Bonds.

3. The liability of a surety in an administrator's
bond is not discharged by the appointment of his
co-surety as administrator de bonis non before any
default on the part of the administrator has been
established, as in that case the liability of the co-
surety in the administrator's bond is not a debt
owing to himself as administrator de bonis non,
which is regarded as paid by operation of law.-
Chick v. Farr, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 176.

4. An administrator's bond is liable for inter-
est on balances as they become due. but not for in-
terest on the aggregate sum of principal and interest
found due on any former accounting.-Chick v.
Farr. (S. C.) 10 S. E. 176.

5. Where it appears, in an action on an admin-
istrator's bond based on a judgment against the
administrator, that the judgment was entered
against the administrator personally, and the exe-
cution issued thereon is de bonis propriis, a non-
suit will be granted.-Ramsey v. Cole, (Ga.) 10 S.

E. 598.

Powers and duties.

6. Where an intestate has acquired the equi-
table title to land charged with the balance due on
an incumbrance, his administrator may pay off and
discharge the lien, under the discretionary powers
given him by Code N. C. § 1415, providing that
nothing in the chapter relating to executors, etc.,
shall be construed to affect the discretionary pow-
ers, trusts, and authorities of an executor or other
trustee, etc., provided creditors are not delayed
thereby, nor the order changed in which by law
they are entitled to be paid.-Pate y. Oliver, (N.
C.) 10 S. E. 709.

7. When an intestate has shown by his con-
duct an intention to complete his title to land which
he has purchased subject to incumbrance, having
purchased all the legal and equitable interests
outstanding, and having on his own motion ob-
tained a decree, making him in effect the equitable
owner of the land, charging him with the amount
of the incumbrance, and adjudging that he pay it
into court, such judgment becomes a debt which
on his death may be discharged by his administra
tor out of his personal estate.-Pate v. Oliver, (N.
C.) 10 S. E. 709.

Administrator de bonis non.

S. When there is a decree in the circuit court
against an administrator for money to be paid out
of the assets in his hands to be administered, and
the administrator then dies, the administrator de
bonis non, and not the administrator of the de-
ceased administrator, is the proper party to appeal
from such decree; and it is not necessary for him
to make himself a formal party to the record by an
order of the circuit court before petitioning for
such appeal.-Miller v. Neff's Adm'r, (W. Va.) 10

S. E. 378.

9. Powers conferred on an executor to continue
testator's business so long as profitable, in his
judgment, and to pay out of the profits such
amount as should be necessary for the support of
testator's widow and children, are personal to
the executor; and on his death they do not vest
in the administrator c. t. a., though Code N. C. §
2168, provides that an administrator c. t. a. "has
all the rights and powers, and is subject to the
same duties, as if he had been named executor
in the will."-Creech v. Grainger, (N. C.) 10 S.

E. 1032.

10. Under Code N. C. § 1493, which expressly
provides that a power to sell land conferred on
the executor by the will shall pass to the admin-
istrator c. t. a., and section 2168, which confers
on the administrator c. t. a., "all the rights and
powers" given the executor by the will, the ad-
ministrator c. t. a. may exercise the general pow
ers of an executor in settling the estate, including
that of selling testator's land.-Creech v. Grain-
ger, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1032.

11. A bequest of $6,000 in trust to an execu-
tor, to be invested in United States bonds, or de-
posited in "some safe bank of this state, as in his
judgment he may think best," the interest to be
applied to the education of testator's children,
v.10s. E.-72

passes to the administrator c. t. a., as the discre-
tion vested in the executor is only as to the man-
ner of safe-keeping,-an incidental matter, that
does not extinguish the trust at his death.-Creech
V. Grainger, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1032.
Presentment of claims.

12. Where the personal property of decedent
was used for the support of the widow and heirs,
they cannot set up laches on the part of the cred-
itors in permitting it to be wasted.-Scott v. Ash-
lin, (Va.) 10 S. E. 751.

13. Under Code Va. 1873, c. 127, § 3, which makes
all the land of a decedent in the hands of his heirs
assets for the payment of his debts in the order in
which the personalty is applied, the creditors of a
decedent are not barred by laches from enforcing
their claims against the land, where it appears
that the principal debtor, for whom decedent was
surety, survived him several years; that within
two years after decedent's death his widow, as
administratrix and guardian, filed her bill setting
forth such claims, and praying that part of the
land be sold, and the proceeds reinvested for the
children, and her dower assigned; that five years
after decedent's death the creditors recovered judg
ments, and promptly asserted their claims, in the
suit brought by the widow, and were partly paid
out of the proceeds of the sale of the land; and
that, after its resale and purchase by the widow,
they never ceased to demand payment.-Scott v.
Ashlin, (Va.) 10 S. E. 751.

Settlement and accounting.

14. Where a will gives to the executors a naked
power to sell real estate, neither the title nor the
right to the possession passes to the executors,
and they are not chargeable for the failure to
rent the same until the sale can be made.-Dunn's
Ex'rs v. Renick, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 810.

15. If the heirs permit real estate to be returned
delinquent for the non-payment of taxes, and the
executors pay said taxes to prevent the loss of the
land, they will be entitled, as against the residuary
legatees, to credit for the taxes so pa d, whether
or not the executors, having a naked power to sell,
were under a duty to pay such taxes.-Dunn's
Ex'rs v. Renick, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 810.

16. Where a testator directs his executors to
sell a certain farm, and out of the proceeds to pay,
first, the debts of one of his sons on which another
of his sons is surety, the executors cannot pay any
such debt which before payment becomes barred
by the statute of limitations, when the statute is
relied on by the debtors.-Dunn's Ex'rs v. Renick,
(W. Va.) 10 S. E. 810.

17. Defendant's intestate died in possession of
vendor took possession without objection from
a saw-mill which he had not fully paid for, and the
defendant, before the last payment on it was due,
and, after having resold it, deducted from the pro-
ceeds the amount due from intestate, and paid the
balance to defendant. He did not deduct interest,
to which he was entitled, and which exceeded
the rental value of the mill from the time of intes-
tate's death to the time the last payment was due
on it. Held that, as the estate did not suffer, de-
fendant could not be charged with rents for the
mill after intestate's death.-Pate v. Oliver, (N.
C.) 10 S. E. 709.

18. A judgment, under which execution had
been levied on the excess of the judgment debt-
or's land, after his homestead had been set apart,
was assigned to defendant's intestate. No steps
were taken for over three years after the death
of intestate, and after defendant had qualified
as his administrator, when, the judgment being
dormant, defendant instituted proceedings to ob-
tain leave to issue execution on it. The judg-
ment debtor filed his affidavit that he had paid
the judgment to defendant's intestate, and the
court found that it was satisfied. Held, that de-
fendant could not be held liable for laches in de-
laying to take steps to enforce the judgment.--Pate
v. Oliver, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 709.

19. Where an administrator sells leases held by
his intestate to the lessors, a counter-claim for
rent will not be allowed in an action for the pur-

chase price of the unexpired term, if the estate is
insolvent, since to the extent of such rents the
lessors are creditors of the estate, and no counter-
claim can be allowed against the estate that will
give undue priority to particular creditors; and,
when the administrator voluntarily allows such
set-offs, he should be charged with them, less the
pro rata part to which the debts to which they
were applied were entitled.-Pate v. Oliver, (N. C.)
10 S. E. 709.

aside for fraud on motion in the cause simply, but
only by independent action, after the order of
confirmation is made, as it is a final judgment.-
McLaurin v. McLaurin, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1056.
29. Before a license is granted to an adminis-
trator to sell land to pay debts, controversies in
regard to claims should first be settled.-Brittain
v. Dickson, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 701.

21. Where it appears that the exigencies of an
estate required the collection of notes belonging to
it in Confederate money, the only currency in cir-
culation at that time, on a subsequent accounting
of the administration the amount due the estate on
these notes should be scaled, under the act relating
to the value of such currency, as of the dates of
maturity of the notes; it being presumed, in the
absence of any evidence, that they were collected
at maturity.-Chick v. Farr, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 176.
Liabilities and misconduct.

22. Imprisonment for debt being abolished, at-
tachment for contempt is not a remedy for oblig-
ing the payment of a mere debt from the execu-
tors to a legatee, adjudged upon citation to account
before the ordinary under Code Ga. § 2598.-Wood
v. Wood, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 501.

23. An administratrix c. t. a., who permits the
trustee under the will to take possession of the
personal property belonging to the estate before
the payment of its debts, is guilty of a devastavit,
and, to the extent of such property, she becomes
personally chargeable with the debts of the es-
tate.-Lewis v. Mason's Adm'r, (Va.) 10 S. E. 529.
24. Where the estate of a deceased obligor on a
bond has been fully administered in a suit for par-
tition to which the holder of the bond was not a
party, and the assets were sufficient to pay all
claims, and the personal representative took no re-
funding bond, a personal decree against him in a
suit by the holder is proper.-Beverly v. Rhodes.
(Va.) 10 S. E. 572.

25. A return of "No property to be found," on an
execution against a certain person individually,
issued on a judgment recovered against him as ad-
ministrator, is no evidence of a devastavit as to
him in that capacity.-Forrester v. Tift, (Ga.) 10

S. E. 1015.

26. An administrator bought land, which his
intestate had sold, by surrendering the note and
mortgage taken by intestate in payment. The
conveyance was to intestate's widow, and his in-
fant son. It was afterwards resold in probate
proceedings, to which the infant was not properly
made a party. Held, that the infant's remedy was
not against the purchaser, but was against the
administrator, since he, being accountable for the
note and mortgage, became the owner of the land
for which the note and mortgage were exchanged.
-Harrison v. Lightsey, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 1010.
Executor de son tort.

27. Under Gen. St. S. C. § 1906, providing that
one who, not having been appointed executor nor
obtained administration, possesses himself of the
property of the deceased, shall be considered ex-
ecutor de son tort, the attorney of certain persons
who held a mortgage of the entire property of a
deceased person to secure a debt is liable, as ex-
ecutor de son tort, for the excess of the property
over the debt, when he has possessed himself of it,
sold it, and distributed the proceeds.-Davega v.
Henry, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 72.

Sales under order of court.

28. An order of sale of land of an intestate to
pay debts, granted in special proceedings by the
administrator for that purpose, the sale thereun-
der, and the order of confirmation, cannot be set

31. Under an order of court an administrator
sold land of a decedent at a very low price, and
immediately stipulated with the bidder to take the
land for himself at an advance of $50, the bidder
having neither paid the purchase money nor taken
a conveyance. He then executed a deed to the
bidder, in which the co-administrator refused to
join, received a check for the amount of the bid, re-
turned the check, and took a deed from the bidder,
paying the agreed $50. Held, that the land re-
mained the property of the estate, both legally and
equitably; and the two deeds ought to be canceled,
as a fraudulent cloud upon the title, and the land
be resold.-Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, (Ga.) 10 S. E.
495.

32. An agreement between an administrator,
who is also one of the heirs of his intestate, and
the other heirs, by which the administrator is to
live on the land, and receive the rents and profits,
in consideration of his paying the debts of the in-
testate, and supporting the widow, is no defense
to a proceeding by the administrator to subject
the lands of his intestate to the payment of debts.
Proctor v. Proctor, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1036.

33. Where heirs, in their answer to a proceed-
ing by an administrator to obtain a license to sell
land for the payment of his intestate's debts, plead
that the action was not brought within the time pre-
scribed by law, and the court below fails to con-
sider the merits of the plea, and there is some ev-
idence to sustain it, a new trial will be granted,
as the plea raises an important question under
the statute.-Proctor v. Proctor, (N. C.) 10 S. E.

1036.

34. An executor who waives a cash payment on
a public sale of land belonging to his decedent's
estate, and who puts the purchaser into possession
under an independent contract whereby the pur-
claims for dower and for a year's support have
chase money is not to be paid until the widow's
been settled, and who subsequently receives a part
of the purchase price, loses the right given him by
Code Ga. § 3655, to resell the land at the purchaser's
risk on his failure to pay the balance of the pur-
chase money; the executor's remedy being a suit
for the unpaid balance.-Penn v. Willingham,
(Ga) 10 S. E. 1085.

Widows' and children's allowance.

35. General allowance from the estate of a dece-
dent for a year's support, if not consumed during
the year, will stand over for the support of the
widow and minors afterwards, so long as they are
members of the family, and fill this description
Children attaining majority, or ceasing by mar
riage to be of the family, cannot during that time
coerce partition of land thus allowed and set apart:
the whole land being charged with the support of
the family.-Whitt v. Ketchem, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 503

36. Though a court of ordinary has exclusive
original jurisdiction to order an administrator to
sell the perishable property of the estate, yet
where it has no power to revoke such order ex-
cept in term, a court of equity will enjoin a sale
of such property ordered to take place in vaca-
tion, where sufficient thereof has not been set
apart for a 12-months support of the intestate's
minor children, to which they are entitled under
Code Ga. § 2571, as such sale would deprive the ap
praisers therein authorized to be appointed of
the discretion conferred on them to set apart such

Fees.

Of sheriffs, see Sheriffs and Constables, 2.
witnesses, see Witness, 16, 17.

FENCES.

Adoption of stock law.

Code Ga. $$ 1449-1455, providing for elec-
tions, upon petition to the ordinary of a specified
number of freeholders, to determine whether the
provisions of the stock law shall be adopted in any

militia district, makes no provision for a counter-
petition, or for any contest or hearing before the
ordinary. Held, that the ordinary's action upon a
petition for such an election is ministerial, not ju-
dicial, and certiorari will not lie for the correction
of any error or mistake in his conduct.-Meadows
v. Taylor, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 204.

FRAUDULENT CONVEY-

ANCES.

What constitutes.

1. At the time of the dissolution of the part-
nership existing between P. and K., by the terms
of which K. agreed to assume all firm liabilities
and pay P. a certain amount, their firm note was
held by plaintiff, to whom P. wrote, informing
him of the terms of the dissolution, and urging him
to push K. for a settlement. Instead of doing so,
plaintiff continued to sell to K. After the dissolu-
tion P. executed his bond to plaintiff for an indi-
vidual indebtedness, and offered to sell him certain
land in payment of this and the firm debt, which
offer was refused. Thereafter P., being about to
remove from the state, conveyed the land to his
brother in payment of a debt equal to the value of
the property. Held, that the facts did not show
fraud for which the conveyance would be set aside
in favor of plaintiff.-Saunders v. Parrish, (Va.)
10 S. E. 748.

2. Where one member of a mercantile firm pur-
chases the interest of the other member, and in
consideration thereof assumes to pay all the part-
nership debts, the firm and both members being
on the eve of insolvency, and shortly thereafter the
purchasing partner, without paying any of the firm
firm to a trustee, in such a manner as to devote the
debts, conveys the whole of the assets of the late
whole thereof to the payment of his individual
debts, such sale, being without any valuable con-
sideration, is ineffectual to convert the social as
table rights of the firm creditors, such trust-deed
sets into individual property; and, as to the equi-
is fraudulent and void.-Darby v. Gilligan, (W.
Va.) 10 S. E. 400.

3. A conveyance by one partner, being appre-

Former Jeopardy.

See Criminal Law, 12-14.

FORNICATION.

Evidence.
On trial for fornication, evidence of acts of
defendant prior to a former conviction is admissi-
ble to show the character of subsequent acts.
State v. Wheeler, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 491.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Promise to answer for debt of another.
1. An agreement between a contractor, his
subcontractor, and a third person, under which
the contractor is to pay for all goods purchased of
the third person by the subcontractor out of mon-
eys to come into his hands for the latter, and re-
ceive a percentage on the amount, is not within the
statute of frauds, as a collateral agreement to an-
swer for the debt of another, but is an original
promise, founded on a sufficient consideration.-
Ledbetter v. McGhees, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 727.
Agreements relating to land.

2. A written contract for the sale of land can
be discharged by matter in pais.-Miller v. Pierce,
(N. C.) 10 S. E. 554.

of outstanding claims against him, of his interest
in partnership land to his copartner, to facilitate
the adjustment of the partnership affairs, and in
order that the partnership property should not be
embarrassed by his outstanding personal indebted-
ness, is not in fraud of partnership creditors, be-
cause, whether the title to the land is in one or both
partners, it is alike liable for partnership debts;
nor is it in fraud of the individual creditors of the
grantor, because the land, still continuing to be in
fact partnership property, is liable for individual
debts after those of the partnership are paid.-
Jones v. Smith, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 340.

4. The mere fact that in a sale of all its assets
made by an insolvent partnership there is an agree
ment by the purchasers to employ one of the part-
ners at a stipulated compensation per month to
manage the business, will not per se render the
sale void as against creditors.-Cribb v. Bagley,
(Ga.) 10 S. E. 194.

5. Under Code N. C. § 685, a chattel mortgage
of its property, executed by a corporation, is void
as to its creditors existing at the time of the ex-
ecution of said mortgage, who commence proceed-
ings to enforce their claims within 60 days after
its registration.-Duke v. Markham, (N. C.) 10 S.
E. 1003.

6. An insolvent, in pursuance of an agreement
that his wife would abandon her purpose to sue
for a divorce, and that she and her sons would pay
certain specified debts, which he asserted and they
believed were all he owed, amounting to over $500,-
caused to be conveyed to the wife real estate
worth from $600 to $800. The wife and sons, in
good faith and without notice of any fraud, paid off

year.

3. An agreement to leave a person a support
after the death of the promisor, in consideration of
services to be rendered by the promisce during
the balance of the promisor's life, full perform-
ance of the contract being dependent upon a con-
tingency that may happen within a year, is not
within Code Va. § 2840, cl. 7, prohibiting an ac-
tion upon an agreement not to be performed within
a year, unless the same is in writing.-Thomas v.
Armstrong, (Va.) 10 S. E. 6.

as against the creditors of the husband whose debts
but of which the wife had no notice.-Casto v. Fry,
existed prior to and at the time of the conveyance,
(W. Va.) 10 S. E. 799.

Knowledge of grantee.

7. An absolute deed, made with intent to delay
or defraud creditors, though made also to secure a
debt, is void as against creditors if the grantee
takes it with notice of the fraudulent intention.-
Palmour v. Johnson, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 500.

S. C. transferred a leasehold interest in lands
to B., his wife's brother, receiving the notes of the
latter. B. transferred such interest to the wife
through her cousin, receiving back his notes, which
the wife obtained from her husband. There was
no proof that the wife paid any consideration for
the notes. At the expiration of the lease, a new
lease was executed to the wife, but the considera-
tion was furnished by the husband. Held, that
the assignment was void as to creditors of the hus-
band.-Mayhew v. Clark, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 785.

9. Where a wife purchases land at a commis-
sioner's sale, which her husband pays for out of
moneys which were placed in his hands by his
wife before her marriage to him, the land cannot
be subjected to judgments against the husband
obtained after such sale and confirmation, under
Code W. Va. 1868, c. 66, p. 447, § 2, providing that
the property which any woman shall own at her
marriage shall not be subject to her husband's
debts.-Cale's Adm'r v. Shaw, (W. Va.) 10 S. E.

637.

10. A husband, owing no debts, can pay his
wife any debt contracted to her before his mar-
riage.-Cale's Adm'r v. Shaw, (W. Va.) 10 S. E.

637.

11. Failure to pay an adequate price for land,
where the parties to the deed are husband and
wife, raises a presumption of fraud, and the bur-
den of rebutting it is on those claiming under the
deed.-Woodruff v. Bowles, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 482.

12. Where, in a deed from husband to wife, part
of the consideration is feigned, the deed is not on
that account fraudulent as to creditors.-Woodruff
v. Bowles, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 482.*

13. Land bought by the husband prior to the
adoption of the constitution of 1868, with the wife's
money, and subsequently deeded by the husband
to the wife, cannot be sold to satisfy a judgment
against the husband, where there is proof of a
verbal agreement between the husband and wife
at the time of purchase that the land should belong
to her, and it does not appear that the deed to the
wife was made by the husband with intent to hin-
der, delay, or defraud his creditors.- Woodruff v.
Bowles, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 482.*

14. A deed from a husband to his wife, made for
a recited valuable consideration, and the added one
of natural affection, it not appearing therein that
the husband was then indebted to any one, is not
fraudulent on its face.-Woodruff v. Bowles, (N.
C.) 10 S. E. 482.*

Rights of creditors.

15. Where R. purchased and paid for land, but,
to defraud his creditors, procured the title to be
made to his father, the remedy of R.'s creditors
was an action, in the nature of a bill in equity, to
subject the land to the payment of their debts.-
Everett v. Raby, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 526.
Actions to set aside-Evidence.

16. In an action to set aside a deed as fraudu-
lent, because voluntary on its face, it is compe-
tent to show a valuable consideration by parol evi-
dence. Following Jackson v. Lewis, 7 S. E. 252.—
Jackson v. Lewis, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 1074.

17. An action to set aside a deed, voluntary on
its face, was brought by creditors of a grantor,
who has since died, to subject the property to pay-
ment of their debts. It appeared that the debts
were allowed to be contracted on the faith of a re-
corded deed, conveying the property to the gran-
tor for a valuable consideration. Held, that it was
inadmissible to show, by evidence of parol declara-
tions of the grantor, that, though conveyed to her,
the property did not in fact belong to her, but was
intended for the grantee in the alleged voluntary
conveyance. Following Jackson v. Lewis, 7 S. E.
252.-Jackson v. Lewis, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 1074.

18. When a deed is assailed by third parties on
the ground of fraud, it is admissible to show, in
addition to the consideration expressed in the deed,
that a substantial and valuable consideration was
paid.-Casto v. Fry, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 799.

19. Where a grantor in a deed made with intent
to defraud creditors swears he gave notice to the
grantee beforehand of his fraudulent purpose, the
latter, by denying in rebuttal other statements in
the testimony of the former, but not this, virtually
admits the fact of notice, there being no explana-
tion of the failure to deny such notice.-Palmour
v. Johnson, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 500.
Instructions.

20. Code Ga. § 1952, par. 1, provides that a trans-
fer of property by an insolvent debtor in trust for
creditors shall be void as to creditors, if any ben-
efit is reserved to the debtor. The second para-
graph of such section provides that every convey-
ance made with intent to defraud creditors shall
be void as to them. Held, that though a transac-
tion, attacked as fraudulent as to creditors, be one
second paragraph of section 1952, yet, for illustra-
of sale to persons not creditors, and falls under the
tion, the court may give in charge to the jury the
first paragraph of such section, as well as the sec-
ond, since they serve to illustrate each other with
regard to benefits reserved by the debtor.-Cribb
v. Bagley, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 194.

GAMING.

What constitutes.

1. Though a room be rented out, if the land-
lord use it to serve drinks to his bar customers,
and to play cards with them for money, having a
table, cards, and "chips" in the room for the pur-
pose, he may, notwithstanding his tenauts are al-
so using it for storing their property, etc., be con-
victed of keeping it as a gaming-house.-Stephen-
son v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 234.
Indictment.

2. Under Code Va. 1887, § 4011, which provides
that no exception shall be allowed for any defect
or want of form in any indictment under the gam-
ing act, objections that the record did not set forth
the appointment and oath of the foreman of the
grand jury, and that the names of the grand jurors
and witnesses on whose information the indict-
indictment, are properly overruled.-Lawrence v.
ment was found were not written at the foot of the
Commonwealth, (Va.) 10 S. E. 840.
Evidence.

3. In a prosecution for keeping a gaming-
house, the fact that the accused, in selecting his
witnesses to reply to the state's evidence, chose
those who did not know the material facts, rather
than those who did, though the latter were equally
accessible, was proper to be considered by the jury
as adding force to the case made out by the state.
Stephenson v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 234.
Gambling contract.

4. One who has deposited money with another,
to be used in a speculation upon chances, or the
purchase of "futures," has no right of action to re-
cover it back until after demand for its return or
repayment.-Dancy v. Phelan, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 205.

5. A demand is not dispensed with by a fraud.
alent execution of the illegal trust or a false and
fraudulent account of the result.-Dancy v. Phe-
lan, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 205.

6. Losses sustained in buying and selling what
are commonly called "futures "cannot be recovered
in a court of law, and an item arising from such
losses in an account will be stricken out.-Lawton
v. Blitch, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 353.*

GARNISHMENT.

Employe's wages--Exemption.

1. Money exempt from garnishment in the
hands of the employer is exempt from seizure by
a rule against the sheriff, when paid to the latter
by the employer on a judgment in favor of the em-
ploye.-Cox v. Bearden, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 627.

2. Wages, as such, may be recovered in Geor-
gia by an employe wrongfully discharged before
the expiration of his term by suit after the term
expires; and money thus recovered will be exempt
from garnishment where wages earned by actual