are established, presided over by Her Majesty's consuls-general, consuls, and vice-consuls. In civil matters it is prescribed,

First. That every consular court and its officers are to promote, as far as possible, reconciliation, to facilitate the amicable settlement of suits, and refer, if necessary, suits or proceedings to arbitration.

Secondly. In the event of a trial, where the amount sought to be recovered is £50, or upwards, the suit is, on the demand of either party, to be tried by a jury of five,

1 Published in extenso in the London Gazette, Dec. 2, 1864.

British
Consulate

who may be challenged as in England, whose decision Orders in must be unanimous, and before whom all the proceedings relatio must be in English. Thirdly. In certain cases a provincial court is to in the hear and determine the matters with assessors. And, Ottoman Empire. Fourthly. Besides being courts of law and equity, the supreme and other consular courts are to be courts of bankruptcy. The supreme court is to be a court of viceadmiralty, a court for matrimonial causes, and a court of probate; whilst the provincial courts, if held before a legal vice-consul, are to have a vice-admiralty jurisdiction, and also power to grant probate or administration in non-contentious cases.

In criminal matters, the jurisdiction of the consular court extends to every British subject within the district of the court and charged with a crime or offence within the Ottoman dominions, or on board a British vessel within those dominions. And,

First. A consular court is to promote reconciliation and facilitate an amicable settlement of proceedings for assault, or offences not amounting to felony, on certain prescribed terms.

Secondly. Certain classes of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the supreme courts, or of a provincial consular court, may, by direction of the judge of the supreme court, be heard and determined in a summary way.

Thirdly. Other crimes and offences above the degree of misdemeanour, tried before the judge, or law-secretary of the supreme court, or before a resident legal viceconsul in a provincial court, are to be tried by a jury of five, whose decision is to be unanimous, and before whom all the proceedings are to be in English.

Fourthly. Capital crimes are to be tried only by the judge of the supreme court; and in the case of convictions for murder, judgement of death is to be entered on the record, and a report of this and every other judgement to be sent to one of Her Majesty's Secretaries of State, for his direction as to the punishment actually to be imposed.

III. Provision is made for preventing any prospective breach of the public peace, and for the deportation of offenders, for the registration of residents and others, for

British

in the

Ottoman
Empire.

dealing with the property of British subjects non-resident Consulate and dying within the Ottoman dominions, for offences against the religion established or observed within the Ottoman dominions, and for opportunities to foreigners, so desiring it, to institute proceedings of a civil nature against British subjects, or vice versâ to British subjects.

IV. In civil cases, where the amount in dispute is of the value of £50, or upwards, appeals are allowed from the provincial courts to the supreme court; and where the amount or value is of £500, or upwards, from the supreme court to the Queen in Council.

In criminal cases, where the trial of the offence has been in a summary way, the supreme consular court may review the decision, in the shape of a special case; and where the trial has been otherwise than a summary one, questions of law may be reserved for the consideration of the supreme court.]

CHAPTER IV,

OF THE DECLARATION AND OTHER EARLY MEASURES OF A STATE OF WAR,

IN the preceding chapters we have considered the principal rights and duties of nations in a state of peace; and if those duties were generally and duly fulfilled, a new order of things would arise, and shed a brighter light over the history of human affairs. Peace is said to be the natural state of man, and war is undertaken for the sake of peace, which is its only lawful end and purpose'. "Wars," says Lord Bacon, "are no massacres and confusions, but they are the highest trials of right when princes and states shall put themselves upon the justice of God for deciding their controversies as it shall please Him to put on either side." The history of mankind is an almost uninterrupted narration of a state of war, and gives colour to the sarcastic theory of Hobbes3, who maintains that the natural state of man is a state of war of all against all; and it adds plausibility to the conclusions of those other writers, who, having known and studied the Indian character, insist, that continual war is the natural instinct and appetite of man in a natural

1 Cic. de Off. I. 11 and 23. Grotius, Book 1. Chap. 1. Burlamaqui, Part IV. Chap. 1. § 4. Vattel, Book IV. Chap 1.

Bacon's Works, edited by Basil Montague, Vol. v. p. 384.

3 Leviathan, Part 1. Chap. 13. The allusion in the text to an often cited though probably carelessly examined dictum of one of the most vigorous as well as one of the clearest thinkers England can boast of, affords an opportunity for a reference to an admirable exposition of the excellencies and errors of Hobbes as a teacher and guide in the science of Politics by one who himself was a sure and certain light in the science of Jurisprudence, the late Mr John Austin: see Vol. 1. p. 248 (note) of the recent edition of his works (1861).

All pacific

modes of redress to be exhausted.

state. It is, doubtless, true, that a sincere disposition for peace, and a just appreciation of its blessings, are the natural and necessary result of science and civilization.

The right of self-defence is part of the law of our nature, and it is the indispensable duty of civil society to protect its members in the enjoyment of their rights, both of person and property. This is the fundamental principle of the social compact. An injury either done or threatened, to the perfect rights of the nation, or of any of its members, and susceptible of no other redress, is a just cause of war. The injury may consist, not only in the direct violation of personal or political rights, but in wrongfully withholding what is due, or in the refusal of a reasonable reparation for injuries committed, or of adequate explanation or security in respect to manifest and impending danger'. Grotius condemns the doctrine, that war may be undertaken to weaken the power of a neighbour, under the apprehension that its further increase may render him dangerous. This would be contrary to justice, unless we were morally certain, not only of a capacity, but of an actual intention to injure us. We ought rather to meet the anticipated danger by a diligent cultivation, and prudent management, of our own resources. We ought to conciliate the respect and good will of other nations, and secure their assistance in case of need, by the benevolence and justice of our conduct. War is not to be resorted to without absolute necessity, nor unless peace would be more dangerous, and more miserable, than war itself. An injury to an individual member of a state, is a just cause of war, if redress be refused, but a nation is not bound to go to war on so slight a foundation; for it may of itself grant indemnity to the injured party, and if this cannot be done, yet the good of the whole is to be preferred to the welfare of a part3. [It is true that a just war, one that is undertaken for just causes, to repel or avert wrongful force, or to establish a right, cannot be impeached on any grounds, religious, moral, or political. And if it be carried to a successful issue, if force is repelled, wrong redressed, or

1 Grotius, Book 11. Chap. 1. and 22 Rutherforth, Book II. Chap. IX. Vattel, Book III. Chap. 1. § 26.

2 Grotius, Book II. Chap. XXII.—xxv. Rutherforth, Book II, Chap. IX.