25. Under Code N. C. § 1826, providing that
"no woman, during her coverture, shall be capa- 33. Though Code N. C. § 178, provides that when
ble of making any contract to affect her real or a married woman brings an action her husband
personal estate, except for her necessary personal must be joined, except when the action concerns
expenses, or for the support of the family, or such her separate property, or is between herself and
as may be necessary in order to pay her debts ex- her husband, an action by the wife should not be
isting before marriage, without the written con-
dismissed for failure of the husband to join, where
sent of her husband, unless she be a free trader, it appears that he is hostile to plaintiff's rights,
as hereinafter allowed, a married woman cannot and she may be entitled to redress as against him.
make a contract binding herself personally.-Far--Barnes v. Barnes, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 304.
thing v. Shields, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 998.

Against mortgage sale.

4. A mortgage sale will not be enjoined be-
cause of want of legal authority in defendant to
sell, as, if she has no power to sell, the sale will be
a nullity. Chapman v. Younger, (S. C.) 10 S. E.
1077.

Against action at law.

5. It is no abuse of the discretion of the court
to grant an injunction against an action of eject-
ment, upon the petition of one who alleges that she
has a vested remainder in the land in dispute, aft-
er the life-estate of defendant in ejectment; that
the latter has acknowledged service in the eject-
ment suit, but has concealed the pendency of the
suit from petitioner; and that petitioner believes
that a fraudulent conspiracy exists between the
parties in ejectment to suffer plaintiffs to recover,
and to allow them to buy the land at a sale for cer-
tain taxes which have never been paid, although
the tenant enjoys a large income from the land, in
order to interpose a tax-title to defeat petitioner's
rights.-Kendy v. Beatty, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 267.
Against interference with water supply.
6. Equity has jurisdiction to restrain an un-
lawful interference with the water supply of the
depot of a railroad company, whereby the latter is
obliged, either to provide water for drinking and
other purposes, at heavy and continual expense and
inconvenience, or to have its water-closets closed
or used without water, at the risk of becoming a
nuisance, as this is an irreparable damage, for
which there is no adequate remedy at law. -Diffen-
dal v. Virginia M. Ry. Co., (Va.) 10 S. E. 536.
To restrain construction of street rail-
way.

ognized the porter as the same one who on a for-
mer occasion had performed similar services for
him, but did not know that the wagon which
brought the baggage was run by another per-
son than the hotel proprietor, and when he
paid his fare on the former occasion supposed it
was to the hotel. The omnibus and wagon were
the usual mode of conveyance from the depot to
the hotel by agreement of the owner thereof with
the hotel proprietor, and one of the omnibuses
bore the hotel's name. The baggage was lost aft-
er it had been delivered by the railroad company
to the holder of the check. Held, that the hotel
proprietor was liable therefor, although the porter
was not authorized to receive baggage or checks
therefor from guests at the depot, but merely to
advertise and solicit patronage for the hotel.--
Coskery v. Nagle, (Ga.) 10 S. Ě. 491.

2. Plaintiff's failure to inform the porter that
his valise contained valuable clothing and jewelry
was not negligence.-Coskery v. Nagle, (Ga.) 10
S. E. 491.

INSANITY.

As a defense, see Homicide, 20-27.
Evidence.

Evidence as to a person's sanity or insan-
ity at the time of trial is competent to show the
condition of his mind at a previous period, when
some act was done by him which depends for its
validity on his mental capacity; its competency
Berry v. Hall, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 903.
not being affected by the mere lapse of time.-

Insolvency.

See Assignment for Benefit of Creditors; Bank-
ruptcy.

7. An injunction against the construction of a
street railway should be dissolved where the com-
pany gives a sufficient bond, conditioned to pay
all damages that might be recovered or assessed
in favor of plaintiff, none of his property being See Trial, 9-17.
sought to be taken, and the conflicting evidence
making it doubtful that it would be damaged.-
Fouche v. Rome St. R. Co., (Ga.) 10 S. E. 726.
Procedure.

8. Code N. C. § 340, provides that an injunction
shall not be allowed after defendant has answered,
unless on notice, or on an order to show cause,
etc. Held, that where a motion for an injunction
is made in term-time, and defendant is in court, and
actually appears by counsel and resists the mo-
tion, she will be deemed to have taken actual notice
thereof and to have waived formal notice.-Hemp-
hill v. Moore, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 313.
Appeal-Reversal.

9. A decree continuing an injunction restrain-
ing railroad companies from building a track along
a certain strip of land until the hearing will not
be reversed on appeal by defendants, where they
have built their track, as originally intended, on
another strip claimed by plaintiff, but on which
the court finds defendants are not trespassers.-
Town of Durham v. Richmond & D. R. Co., (N. C.)

10 S. E. 208.

Instructions.

INSURANCE.

Insurable interest.

1. One who hires a barge of another to use for
his own profit, and has it in his actual custody
and control, has an insurable interest therein.-
Murdock v. Franklin Ins. Co., (W. Va.) 10 S. E.

777.

Assignment of policy.

2. In an action by the administrator against
the assignee of a life insurance policy, it appeared
that the insured gave his note to the insurance
agents for the first premium, which note was dis-
counted by the assignee, he taking the policy as
collateral security; that, the note not being paid,
the assignee drew up an absolute assignment, au-
thorizing him to collect the policy, "provided that
in the mean time this assignment and power be
not canceled and annulled, "but this was never ex-
ecuted by the insured; that afterwards the as-
signee wrote the insured a letter, claiming that
the original agreement was that, "as long as I paid
the premium, the policy was to be mine, and you
were to assign it to me;" that, after paying sev-

10. Neither will it be reversed, on appeal by
plaintiff, as to the strip not covered by the injunc-eral of the premiums, the assignee procured an as-
tion, where the evidence as to plaintiff's rights as
to such strip is conflicting.-Town of Durham v.
Richmond & D. R. Co., (Ga.) 10 S. E. 208.

INNKEEPERS.

Liability for loss of baggage.

1. At a certain depot plaintiff was directed to
an omnibus which was to carry him to defend
ant's hotel, by a porter who cried out the name of
the hotel and wore it on his cap. Plaintiff deliv-
ered the check for his baggage to the porter, and
told him that he was anxious to have it promptly, to
which the porter replied that it would come right
along in another wagon. In plaintiff's presence
the porter then gave the check to another man,
who, plaintiff testified, he "did not know was any
other than an uttuché of the hotel." Plaintiff rec-

signment absolute on its face; and that on the death
of the insured he had collected the policy. Held,
that the assignment was merely to secure the
amount of the premiums paid.-Roller v. Moore's
Adm'r, (Va.) 10 S. E. 241.

3. The assignee could retain no more of the
proceeds than the amount of premiums paid by
him, even had the assignment been absolute, be-
cause a creditor has no greater insurable interest
in the life of the insured than his actual indebted-
ness.-Roller v. Moore's Adm'r, (Va.) 10 S. E. 241.
Conditions of policy-Arbitration.

4. The rejection by assured of an offer by the
insurance company of a certain amount in settle-
ment of damages to the insured property consti-
tutes a "difference" between the parties, within
the meaning of a condition in the policy that ev-
ery "difference" as to the amount of loss or dam-

age shall be submitted to arbitration before action | made; in which case it may be 8 per cent.-Trim-
is brought.-Pioneer Manuf'g Co. v. Phoenix Assur. ble v. Hunter, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 291.
Co., (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1057.

Evidence.

7. Plaintiff admitted that defendant's agent,
at an interview, submitted two propositions to
arbitrate, one on a printed form; but his evi
dence showed that thereafter the agent denied de-
fendant's liability. Held, that evidence was ad-
missible for defendant that plaintiff "refused to
sign the printed form of submission, stating to
witness, as a reason, that it contained a provision
that the appraisers should not decide the liability
of the company," for the purpose of showing why
the alleged denial of liability was made.-Pioneer
Manuf'g Co. v. Phoenix Assur. Co., (N. C.) 10 S.

E. 1057.

Instructions.

2. A bond, conditioned for payment in annual
installments, and, "if there should happen to be
with interest after that day at the rate of one and
any delay in either of the payments thereof, then
one-half cents per month on each dollar," bears
interest at the rate of 18 per cent. on each install-
lis v. Sanders, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 824.
ment from its maturity until payment in full—El-

On allowance in lieu of dower.

3. Where the mode adopted by decree of ascer-
taining the amount of money which a widow is
according to life and annuity tables the value for
to have absolutely in lieu of dower is by computing
her life of one-third of the proceeds realized by a
sale of the husband's realty, the amount thus ar-
rived at is not to be augmented by the addition of
interest thereon from the husband's death, or from
any other period, if the decree is silent as to in-
terest.-Johnson v. Moon, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 193.
Running of interest.

ey, the sum named therein became due on the pres-
4. Where, by an order for the payment of mon-
entation of the order to the drawee, the payee was
entitled to interest from that time.-Brem v. Cov-
ington, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 706.

is no fraud or misconduct by the party receiving
5. Where money is paid by mistake, and there
it, interest does not run until after demand. Prior
to demand, by suit or otherwise, the receiver is in
no default.-Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v.
Smith, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 235.

Law governing.

6. The law in force at the time of the render-
ing of a verdict governs as to the interest to be al-
lowed upon the sum found by the verdict, and not
the law in force at the time of the rendition of the
judgment, it not clearly appearing that the later
dock v. Franklin Ins. Co., (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 777.
law is intended to operate retrospectively.-Mur-

Intervention.

8. The policy provided that each party should
select an arbitrator, and that the award should be
"binding and conclusive as to the amount of such
loss or damage, but shall not decide the liability
of said insurance company," and that the submis-
sion should be "at the written request of either
party. Defendant insurance company submitted
a proposition conforming to the provisions of the
policy, and also, by letter, formally requested an
arbitration, referring to "a paper indicating an
agreement for that purpose, "executed by the
company, and which it requested plaintiff to
sign. Held, that an instruction that, if the let of parties, see Attachment, 4, 5.
ter was accompanied by the proposition, this con-
stituted a written request, within the meaning of
the policy, was erroneous, as being to the effect
that neither the letter nor proposition, taken sep-
arately, was sufficient; and the error was not cured
by a subsequent reference to the proposition as the
"request in writing. "-Pioneer Manuf'g Co. v.
Phoenix Assur. Co., (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1057.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Constitutionality of acts.

which provides that no person, without a state
1. That portion of Code W. Va. 1887, c. 32, § 1,
license therefor, shall "keep in his possession, for
tional and void.-State v. Gilman, (W. Va.) 10 S.
another, spirituous liquors," etc., is unconstitu-
E. 283.

9. It appeared that plaintiff had said that he
would sign no agreement containing the provision
objected to. Held, that it was error to refuse an
instruction that if defendant's agent did not deny vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors in the
2. "An act to prohibit the sale of spirituous,
liability until after plaintiff refused to sign a sub-county of Douglas, and to provide a penalty for
mission to arbitration, unless the clause providing the violation of the same," is not rendered uncon-
that the appraisers should not decide defendant's stitutional, as containing matter different from
liability were stricken out, such denial was no that expressed in the title, by the usual provisions
waiver of plaintiff's obligation to submit to arbi- as to submitting it to the people of the county, etc.,
tration.-Pioneer Manuf'g Co. v. Phoenix Assur. as they declare the manner of the prohibition. -Mc-
Co., (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1057.
Gruder v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 281.
Local option.

Limitation.

10. Under a policy of insurance providing that
proof of loss shall be furnished to the insurance
company within 30 days from the date of the loss,
that all claims shall be barred unless prosecuted
within 6 months from the same date, and that the
loss shall be paid in 60 days after proof of loss, the
6-months limitation begins to run at the close of
the 60 days allowed the company for payment, not
from the actual loss.-Murdock v. Franklin Ins.
Co., (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 777.

Rate.

INTEREST.

3. The general local option law of Georgia, ap-
proved Sept. 18, 1885, has a general repealing
clause, as to all laws in conflict with it, but in sec-
tion 9 expressly provides that no election shall be
held under it "for any county, city, town, or any
other place in this state, where by law the sale of
spirituous liquors is already prohibited either by
high license, local option, or other legislation, so
long as these local laws remain of force." Held,
that section 9 was intended to save from repeal all
local laws passed prior to the passage of the act,
and approved by the governor, whether they had
been adopted by a vote of the people, if so required
therein, or not.-McGruder v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E

281.

Licenses and taxes.

1. In providing by a trust-deed for 8 per cent.
interest on a portion of the debt secured, the inter-
est on the balance was left at 6 per cent., under sec- 4. Act W. Va. Feb. 13, 1871, amending the char-
tion 3835 of the Code, fixing the rate of interest at 6ter of the town of New Martinsville, and providing
per cent. per annum, except a special contract is that no license to sell spirituous liquors within one

mile of said town shall be granted by the board of | Illegal sales-By agent.
supervisors of the county, without the consent of
said town, will not prevent the granting of a license
to sell spirituous liquors at a place within the town
of Brooklyn, with the consent of said town of
Brooklyn, and against the objection of said town of
New Martinsville, though the place at which such
liquors are to be sold be within one mile of the cor-
porate limits of the town of New Martinsville.-
Town of New Martinsville v. Dunlap, (W. Va.) 10
S. E. 803.

11. Code Ga. § 4540a, makes it an offense for
one, by himself or another, to sell or furnish liquors
to a minor without written permission of the par-
ent. The Code makes it a distinct offense where
the liquor is sold by a person other than defendant,
and not by his order or direction, if he permit it to
be done. Held, that an instruction that section
4540a makes all people connected with the sale re-
sponsible whenever a minor is furnished therewith
without written authority, and it matters not
whether the proprietor knew the facts and con-
sented to it, and his offense is complete if the liq-
uor was sold to the minor by any one acting in his
place of business, is incorrect, as the section cov-
ers only sales by a person, through himself or an-
other, and does not cover sales by those in his em-
ploy without his permission.-Johnson v. State,
(Ga.) 10 S. E. 207.

5. Code Ga. § 1419, as amended by Acts 1884-
85, pp. 59, 60, provides that the applicant for a
liquor license shall present to the ordinary, or com-
missioners of the county, the written consent of
the nearest bona fide residents, five of whom shall
be freeholders owning land, irrespective of county
lines, nearest the place of business where such
spirituous liquors are to be sold: provided, that
the act shall not apply to incorporated towns or
cities. Held, that the persons residing nearest the
place where the liquor is to be sold are the persons
who are to give their consent, and it makes no dif-
ference whether they reside in a different county
from that of the applicant's residence, or whether
13. An instruction that, by the terms of the
they reside within an incorporated town or city.-tatute, a sale by a liquor dealer, either by him-
Ballew v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 623.
self or by another for him, is in violation of the
law, is correct-Johnson v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E.
207.

*

*

6. Act N. C. 1887, c. 135, § 31, prescribes that
every one selling liquor shall pay a license tax semi-
annually (1) for selling in quantities of one quart
or less, $40, "to be
* paid to the treasurer
of the county board of education, for the benefit of
the fund for public schools in such county;" (2) for
selling in quantities of one quart and less than five
gallons, $25, to be paid into the same fund; and (3)
for selling in quantities of five gallons or more,
$100, "to be
paid to the treasurer of the
state;" and provides that "counties may levy not
more than as much tax as the state under this sec-
tion. "
Code N. C. § 707, provides that the county
commissioners shall have power to levy, "in like
manner with the state taxes, the necessary taxes
for county purposes, but the taxes so levied shall
never exceed the double of the state taxes." Held,
that the first and second classes of taxes mentioned
in the act of 1887 were not for county but for state
purposes, and the county authorities might impose
a license tax on all persons coming within them.-
Parker v. Wayne County, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 137.
Illegal sales.

7. The delivery of whisky as compensation for
the use of a buggy, in performance of an agree-
ment so to do, is a sale of the whisky.-Paschal v.
State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 821.

8. One who receives money and delivers
whisky therefor may be treated as the seller, no
other person filling that character in the transac-
tion being pointed out by the evidence.-Paschal v.
State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 821.

12. Such instruction is not reversible error
where the evidence shows that the accused was
present when the sale was made by his clerk, as
this is the same as if he himself made the sale.-
Johnson v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 207.

Criminal prosecution—Indictment.

14. Where an indictment against a physician,
under Laws N. C. 1887, c. 215, § 4, for giving false
and fraudulent prescriptions for liquors, is in sev-
eral counts, each of which charges the giving of a
prescription to a different person, the prosecution
may be compelled to elect on which count it will
proceed.-State v. Farmer, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 563.

15. The indictment need not charge that defend.
ant is a "reputable physician. "-State v. Farmer,
(N. C.) 10 S. E. 563.

16. The indictment should set out distinctly, not
only that the prescription was either false or
fraudulent, but in what the falsehood or fraud con-
sisted.-State v. Farmer, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 563.

Instructions.

17. On a trial for the illegal sale of intoxicating
liquors, a charge that if defendant gave the whisky
away, it would be the same as if he had sold it, is
harmless error, where the sale has been proved.-
McGruder v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 281.

Joinder.

Of causes, see Action, 4.

counts, see Indictment and Information, 7.
Judge.

JUDGMENT.

9. In an action before a justice of the peace for See Justices of the Peace.
violation of Code N. C. §§ 2640, 2646, prohibiting
the sale of spirituous liquors at Chapel Hill, or
within four miles thereof, the affidavit set forth
that defendant did, in Chapel Hill township, sell
spirituous liquors to one S., and received compen-
sation therefor at Chapel Hill, or within four miles
thereof, "contrary to law," etc., and the warrant
directed the arrest of defendant "to answer the
above complaint, and be dealt with as the law di-
rects."
Held, that the warrant must be read in
connection with the affidavit, and was sufficient.-
State v. Sykes, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 191.

10. In an action for violation of Code N. C. SS
2640, 2646, prohibiting the sale of spirituous liquors
at Chapel Hill, or within four miles thereof, where
there was evidence that the contract for the sale
of the liquor was made within 4 miles of Chapel
Hill, and that afterwards defendant brought the
liquor from his distillery, 12 miles distant, and de-
livered it within 4 miles of Chapel Hill, there being
no evidence that defendant sold and delivered a
particular gallon, or any quantity, of whisky at the
distillery, the court correctly refused to instruct
the jury that, unless the contract for the delivery
of whisky was relative to a particular gallon then
set apart at defendant's distillery, there was no
sale within Chapel Hill.-State v. Sykes, (N. C.)
10 S. E. 191.

Actions on, see Limitation of Actions, 4, 5.
In criminal cases, see Criminal Law, 54-57.
By default-Practice.

1. Where defendant in assumpsit has filed no
plea, and no issue has been joined, the only ques-
tion is the quantum of damages, and that only
after an office judgment and an order for inquiry
of damages, and it is error to try the case as if
issue had been joined, and allow defendant to
cross-examine and to demur to the evidence.-Petty
v. Frick Co., (Va.) 10 S. E. 886.

2. Such error is not cured by the statute of
jeofails, for that statute cures misjoinder or in
formal joinder of issue, but not non-joinder or
want of issue altogether.-Petty v. Frick Co., (Va.)
10 S. E. 886.

Validity.

3. Where the original process, and the return
thereon, show that a defendant was not included
in either, a judgment against her is void, as the
presumption of jurisdiction is overcome.-Blanton
v. Carroll, (Va.) 10 S. E. 329.