210 F. 2d 134 (C. A. 1) data it requested. Nevertheless bargaining conferences between the Respondent and the Union took place in the course of which the Union withdrew its request for information as to age, sex and date of employment, that data being available to it as the result of a pension study undertaken by the Respondent, and the Respondent receded from its position by providing data acceptable to the Union from which it could compile a complete roster of all permanent employees in the unit. On the basis of the foregoing data a new collective bargaining agreement was signed on February 21, 1952, retroactive to the first of the year. In the meantime, however, on January 5, 1952, the Union had filed a charge against the Respondent alleging that the latter had refused to bargain with the Union in violation of § 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 140, 141, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (a) (1) and (5), by refusing to furnish the Union with the "names, classifications and weekly salaries of all the employees in the bargaining unit." A complaint issued on the charge on March 18, 1952, and the usual proceedings were had thereon. As a result of those proceedings the Trial Examiner found in accordance with the complaint that the Respondent, in violation of the section of the Act set out above, had refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit in question. He accordingly recommended an order in the usual form requiring the Respondent to furnish the Union upon request with "wage data concerning names, work classifications, dates of employment, and salaries of all employees" in the unit. The Respondent filed exceptions to the intermediate report and the three-member panel of the Board to which the case was referred found merit in the Respondent's contentions and modified the order recommended by the Trial Examiner. The Board first found that the Respondent had not refused to furnish the Union with the dates of employment of the employees in the unit, and then it went on to say: "Although finding that the Union's request for names of employees was complied with by the Respondent to the Union's satisfaction, the Trial Examiner concluded that the Respondent refused to furnish such names. The Respondent excepts to this conclusion as inconsistent with the prior finding. We agree. In 136 view of the Union's acceptance of the data furnished as adequate for its purpose, we do not find that the Respondent refused to furnish names of employees." 210 F. 2d 134 (C. A. 1) . Wherefore the Board entered the order which it seeks to have enforced wherein it directed the Respondent only to furnish the Union upon request with "wage data concerning work classifications and salaries" of all the employees in the unit represented by the Union. Upon the issuance of the Board's order the Respondent disclosed the salaries paid in each job classification, and the number of employees receiving each salary, in the form of a tabulation, a sample of which appears in the margin. The question is whether this tabulation complies with the order entered by the Board. 1 The Respondent does not, nor can it, question the Board's power in appropriate cases to require disclosure of individual data concerning the employees in the unit represented by the Union. N. L. R. B. v. Leland-Gifford Co., 1 Cir., 1952, 200 F. 2d 620, 624 and cases cited. Nor does it dispute that such data, for the purpose of this case, should include the actual wages being paid in each employee classification in the unit. Its contention is that neither the Board's order, nor good faith bargaining in this particular case, requires it to give individual wage data specifically linking the name of each employee with his or her actual salary. Wherefore it contends that the data supplied in the tabulation referred to above complies with the order of the Board. Counsel for the Board disagree. They concede, as they must, that the order entered by the Board is couched in more general terms than the one recommended by the Trial Examiner. They contend, however, that it is specific enough to require the Respondent to provide the Union with the individual wage data of the employees in the unit showing names linked with salaries. Counsel say that the Board modified the Trial Examiner's recommended order by omitting "names" from the list of items required to be disclosed to the Union only because the Union by its own admission had in fact been furnished with adequate data from which to compile a complete roster of the employees in the unit, and that the order as it stands requires the Respondent to link the names of employees with their salaries because it requires disclosure of "classifications and salaries of all employees." Furthermore, they say that since the question of the Respondent's duty to furnish names linked with salaries was a principal bone of contention throughout the proceeding, the Board would 1 Classification Accounts Payable Clerk.. Addressograph Clerk- Number of Salaries @ $76.00 per week 1 8 210 F.2d 134 (C. A. 1) not have disagreed with the Trial Examiner's conclusion on that issue without saying so in terms too clear to be misunderstood. There is some force in the argument. But there is also good basis for the Respondent's counter argument, which is that it cannot be assumed that the Board inadvertently omitted "names" from the list of matters to be disclosed, but on the contrary it must be assumed that the omission was deliberate and for the express purpose of not requiring disclosure of names linked with salaries for the reason that this is not an appropriate case for such a disclosure. It is said that this case is inappropriate for disclosure of specific names and salaries because such disclosure violates not only the privacy of the employer but also the privacy of employees with respect to rates of pay, 2 and we are not to assume that the Board would invade personal privacy 137 without having some good reason which is lacking here for the Respondent and the Union amicably reached an agreement, apparently satisfactory to both, without the benefit of specific individual wage data. There is certainly force in the Respondent's argument. Indeed, we find it more persuasive than that advanced by counsel for the Board. Furthermore, we think that if the Board had meant to invade privacy by requiring disclosure of individual names joined with actual salaries, it would have said so in unmistakable terms. Also, since the Board had free choice of the language in which to express itself, perhaps ambiguities in the terms of an order issued by the Board should be resolved against it, particularly in cases in which the Board can very easily say precisely what it means. We, therefore, interpret the Board's order not as requiring disclosure of names of the employees in the unit linked with their salaries, but only as requiring disclosure of the salaries paid in each job classification, and the number of employees receiving each salary, such as was made in the tabulation submitted to the Union by the Respondent after the Board entered its order. A decree will be entered enforcing the order of the Board. Furthermore it is suggested, and counsel for the Board concede, that privacy in this matter is more highly prized by employees in the higher income brackets, and the unit involved includes employees ranging from those in the lower clerical and maintenance classifications to one drawing $15,000 per year. 211 F.2d 640 (C. A., D. C.) Aerovox Corporation v. N. L. R. B. 211 F. 2d 640 (C. A., D. C.), January 28, 1954; certiorari denied May 17, 1954-102 N. L. R. B. 1526 and 104 N. L. R. B. 246 On petition to review Board Order Before WILBUR K. MILLER, PRETTYMAN, and WASHINGTON, Circuit Judges PRETTYMAN, C. J.: This is a petition to review an order of the National Labor Relations Board. The order directed appellant to cease and desist from certain acts found to constitute domination over a labor organization of its employees, and to take specified affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. This directed action includes withdrawal of recognition from the Aerovox Plant Committee as representative of the employees for collective bargaining purposes and the reinstatement of an employee named Cordeiro who had been discharged by the company. The company says that neither of the two principal findings of the Board, i. e., domination of the employees' organization and the reason for the discharge of Cordeiro, is supported by substantial evidence. We have examined the record as it is presented to us and find the supporting evidence ample. The company says the union which brought the charges against it has abused the Board's processes by filing false non-Communist affidavits and therefore the charges ought not to be entertained. That matter was decided adversely to the company's contention in Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers.1 The order of the Board will be affirmed and an order of enforcement entered. In respect to the latter order it is to be understood that we do not read 641 the order of the Board as forbidding any organization or type of organization which the employees of Aerovox Corporation by their own undominated and uninfluenced wish may choose to form and designate as their representative. References in the Board's order to certain labor organizations by name are not understood by us to require or even to intimate that those organizations or organizations of that type must be chosen or are to be given any preference whatsoever over any other organization by the Aerovox employees. In situations like this one the Board has no more authority than has the company 193 U. S. App. D. C. 178, 211 F. 2d 36 (1953). 211 F.2d 640 (C. A., D. C.) to dictate to employees what labor organization shall represent them, and, as we read the Board's order, it made no attempt to do so. The order as thus read by us is the order which will be enforced under our order. Affirmed. WILBUR K. MILLER, C. J., dissents. N. L. R. B. v. Braswell Motor Freight Lines 209 F.2d 622 (C. A. 5), January 29, 1954; on rehearing 213 F.2d 208, June 4, 1954-101 N. L. R. B. 1151. See also 220 F. 2d 362 On petition to enforce Board Order Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH and RIVES, Circuit Judges HUTCHESON, Chief Judge: As a result of its abortive efforts to secure recognition as the bargaining representative of respondent's employees at the Houston Terminal, the Teamsters Union, A. F. of L. filed with the Board a charge: that on or about May 1, 1950, respondent dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of a 623 Labor organization known as Union of Transportation Employees, hereafter called U. T. E., and has contributed unlawful support thereto; that respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Teamsters Union, A. F. of L., though that organization was the representative of a majority of its employees; and that by the acts set forth in the charge, respondent has restrained and coerced the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.1 The general counsel sponsoring the charge, except as to the refusal to bargain with the Teamsters, and enlarging upon it in a complaint filed by him through the Regional Director, the matters raised came on for hearing and were heard by an examiner who found all the charges of the complaint well founded and made sweeping recommendations.2 129 U. S. C. A. § 157, as amended. "Recommendations. "Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, the Trial Examiner recommends that Braswell Motor Freight Lines, El Paso, Texas, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall: "1. Cease and desist from: "(a) Dominating or interfering with the administration of the Union of Transportation |