State of Minnesota and the Immigration Land Company, wherein the Commissioner held:

"These tracts of land are within the second indemnity limits of the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad (now Railway) Company, under act of July 2, 1864 (13 Stat., 365), as amended by Joint Resolution of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat., 378). On October 15, 1883, said railway company selected all of the above described tracts of land per list No. 12, Crookston, rearranged list No. 12 filed April 19, 1893. The bases given in support of the selections covered by such rearranged list were lands claimed to have been excepted from the company's grant of July 2, 1864, supra, by reason of the reservation subsisting at the date thereof on account of the grant made by the act of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat., 64), to aid in the construction of the Lake Superior and Mississippi Railroad.

"Said list of selections No. 12 was canceled as to these and other tracts of land by letter 'F' of March 20, 1907, upon authority of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Northern Lumber Company v. O'Brien (204 U. S. 190), but the cancellation was suspended by the order of the Secretary of the Interior on April 1, 1907, and remained in that status until October 30, 1909, when said list of selections No. 12 was canceled as to these and other tracts of land.

"The lands above described, with others were sold and conveyed by the Northern Pacific Railway Company by warranty deed for a valuable consideration, January 14, 1891, to Frederick Weyerhauser, Peter Musser and M. G. Norton, whose title was afterwards conveyed by certain mesne conveyances to the applicant Immigration Land Company as set forth in its application to purchase dated February 2, 1907, and filed in your office February 9, 1907.” Of the issues involved the Commissioner said:

"The attorneys on behalf of the State of Minnesota

Opinion of the Court.

247 U.S.

contend that the lands herein involved, which are situated within the limits of the Itasca State Park, were granted to the State by act of August 3, 1892 (27 Stat., 347), and it is urged on the part of the State that the grant took effect immediately, the lands being 'undisposed of' on that date, and that the claim asserted by the Immigration Land Company does not have the dignity of the 'vested right' protected in Sec. 2 of said act.

"On behalf of the Immigration Land Company it is contended that these lands were segregated from the mass of public lands by Crookston indemnity list of selections No. 12, made October 15, 1883, which was not canceled from the records until October 30, 1909; that the sale of the lands covered by cash entry No. 05008, in the name of the Immigration Land Company, by said railway company on January 14, 1891, was bona fide and for a valuable consideration, and it is urged that the Immigration Land Company should have its purchase of said lands protected under Sec. 5 of the act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat., 556), and receive patent therefor; the attorneys for the Land Company contending that the lands involved were not 'undisposed of lands' on August 3, 1892, the date of the grant to the State."

After an opinion, in which the issues were considered, the Commissioner reached the conclusion:

'Accordingly, it is held that under Sec. 5 of the act of March 3, 1887, the rights of the Immigration Land Company under the facts and laws above cited are superior to the claim of the State under the act of August 3, 1892, that cash entry 05008 by said Immigration Land Company should remain intact.

"The protest of the State is hereby dismissed subject to the usual right of appeal within thirty days after notice to the Secretary of the Interior."

The decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior, and

a rehearing denied. State of Minnesota v. Immigration Land Co., 46 L. D. 14.

The purpose of the bill filed in this case is to quiet title to the lands in controversy by a decree in favor of the State of Minnesota notwithstanding the decision of the Secretary of the Interior, and to enjoin that officer from issuing patents for the lands to the Immigration Land Company.

We are of opinion that the State has mistaken its remedy, and if it be true that the Secretary has made a mistake in overruling the contention of the State that the title passed to it under the Act of August 3, 1892, relief must be sought in the courts after the issuance of patent.

The grant to the State of August 3, 1892, was of all undisposed of lands in certain townships, and § 2 specifically provided that it should not interfere with, supersede, suspend, modify or annul the vested rights of any person, company, or corporation in respect to any of said lands existing at the date of the passage of the act. The Act of March 3, 1887, permitting bona fide purchasers of certain lands, in the manner which we have stated, to make payment and acquire title to the lands excepted from the operation of the railroad grant, was then in full force. A part of these lands had been purchased before the act granting them to the State, by the predecessors of the Immigration Land Company, and the Secretary of the Interior held that the title thus acquired was superior to that of the State, and, in accordance with the decision of the Secretary, patents were about to be issued to it as a bona fide purchaser. This decision is not of an arbitrary character, and was made upon full hearing before the department of the Government entrusted with the administration of the public land laws, and the patents were still unissued when this suit was brought.

This is not a case where the title had passed absolutely in favor of the claimant, as was the fact in Lane v. Watts,

234 U. S. 525; 235 U. S. 17. It is a case where the grant was in terms of "undisposed-of lands," and subject to the vested rights of others. As against those holding such lands the title was not intended to pass.

The Act of 1887, under which the Immigration Land Company claims title, specifically provides that patents shall be issued for lands to which the purchaser is entitled. The patents not having issued, the lands in controversy were still in course of administration in that department of the Government which, until patent issues, has exclusive control of proceedings to acquire the title.

As we have said, the remedy must be sought in the courts after the issuance of patent. Under such circumstances as are here disclosed this court has uniformly so held. Litchfield v. The Register, 9 Wall. 575, 577; Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, 592, 593; Brown v. Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473; Kirwan v. Murphy, 189 U. S. 35; Lane v. Mickadiet, 241 U. S. 201, 208, 209. It follows that the bill of the State must be dismissed, and it is so ordered.

Dismissed.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Syllabus.

HAMMER, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, v. DAGENHART ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA.

No. 704. Argued April 15, 16, 1918.-Decided June 3, 1918.

The Act of September 1, 1916, c. 432, 39 Stat. 675, prohibits transportation in interstate commerce of goods made at a factory in which, within thirty days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the age of 14 years have been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of 14 and 16 years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 P. M. or before the hour of 6 A. M. Held, unconstitutional as exceeding the commerce power of Congress and invading the powers reserved to the States. The power to regulate interstate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which the commerce is to be governed; in other words, to control the means by which it is carried on.

The court has never sustained a right to exclude save in cases where the character of the particular things excluded was such as to bring them peculiarly within the governmental authority of the State or Nation and render their exclusion, in effect, but a regulation of interstate transportation, necessary to prevent the accomplishment, through that means of the evils inherent in them.

The manufacture of goods is not commerce, nor do the facts that they are intended for, and are afterwards shipped in, interstate commerce make their production a part of that commerce subject to the control of Congress.

The power to regulate interstate commerce was not intended as a means of enabling Congress to equalize the economic conditions in the States for the prevention of unfair competition among them, by forbidding the interstate transportation of goods made under conditions which Congress deems productive of unfairness.

It was not intended as an authority to Congress to control the States in the exercise of their police power over local trade and manufacture, always existing and expressly reserved to them by the Tenth Amend

ment.

Affirmed.