Now, Mr. Comstock, you are presently chairman of the Legislative Committee of the NRA, as I understand it.

Mr. COMSTOCK. Well, I shall not be reappointed and those committees are now being revised.

Senator DODD. I did not ask that. Now, are you presently chairman?

Mr. COMSTOCK. Well, yes, I think I am, unless there has been a complete acceptance by a newly appointed one that I am unaware of. At the time I prepared my statement I certainly was.

Senator DODD. You know those are pretty simple questions for an experienced judge.

As far as you know, you are presently chairman?

Mr. COMSTOCK. So far as I know; and so far as I know I shall very soon, if not already, be replaced and accept a new committee on law and order.

Senator DODD. As far as you know, you may not live the day out. I asked if you are presently chairman.

Were you chairman when this body considered S. 1592?
Mr. COMSTOCK. Yes, I was.

Senator DODD. And did you participate in the drafting of the April 9 newsletter that was circulated to the NRA membership?

Mr. COMSTOCK. To the extent that I considered the draft after it had been written by other members of a committee appointed for that purpose.

Senator DODD. Well, you merely reviewed what others had prepared. Mr. COMSTOCK. What?

Senator DODD. I said you just reviewed what others had prepared. Mr. COMSTOCK. I participated in the discussion before the other thing was approved and so did our executive committee.

We were all aware of the content of it and I think share the responsibility for it.

Senator DODD. Were you aware of the inaccuracies and misstatements in it?

Mr. COMSTOCK. I have been made aware of some things that have been pointed out as inaccuracies and some of them I do not consider were inaccuracies. Others I think were quite inadvertent and certainly no greater than the inaccuracies contained in the statement of witnesses before this committee and members of this committee.

Mr. DODD. I know, but you are an expert. You are a judicial person. It is your business to read carefully and understand. You said you did review it.

Mr. COMSTOCK. Yes, sir, I did; and I would not deny responsibility for the statement or my part in it.

Senator DODD. Let me read some excerpts from that NRA letter. Well, it will be unnecessary to do it because we have reached the point where you say that you did review it and can take the same responsibility as the others.

I point out to you that letter was mailed on April 9. The President of the United States, President Johnson, delivered his "crime" message on March 8, 1965, and up until April 9 he received only 50 letters opposing his position and after April 9 he received 12,000.

Do you think this NRA letter had anything to do with the tremendous increase in the number of messages in opposition that the President received?

Mr. COMSTOCK. Why certainly, sir. I certainly do. I think that we sent out an informative letter to our membership.

Senator DODD. And do you think the statements and inaccuracies and exaggerations in it had anything to do with this tremendous volume of opposition?

Mr. COMSTOCK. Well, sir, I deny the premise of the inaccuracy and misstatements. I would like to comment on those.

Senator DODD. Well, let me conclude and you can comment all you

want to.

I received a letter on May 27 on the stationery of the Hawthorne Trap & Wildlife Club, Hawthorne, Wis., addressed to me. It reads, in part:

As the sponsor of S. 1592, presented on March 22, 1965, I am returning directly to you for answer some questions which are bothering gun club members and shooting enthusiasts all over the United States.

I must first say I have already written both Senators from Wisconsin as well as the President in opposition to the proposed legislation. However, within the last 48 hours I have read and reread your bill which after perusal has caused me to have some very serious second thoughts. I am therefore, as the secretary of a responsible gun club, asking you personally to reply at your earliest convenience to the following three questions.

I point out to you that these are the points in your letter which General Orth said were inaccurate and said were not factually true.

1. Would the enactment of S. 1592 prevent me, as an individual sportsman from reloading ammunition for my own use either for target or hunting purposes? Of course it would not, as you well know, Judge.

Mr. COMSTOCK. Certainly not.

Senator DODD (reading):

No. 2. The passage of your bill, would it prevent our trap club from reloading shotgun ammunition for resale to our members and visiting shooters?

Of course it would not, as you know is true.

Mr. COMSTOCK. I would not concede that point, Senator. I would like to speak on that.

Senator DODD. It is a little hopeless, because it is abundantly clear. And the third question is:

3. Would the enactment of S. 1592 prevent me, as a resident of Wisconsin, from transporting my own shotguns or rifles into another State for lawful purposes; that is, for target shooting or hunting?

You know very well it would not do such a thing.

Mr. COMSTOCK. We do not say it would.

Senator DODD. In your letter it did.

Mr. COMSTOCK. I do not; and I would like to speak on that.

Senator DODD. I do not have the letter in front of me. I could be mistaken, but my recollection is that it was.

The letter goes on to say:

Should your answer to the above three questions be in the negative I can assure you that the opposition to your bill will fade rapidly.

If, on the other hand, your bill would restrict legitimate hunting or sport shooting I believe you have already stated it would never pass on the floor of the Senate.

This letter is obviously based on the inaccuracies in your information letter that you sent out.

He says on the last question

Would it prevent me as a resident of Wisconsin from transporting my own shotgun or rifle into another State for lawful purposes?

That is for target shooting or hunting. You said it did not say that. Let me read from your letter, page 2:

If you transported your rifle or shotgun to another State for lawful purposes such as hunting, you would have to comply with such ordinance and restrictions and redtape as might be required by the regulations.

This is obvious. The readers believe they would not be permitted to carry their rifle or shotgun to another State.

Mr. COMSTOCK. I do not think so at all. I think it would merely compel him to comply with burdensome restrictions as might be required by regulations, and as exactly as we state.

Senator DODD. You know the bill says just the opposite.

Mr. COMSTOCK. What is that?

Senator DODD. The bill says just the opposite.

Mr. COMSTOCK. I do not feel sure of that.

As I read the bill, if I go over into Nevada, as I frequently do, to hunt mule deer and transport my gun, under the words of the bill if I have someone else transport it for me, I am going to have to comply with such regulations on that as may be required and I promise you, sir, that we out in the Far West will have a terrible time uncovering from the Federal Register, or what have you, those regulations which may control what we have to do. My vacation is coming on and I want to take a mule deer trip over into Nevada and I think it would be very burdensome for me to hunt up all the regulations I would have to comply with before I go hunting.

Senator DODD. We have had witnesses, a good many people I am sure who said they did understand and from your letter that they would be permitted to carry a shotgun or rifle for hunting purposes.

Mr. COMSTOCK. I refer only to the language of our letter that says we would have to comply with such burdensome regulations or redtape as might be required by the regulations.

Senator DODD. I have something I want to put in the record. At my request the American Law Division of the Library of Congress has prepared a memorandum on one of the items you raised here today, the scope of congressional practice of delegating discretion to executive officers to issue regulations implementing enforcement of statutes.

I think it is interesting to point something out and that is that the American Law Division of the Library of Congress has provided the subcommittee with a 35-page document, with covering letter, which cites the legislative history of congressional delegation of discretionary authority to executive officers. It says, and I quote:

Almost from the very inception of the National Government established pursuant to the Constitution, the Congress found it necessary to delegate to the President or to subordinate executive officers, discretionary power to issue regulations found necessary to carry into effect congressional policy expressed in statutes. As long as Congress embodies in such statutes an intelligible statement of policy, the Supreme Court, with one exception, has been disposed to uphold as such discretion conveyed thereunder to executive officers.

The one exception was the case you cited.

Mr. COMSTOCK. That is the "sick chicken case."

Senator DODD. That is the only one. Have you researched this from a legal standpoint?

Mr. COMSTOCK. No, sir, as most of us are familiar with that decision. I did not research it as thoroughly as I might have.

Senator DODD. I think it is significant that you testify here about the only case, the "sick chicken case," and there have been a long line of cases and they have all been otherwise gone the other way. Isuggest that you read it. I will make it available to you and I will put it in the record, together with the memorandum from the Library of Congress at this point.

(The memorandum from the Library of Congress and the decision referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 104," and are as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 104

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1965. Delinquency, attention: Mr. Mooney.

To: Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile From: American Law Division. Subject: Scope of congressional practice of delegating discretion to executive officers to issue regulations implementing enforcement of statutes. Almost from the very inception of the National Government established pursuant to the Constitution, the Congress found it necessary to delegate to the President or to subordinate executive officers discretionary power to issue regulations found necessary to carry into effect congressional policy expressed in statutes. As long as the Congress embodies in such statutes an intelligible statement of policy, the Supreme Court, with one exception, has been disposed to uphold such discretion conveyed thereunder to executive officers. The one exception occurred during the depression of the 1930's when the Court voided the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 on the ground that these measures, insofar as they delegated to private industrial groups the power to issue binding rules pertaining to methods of competion or wages and hours of labor, entailed a virtual abdication of the legislative fuction by Congress (Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)).

NORMAN J. SMALL,
Legislative Attorney.

AMERICAN LAW DIVISION,

July 6, 1954.

Subject: Digest of decisions and list of recent references pertaining to the separation of powers principle as applied to the National Government.

1. List of recent references:

Daniel S. Cheever and D. Field Haviland. American foreign policy and the separation of powers (1952), chs. 1-3, 14.

The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Appraisal (1952), pp. 173–181, 380, 392, 442, 460–462, 465-469, 479-480, 489, 499–500, 521, 525-526, 546-551.

Charles S. Hyneman. Bureaucracy is a democracy (1950), pts, 1, 2, pp. 3-206.

Arthur T. Vanderbilt. The doctrine of the separation of powers and its present-day significance. 1953.

Arthur W. MacMahon. Congressional oversight of administration; the power of the purse (1943), 58 Pol. Sci. Quar. 380-414.

Delegation of legislative power (1945), 20 N.Y.U.L.Q.R. 347-354.

Oliver P. Field. Separation and delegation of powers (1947), 41 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1161-1170.

2.

L. L. Jaffe. Delegation of legislative power: an essay (1947), 47 Col. L.R. 359-376.

J. Rowe, Jr. Cooperation or conflict? The President's relationship with an opposition Congress (1947), 36 Geo. L.J. 1–15.

F. L. Fox. Separation of powers (1948), 5 Wash. & Lee L.R. 185–203.
Separation of powers-congressional investigatory action (1948), 2 Rutgers
L.R. 125-144.

H. Wolkinson. Demands of congressional committees for executive papers
(1949), 10 Fed. B.J. 103-150, 223–229, 319-350.

President and Congress-power of the President to refuse congressional demands for information (1949), 1 Stanford L.R. 252–262.

P. R. Collins. Power of congressional committees of investigation to obtain information from the executive branch: the argument for the legislative branch (1951), 39 Geo. L.J. 563–598.

R. W. Ginnane. Control of federal administration by congressional resolutions and committees (1953), 66 Harv. L.R. 569–611.

F. A. Newman and H. J. Keaton. Congress and the faithful execution of the laws-should legislators supervise administrators (1953-1954), 41 Cal. L.R. 565-595.

Digest of certain Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the separation of powers.

I. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

A. Delegation by Congress of legislative power to executive and judicial branches The Brig Aurora ((1813) 7 Cr. 382): Congress may legislate contingently, leaving to the President the task of ascertaining the existence of facts which will bring into operation the statute containing expression of its declared policy. Thus, Congress, by an act of May 1, 1810, could make the revival of the Nonintercourse Act of 1809 contingent upon the (1) issuance by the President of a proclamation confirming the fact that a certain foreign nation, France or Britain, had repealed its edicts violative of our neutral commerce, and (2) upon the elapse of 3 months following such proclamation without the second nation having effected a similar revocation. A ship captured under the act of 1809 thus revived was held to have been lawfully seized.

Wayman v. Southward ((1825) 10 Wheat. 1): Although Congress cannot "delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative, Congress certainly may delegate to others, powers which the legislature rightfully may exercise itself * * *. The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details.

"It is, undoubtedly, proper for the legislature to prescribe the manner in which * * * ministerial offices shall be performed, and this duty will never be devolved on any other department, without urgent reasons. But in the mode of obeying the mandate issuing from a court, so much of that which may be done by the judiciary, under the authority of the legislature, seems to be blended with that for which the legislature must expressly and directly provide, that there is some difficulty in discerning the exact limits within which the legislature may may avail itself of the agency of its courts."

Accordingly, it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to delegate to the Federal courts the rulemaking power in regard to judicial procedure, and to accomplish that result through enactment of the Process Act. By the terms of the latter, State laws regulating the modes of procedure in suits at common law were adopted for use in Federal courts, subject to such "alterations and additions as the said courts, respectively, shall, in their discretion, deem expedient or to such regulations as the Supreme Court * ** shall think proper, from time to time, to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same."

Field v. Clark ((1892) 143 U.S. 649): "That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution ***. "The true distinction, [however], is between the delegation of power to make law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid