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strengthen that and ensure that its mission is that which we need for the 21st Century.

One of your recommendations, and I think it is an important one, if you are going to have bipartisan support across the board, from liberals to conservatives, is that it does its best to stay out of policy opinion. Now, you are right; the line sometimes is difficult to draw.

In trying to evaluate the work of GAO, it depends primarily on financial benefits and recommendations implemented. Both of these measurements are produced by GAO and, of course, not independently derived.

To what extent can this Committee and the Congress depend on these statistics as true measurements of the value of GAO work? Are there any better alternative methods?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think I can say that the panel would agree that there is some softness in the numbers that are stated relevant to potential savings and the like. One recommendation that we make which is relevant to that point is that GAO establish an external peer review system, not before the studies but after studies are completed. The panel recommended that three or four major areas of GAO work be selected each year for peer review, with panels of outside experts convened to assess a sampling of recently completed GAO reports and then report to GAO and share the results with Congress on what they find (quality, methodology, sources, presentation, as well as practicality, usefulness and value of the products).

I understand that GAO is quite supportive of doing this, and I would urge on this Committee that they urge GAO to do it, because it seems to me it is an opportunity to have an independent examination on a regular basis that would deal with questions like reliability of cost estimates and the like.

Chairman ROTH. Well, let me move on. GAO, of course, is not the only agency providing oversight of Federal expenditures of the Federal workforce. We have created the inspectors general, the chief financial officers, OMB and CBO, all of which oversee and review the spending of Washington.

My question is: What relationship should GAO have with these other oversight bodies? In other words, with these other independent auditors, does the financial auditing become less important? And we talk about reviewing performance and goals. How do you see that developing?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Well, let me make a couple responses and then ask my colleagues if they wish to respond to that, because that deals with a very major problem of government.

May I say that when I headed a Federal agency, one had the sense that everybody is engaged in oversight of what you are doing, whether it is the inspectors general or subcommittees up here on the Hill or the media or GAO. There is just an unbelievable amount of oversight going on-which, by the way, I would argue often stands in the way of getting the kind of entrepreneurial and independent action from the executive side which is often advocated. So I would suggest that any examination this Committee would make of the piling on of oversight which has gone on in this government would be a very useful undertaking.

Now, having said that as a general comment, let me say that in relation to the financial side of the Federal Government and the auditing of that, in my judgment the enactment of the Chief Financial Officers Act was a very important contribution. There needs to be a greater attention to the ability of those officers to perform their functions, and they need a lot of help from GAO in doing that. Now I am speaking for myself and not the panel, I think that the relationship of the inspectors general to the other oversight agencies has not been well worked out and that some effort and attention should be devoted to that question.

I was here in Washington when the Inspectors General Act was passed, and I testified on its behalf. I think that there does need to be an examination of the relationship of the IGs to GAO's role as well as how they relate to other internal systems of auditing within the agencies.

The fundamental role, I believe, that GAO plays that is unique to it and where it can make its biggest contribution is in effectiveness and program evaluation. It is really looking at whether the programs that Congress passes and the Executive Branch administers are, in fact, accomplishing what they were designed to accomplish and at what cost. And the cost issue is at the moment, I would argue, not as well investigated by anybody as it ought to be.

Now, having made those general statements, let me turn to Annmarie and ask if she wishes to add to that. I know that you have views about the oversight issue.

Ms. WALSH. Well, certainly, to go to the beginning of your question, we have found there was very close cooperation and coordination with the other legislative agencies, with CBO and OTA.

The example of the Chief Financial Officers Act indicates, as I am sure you are aware, that the actual development of the financial management systems anticipated by that act has been slow and difficult. Even filling the positions called for has been slow, and the process requires more attention to financial management accounting and tying accounting into budgeting, on which the agencies and Congress have seldom focused. Budgeting activity tends to drive out the financial management system improvements.

The panel definitely concluded that GAO's role was made more important by the passage of the CFO Act and not in any way made redundant by it.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Scott, do you wish to comment?

Mr. FOSLER. I would just make one point. Mr. Chairman, I think you raise a very important question, both with regard to the number of different oversight activities and agencies that we have in the government at the present time and how do we integrate them. But it also raises the question that this Committee has addressed of how we can begin to shift that whole process from a preoccupation with procedure to a focus on performance.

In that regard, the Government Performance and Results Act, which came out of this Committee, it seems to me is both a hopeful step and shows signs of being able to form that integrative mechanism to get the whole government process and these various investigative units focused on the question of what is it that the government should do and is it doing it.

Chairman ROTH. Well, as the author of the performance and results legislation, I, of course, strongly agree with what you are saying. And I am also concerned about the point made in the panel's studies where we zero in and find situations of fraud or abuse which are outrageous but don't do much to improve management. In fact, I think the opposite happens.

Would you agree that part of the problem is every time we unfold one of these or disclose one of these frauds or abuses and begin to write new rules and regulations, that creates part of the bureaucracy and part of the problem of ineffectiveness?

Mr. CAMPBELL. I don't think there is any question about it. I can't say that the panel devoted a lot of attention to that, but let me say that I feel confident in saying that there is a concern that when GAO is used essentially to find what are examples of inefficient, ineffective, or even fraudulent activity, and that then becomes a matter of considerable media attention, the result is to add new layers of oversight. And in the process of applying those new levels of oversight, you end up with internal processes within the executive agency which add to the inefficiency of the operation.

I don't know what the answer is to that problem, but I think you have described what I believe is a very major issue.

Chairman ROTH. My final question in this round: In your testimony, you recommend that GAO clearly state the cost of fulfilling a report request to the Member of Congress or congressional Committee asking for the report. Should this estimate include the job design cost, which currently averages $138,000?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. I don't know about the $138,000 figure. We didn't look at that. But I would say that all the costs should be included in the TORS as a way of getting at the question of what is this project going to cost; and then having done that, ask is it really worth doing it.

Chairman ROTH. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Campbell, you stated that an immediate and significant additional reduction in GAO resources could adversely impact the organization's ability to carry out its statutory mission and respond to congressional requests for GAO's services. I think from what you said a little while ago, you would think that a 25-percent cut would be considered immediate and significant from your standpoint.

Mr. CAMPBELL. It would certainly be significant, and I understand that it is being contemplated to be done immediately.

Senator GLENN. Well, I think you probably have gone through the GAO plan for downsizing, which they say they can do by 1997. Do you see any advantage to cutting now? Or what is the disadvantage to cutting now as opposed to letting them go on their planned reduction out to 1997?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Again, the panel did not devote itself to this issue; therefore, I think what I am saying would be consistent with the panel's point of view, but it is done by extension of their attitudes in other areas.

There is no question that a 25-percent cut is going to have an impact on what GAO can do; therefore, it needs to be carefully examined. It is quite possible that that cut could be made in a way which would not undermine their core competence. I do think it is

important that it be looked at in relation to how can we do that over time, which would make it possible for us to take into account what would be the impact of it in relation to activities that could no longer be continued.

Senator GLENN. I would note, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that more than 80 percent of the requests for GAO studies or investigations of different things have come from the Republican side of the House, which is natural. They have the leadership now. I think to cut back 25 percent, I would tell my Republican colleagues, is only going to limit your own ability to do the job here on the Committee.

Chairman ROTH. Maybe we should change our minds now. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. Take that back to the Republican Conference. I think that would be a good step to say you are limiting yourself on what you can do with investigations right now by this 25-percent proposal.

Now, there are some people who are, perhaps, running for other offices, who have been quoted in the paper as saying that they think GAO should be cut 50 percent. I presume that would be absolutely devastating, as you see it, in terms of GAO's ability to carry out its job.

Mr. CAMPBELL. It would change their role.

Senator GLENN. It sure would. Would it eliminate most of the functions they do now? What could they do on a 50-percent budget cut right now this year? That has been proposed by some people. Mr. CAMPBELL. You see, one of the reasons I have difficulty with responding as firmly as I would like to is that it would be possible to develop a program (in terms of things that could be usefully done) that would double the size of GAO, and they would still not be able to do everything some would believe needs doing. On the other hand, that doesn't mean that all of it would be as important as some parts would be.

What is required here is judgment, and that can only be done on the basis of looking internally. I know that GAO is doing this in relation to their own internal processes, and I am sure they will be frank with the Committee as to what it will mean in terms of substance if they are cut by whatever percent.

Senator GLENN. You stated that requests for GAO work, for the purpose of creating scenarios for Committee hearings, that are critical of agencies without comprehensive review of comparative costs and benefits of alternatives often do not contribute to constructive improvements in government process or outcomes.

Now, that is a nice paragraph, basically addressing the "gotcha" hearings, as we refer to them.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. That is what it is supposed to do.

Senator GLENN. That is what it was supposed to do. Would you expand on that a little bit? Because I think that most of the time when GAO does not go back to an agency and get their comments and everything on a report, it is usually at the request of the requester of the report. I may have been guilty of that myself, and I don't think that is a good practice. I think we ought to eliminate that. I think we should have as complete a picture in these reports as possible, although maybe I may have been a violator.

Could you address that a little bit?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. Certainly, there was a very strong opinion in the panel that: First, executive agencies should have the opportunity to comment on what is being said in the audit because it is quite possible that there has been a lack of understanding between the auditor and the agency being audited. To deny the agency the opportunity to do that creates a hostile environment that I don't think serves the interest of effective auditing.

Second, the controlling of the timing of the release, which frequently is done at the request of a committee or a committee chair, relates to the desire to embarrass the executive agency, and the panel doesn't think that is what audit is all about.

Senator GLENN. I certainly agree with that.

There have been some recent proposals under consideration here in Congress which would subject GAO to periodic reauthorization and also reduce the term of the Comptroller General. Proponents of these ideas say it will enhance congressional oversight of GAO and increase accountability.

Now, ironically, these ideas have come from those who have said that GAO is subject to partisan and political pressure. I have not favored these proposals. I think the long-term approach, the long term of the CG, the fact that he is almost considered like a judge and is treated that way in pay and retirement and everything else, is supposed to give him an independence and a stability that wouldn't come up for debate every few years.

What is your comment on that?

Mr. CAMPBELL. The panel specifically looked at that question. In my opening comments, I made the point that we were unanimously agreed on everything except one point, and that is the point on which there was not unanimous agreement. The overwhelming majority did not feel that there should be regular reauthorization; instead they felt that the oversight committees should engage in continual oversight as opposed to establishing a reauthorization process, because of the potential for that to lead to politicization.

However, there were a couple members of the panel who did not agree with that position, and in fairness, I need to make that statement. But the majority did strongly oppose a periodic reauthorization process.

Senator GLENN. You brought up another issue a little while ago here or touched on it, and I was pleased to note your report found no evidence of any partisan or political bias on the part of GAO, which has been charged by some people in the Congress. While you do raise concerns over GAO's involvement in policy issues, you also recognize that program evaluations can sometimes lead into matters of policy.

I think analysis and audits and determining why things were done-I don't see, really, how you can isolate those things completely from auditing and evaluation. Now, I agree that GAO should not just set out to take a position on a policy matter, per se, by itself, and I agree with you completely on that. At the same time, I think it is very difficult to keep GAO as completely separated from policy as we might like.

Do you have any thoughts on how they can do that?

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