Opinion of the Court.

247 U.S.

22, 1874. The plaintiff derived its title from these heirs under deeds executed in 1914.

A plausible argument can be made that the working of the Act of 1870 and other pertinent facts and statutes which we do not recite was to give to the land warrant the validity and effect that it would have had if lawfully executed in General Houston's life. But as that is not the ground upon which the writ of certiorari was asked or granted we confine our discussion to the matter relied upon in asking the intervention of this Court. Hubbard v. Tod, 171 U. S. 474, 494. The defendants alleged that if the deeds did not give them a good title, still they had held peaceable and adverse possession of the land, using and enjoying the same, paying taxes thereon, and claiming under deeds duly registered, for more than five years, and therefore that this suit was too late under Rev. Stats. Texas, Art. 5674. They contended that the fact appeared as matter of law, and also that at least the jury might find for them and sufficiently saved the question as against the view taken by the Court below.

There was evidence that the land in question was part of a large pasture fenced on the north along the Chiltipin Creek and on the east and west by fences running from the creek to deep water in Nueces Bay. There was evidence also that the defendants or their predecessors had paid the taxes, had pastured their cattle there, and excluded those of others, and that they claimed under duly registered deeds. The ground on which the Court ruled as it did and refused requests of the petitioners was stated by it to be that the water front on Nueces Bay was not "such a barrier as would put in motion the statutes of limitation." This ruling was in deference to Hyde v. McFaddin, 140 Fed. Rep. 433, (442). But that case was decided on peculiar circumstances, and we do not think an extensive citation from the Texas decisions necessary to show that when the other elements of ad

verse occupation are present, deep water upon one side of a parallelogram is as good a barrier as a fence. Evidently that is the law in Texas as well as elsewhere, and an enclosure by fences and the Nueces River has been said to sustain the defence of the statute as well as fences all around. Dunn v. Taylor, 107 S. W. Rep. 952, 956; 102 Texas, 80, 87. The arguments of the respondent on this point at the most do no more than offer considerations of fact that possibly it might be entitled to present to the jury when the case next is tried.

Judgment reversed.

STATE OF MINNESOTA v. LANE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.

IN EQUITY.

No. 20. Original. Motion to dismiss. Argued April 15, 1918.-Decided June 3, 1918.

An act of Congress granted the "undisposed of" lands in certain sections to a State, saving "vested rights" of others existing at its date. Part of the described tracts, here in question, within the indemnity limits of the Northern Pacific, had previously been selected by that railroad and by it sold to purchasers in good faith. After the date of the act, the selections were canceled as being founded on improper bases, but the Land Department, upon fully hearing the State, allowed an application of the purchasers' assignee, made meanwhile, to purchase the lands in question from the United States, and secure patents therefor, under the Adjustment Act of March 3, 1887. Held, that the decision was not arbitrary, and that a suit against the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office, brought by the State before the patents issued, to enjoin their issuance and to quiet its title, would not lie. Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, distinguished.

Dismissed.

Opinion of the Court.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

247 U. S.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Kearful, for defendants, in support of the motion.

Mr. Charles R. Pierce, with whom Mr. Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, and Mr. Clifford L. Hilton, Deputy Attorney General of the State of Minnesota, were on the brief, for complainant, in opposition to the motion.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This bill of complaint is filed by the State of Minnesota to quiet title to certain lands in that State, and to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office from issuing patents for the lands to the Immigration Land Company, a corporation of the State of Minnesota. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the bill upon the following grounds:

"1. The court is without jurisdiction to entertain this suit because it is in substance and effect against the United States, which has not consented to be sued or waived its immunity from suit.

"2. There is a defect of parties defendant which can not be cured without depriving the court of jurisdiction.

"3. The relief prayed for would be an invasion of the lawful jurisdiction of the defendants as officers of the Land Department.

"4. The bill of complaint does not state facts sufficient to entitle the State of Minnesota to any relief."

From the allegations of the bill it appears that the State claims title to the lands under the Act of August 3, 1892, 27 Stat. 347.1

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all undisposed lands of

The Immigration Land Company claims title under § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 556,1 relat

the United States situated in the following subdivisions, according to the public surveys thereof, to-wit: Section six of township one hundred and forty-two; sections six, seven, eighteen, nineteen, thirty, and thirtyone of township one hundred and forty-three, all in range thirty-five; sections one, two, three, and four of township one hundred and fortytwo, and sections one, two, three, four, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, twenty-one, twenty-two, twentythree, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty-seven, twentyeight, thirty-three, thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six, of township one hundred and forty-three, all in range thirty-six, situate in the district of lands subject to sale at Saint Cloud and Crookston, Minnesota, is hereby forever granted to the State of Minnesota, to be perpetually used by said State as and for a public State park: Provided, That the land hereby granted shall revert to the United States, together with all improvements thereon, if at any time it shall cease to be exclusively used for a public State park; or if the State shall not pass a law or laws to protect the timber thereon.

Sec. 2. That this act shall not in any manner whatsoever interfere with, supersede, suspend, modify, or annul the vested rights of any person, company, or corporation in respect to any of said lands existing at the date of the passage of this act.

1 That where any said company shall have sold to citizens of the United States, or to any persons who have declared their intention to become such citizens, as a part of its grant, lands not conveyed to or for the use of such company, said lands being the numbered sections prescribed in the grant, and being coterminous with the constructed parts of said road, and where the lands so sold are for any reason excepted from the operation of the grant to said company, it shall be lawful for the bona fide purchaser thereof from said company to make payment to the United States for said lands at the ordinary Government price for like lands, and thereupon patents shall issue therefor to the said bona fide purchaser, his heirs or assigns: Provided, That all lands shall be excepted from the provisions of this section which at the date of such sales were in the bona fide occupation of adverse claimants under the pre-emption or homestead laws of the United States, and whose claims and occupation have not since been voluntarily abandoned, as to which excepted lands the said pre-emption and homestead claimants shall be permitted to perfect their proofs and entries and receive patents therefor: Provided further, That this section

Opinion of the Court.

247 U.S.

ing to the adjustment of land grants to railroad companies.

The last-named statute provides that where the railroad company shall have sold to citizens of the United States as a part of its grant, lands not conveyed to or for the use of the company, said lands being the numbered sections prescribed in the grant, and being coterminous with the constructed parts of the road, and where the lands so sold are for any reason excepted from the operation of the grant, it shall be lawful for a bona fide purchaser thereof from said company, to make payment to the United States for the lands at the ordinary government price for like lands, and thereupon patents shall issue to the bona fide purchaser, his heirs or assigns.

Under this act, on February 9, 1907, the Land Company made application in the Land Department to purchase the land, claiming to be the assignee of a bona fide purchaser of the lands from the railroad company. The State of Minnesota protested against the issuance of a patent to the Immigration Land Company, and claimed the land under the Act of August 3, 1892, under which undisposedof lands of the United States, situated in certain sections and townships, were granted to the State for a public park. The Act of 1892 also provides that it shall not in any manner interfere with, supersede, suspend, modify or annul the vested right of any person, company, or corporation in respect to any of the land existing at the date of the passage of the act.

A hearing was had before the Commissioner of the General Land Office upon the issue made between the

shall not apply to lands settled upon subsequent to the first day of December, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, by persons claiming to enter the same under the settlement laws of the United States, as to which lands the parties claiming the same as aforesaid shall be entitled to prove up and enter as in other like cases.