209 F.2d 273 (C. A. 5) right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. We do not pass upon the right of Council to enforce this provision of its constitution, but we agree with the Board that when a first opportunity clause in a contract is em 277 * * ployed as a means of discrimination against a recalcitrant member and he is thereby denied employment under conditions present here such conduct is in violation of the Act. As stated by the Board,"* when a labor organization undertakes to supply an employer with workmen, it violates Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act unless it carries out this undertaking on a non-discriminatory basis." 3 It is also urged by Council that the word "employee" as used in § 8 (b) (2), making it an unfair labor practice for a labor union to attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of § 8 (a) (3), does not include a job applicant, but is limited to those who are already employed. The word can not be so narrowly construed, but must be considered in its context. The meaning of § 8 (b) (2) is that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a union to attempt to cause an employer to violate § 8 (a) (3). The refusal of Council to issue Kirby a job referral or to approve him for a referral, caused Auchter to discriminate against him with regard to hire and thereby discourage him from retaining his membership in the machinists union in violation of § 8 (a) (3). The application of § 8 (b) (2) can not be made to depend upon whether the labor union's efforts to induce the employer to discriminate with regard to hire are successful, for this would place a premium upon the success of the unfair labor practice which it perpetrated. We think that the word "employee" is broad enough to include, and does include, a job applicant who is discriminately denied employment in violation of § 8 (a) (3). Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 313 U. S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. Ed. 1271; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 89 U. S. App. D. C. 261, 191 F.2d 483. The Board found that the "first opportunity" clause of the contract, as interpreted and administered by the parties thereto, constituted an invalid union-security agreement which amounted to a closed-shop arrangement and that by continuing this contract in force and effect Auchter and A. G. C. violated §§ 8 (a) (1) and (3) and 3 See N. L. R. B. v. National Maritime Union of America, 2 Cir., 175 F. 2d 686; Union Starch & Refining Co. v. N. L. R. B., 7 Cir., 186 F. 2d 1008, 27 A. L. R. 2d 629; N. L. R. B. v. Reed, 9 Cir., 206 F. 2d 184. 4 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (a) (3): “It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer*** By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of eraployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization * *." (Emphasis supplied.) 34 L. R. R. M. 2144 (C. A. 3) Council violated §§ 8 (b) (1) (A) and (b) (2) of the Act, supra. The facts relating to Kirby's efforts to obtain employment sustain this finding, as does other evidence which has not been related in detail. When a copy of the contract was offered in evidence respondents objected to its admission on the basis that the instrument was not complete within itself. Thereafter, testimony was offered tending to show that there was an additional page attached to the original contract on which additional signatures appear. Pittman testified that the missing page contained signatures and also "an additional matter between the two parties." The exhibit was admitted over objection. As it appears in the record it is a complete instrument within itself and it is signed by representatives of A. G. C. and Council. There is no reference in the agreement to any other instrument or addendum which would indicate that the copy of the agreement was not a complete instrument. Under these circumstances the exhibit was properly received in evidence and the Board was justified in considering that it represented the complete written agreement executed by the parties. The Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence and are otherwise in accordance with law. The petition for enforcement of the order is granted. Order enforced. N. L. R. B. v. L. B. Hosiery Co., Incorporated, et al. 34 L. R. R. M. 2144 (C. A. 3), January 16, 1954; certiorari denied 347 U.S. 976-88 N. L. R. B. 1000. See also 34 L. R. R. M. 2639 On motion for entry of supplemental decree Before MCLAUGHLIN, KALODNER, and HASTIE, Circuit Judges 2144 Supplemental Decree This Court having on April 18, 1951, entered its decree enforcing a remedial order of the National Labor Relations Board which directed among other things, that the respondents, The L. B. Hosiery Co., Incorporated, and Lee Maisel, doing business as Myerstown Hosiery Mills, make whole certain employees for loss of pay suffered because of unlawful discrimination practiced against them, and the Board having thereafter held supplemental hearings and having issued its Supplemental Decision and Order [99 N. L. R. B. 630], its Second Supplemental Decision and Order [102 N. L. R. B. 1033] and its order correcting Second Supplemental Decision and Order, determining the amounts of net back pay necessary to make whole said employees; the Board having thereafter moved this Court for the entry of a supple 34 L. R. R. M. 2144 (C. A. 3) mental decree making definite the amounts of back pay due said employees as so determined; and this Court on December 18, 1953, having granted the Board's motion. It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the respondents above-named, their officers, agents, successors and assigns shall make whole the employees named below by payment to each employee of the following respective amounts: It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said respondents shall notify in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Supplemental Decree, the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board for the Fourth Region, 1500 Bankers Building, Philadelphia 7, Pennsylvania, what steps they have taken to comply herewith. Building Trades Council et al. v. Kinard Construction Co. 346 U. S. 933, January 18, 1954, reversing 64 So. 2d 400 (Ala. Sup. Ct.) On writ of certiorari to Supreme Court of Alabama 933 PER CURIAM: The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment is reversed. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485. Since there has been no clear showing that respondent has applied to the National Labor Relations Board for appropriate relief, or that it would be futile to do so, the Court does not pass upon the question suggested by the opinion below of whether the state court could grant its own relief should the Board decline to exercise its jurisdiction. 209 F.2d 645 (C. A. 6) N. L. R. B. v. Sharples Chemicals, Inc. 209 F. 2d 645 (C. A. 6), January 27, 1954-100 N. L. R. B. 20 On petition to enforce Board Order Before SIMONS, Chief Judge, and MCALLISTER and MILLER, Circuit Judges MILLER, C. J.: The National Labor Relations Board seeks enforcement of its order issued July 8, 1952 against the respondent, Sharples Chemicals, Incorporated, pursuant to § 10 (e) of the Labor Relations Act, §§ 141-168, Title 29 U. S. C. A. The respondent, a Delaware corporation, manufactures various chemical products at its plant in Riverview, Michigan. It is conceded that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The charge upon which the complaint was issued was filed October 18, 1950 by United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers of America, CIO, a labor organization within the meaning of § 2 (5) of the Act. The complaint alleges that the respondent continuously since 1941 has dominated and interfered with the administration of a labor organization and has contributed financial and other support to said organization, thus engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8 (a) (2) of the Act, and has interfered with its employees' right of self-organization and collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, thus engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8 (a) (1) of the Act. The respondent by its answer denied the commission of any unfair labor practices, and also put in issue the question of the charging union's compliance with § 9 (f) of the Act. The Board's findings of fact can be summarized as follows: No outside labor organization has ever represented the respondent's employees. Instead there have been in existence several organizations, one known as the Employee Representative Group, hereinafter referred to as the Group, and five others, known as the Election Committee, the Grievance Committee, the Job Evaluation Committee, the Clothing Committee, and the Benefit Fund Committee, which functioned in the ways hereinafter described and which are the labor organizations referred to in the complaint whose administration has been dominated and interfered with by respondent. Prior to 1942, respondent's plant manager customarily met with employees individually or in small groups to discuss matters affecting their working conditions. The rapid expansion of respondent's 209 F.2d 645 (C. A. 6) business resulting from World War 2 made it difficult to follow this custom, and, about the early part of 1942, the Employee Representative Group Plan was put into effect, by which representatives selected by employees would regularly meet with the Management. One object of the group meetings was to serve as "a two-way street for communication between Management and the people in the plant." The plant manager presided and the personnel manager acted as secretary. Foremen and other supervisory employees were excluded. The Group was made up of one representative for every fifteen employees in a designated unit, elected by the employees in their respective units for a term of one year. This totaled 34 representatives in the group. A wide variety of subjects were discussed at the meetings which were held usually once a month at the plant. The subjects included wages, vacation 648 pay, work schedules, overtime, pension plans and hospitalization insurance. The plant manager or the personnel manager either disposed of these matters at the meeting at which they were raised or took them under advisement and announced their decision at a later meeting. The Election Committee consisted of five members of the Group, appointed by the plant manager as Group chairman with the approval of the Group Representatives. The Committee conducted the elections of employee representatives of the Group and members of the standing committees. The elections were conducted on company premises with the respondent supplying the Committee with the necessary ballots, ballot boxes, and eligibility lists of candidates. The Committee has not conducted any elections since April 1950. The Grievance Committee was composed of three employee members, each representing a different department. An employee was required to have at least three years' service to be eligible. In the 1950 election the procedure was for the employees in the department involved to elect their own committeemen. The Committee took up complaint or disagreements affecting the relations of the Company with its employees where the aggrieved employee was unable to settle his grievance with his foreman. After investigating the grievance, the Committee might attempt to adjust it with the personnel manager and if unsuccessful proceed with it to higher levels of management. Since April 1950 the Committee made recommendations to the personnel manager in three separate complaints, all three of which the personnel manager accepted. The Job Evaluation Committee evaluated new jobs and revised old evaluations that were questioned by hourly-rated employees or management. It consisted of four employees, elected by the employees of |