David's Hammer: The Case for an Activist JudiciaryCato Institute, 2007. gada 10. apr. - 192 lappuses Judicial activism is condemned by both right and left, for good reason: lawless courts are a threat to republican government. But challenging conventional wisdom, constitutional litigator Clint Bolick argues in David’s Hammer that far worse is a judiciary that allows the other branches of government to run roughshod over precious liberties. For better or for worse, only a vigorous judiciary can enforce the limits on executive and legislative action, protect constitutional rights, and tame unelected bureaucrats. That, Bolick demonstrates, is exactly the role the framers intended the courts to play, envisioning a judiciary deferential to proper democratic governance but bold in defense of freedom. But the historical record is painfully uneven. During the Warren era, courts protected freedom of speech and equal protection of the law but denigrated other important rights and took on executive and legislative powers that brought disrepute to the judiciary. The Rehnquist Court restored some balance, reining in judicial excesses and protecting property rights, but stopped far short of the activist judicial role the framers charted for the courts in policing conduct of other branches of government that exceeds constitutional boundaries. Bolick showcases numerous real-world examples of people whose rights to free speech, economic liberty, equal protection of the law, and private property were violated by government—victims of government oppression whose only recourse is the courts. David’s Hammer reclaims for the judiciary its intended role as the ultimate safeguard of a free society. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 24.
... commerce, meant to limit that power to commerce or rather to allow Congress to regulate everything. Given that the latter construction not only ignores the plain meaning of the clause but also fundamentally transforms the Constitution ...
... trade barriers presented a textbook example of precisely the evil that the Framers intended to forbid when they placed the commerce clause in the Constitution. The Federal Trade Commission studied the issue and found that “State bans on ...
... economic union. The Twenty-First Amendment did not repeal the commerce clause. When faced with seemingly compet— ing constitutional provisions, the proper role of courts, my colleagues and I argued, was to harmonize the two provisions ...
... commerce clause. A small winemaker like juanita Swedenburg would have found opening and fully staffing a warehouse just to gain the privilege of selling a few cases of wine in New York econom— ically impossible. Multiply that burden by ...
... commerce clause was that an enterprise in one state could do business in another state without having to move there. The state's legitimate regulatory interests with regard to alcohol could be achieved in less onerous fashion, such as ...
Saturs
127 | |
The Beckoning Frontier | 139 |
11 An Activist Judiciary for All the Right Reasons | 157 |
Notes | 165 |
Index | 179 |
About the Author | 189 |
Cato Institute | 192 |