allow naked lamps to be used in this mine." "Oh," replied the superintendent, easily, "we are installing a ventilating system that in a few months will rid the mine entirely of gas and render the use of safety lamps unnecessary." "Before that time arrives," protested the European expert, "your mine will be blown up." And this is precisely what happened. The naked lamps were not excluded, the mine was blown up a few weeks later, and hundreds of miners lost their lives. ... No European mining superintendent would dream of taking such chances as he foolishly took at the cost of so many lives; and, if he were so inclined, the government inspector would not permit him to do so.1 Mine explosions and mine fires impress the imagination by the appalling destruction of lives in a single accident. A great many more lives, however, are sacrificed under ordinary circumstances in every-day accidents, which find their way only into the statistical reports of State mine inspectors, being too common to be noticed by the newspapers. Every advance in mining engineering within recent years has had the effect of increasing the risks of the miner in the United States. One of the original dangers in underground coal mines is from falls of roof, which are the result, at least in part, of insufficient timbering. This risk has been considerably increased by the use of high explosives." With the installation of improved mining machinery, exposure to unguarded machines has been added to other perils of mining.3 Electrocution threatens the miner as a result of the application of electricity to mining. The chief inspector of coal mines for Pennsylvania gave warning of this danger in his report for 1901: Electricity in various forms has been the cause of many of the deaths in soft coal mines, either from the men coming in contact with the electric trolley wire, or with the electric wire that carries the power to the electric cutting machines. In my opinion, separate travelling ways should be provided for the workman, when the haulage is done by electricity. 4 Haynes, loc. cit., p. 143. 3 Hoffman, loc. cit., pp. 476-477. a Eastman, loc. cit., pp. 38-39. 4 Ibid., pp. 478-479. When this recommendation was adopted in one Colorado mine ten years later, the Engineering and Mining Journal found the fact of sufficient interest as news to print the following letter from a correspondent: This mine has introduced a decided novelty in the form of a separate roadway for the miners to enter and leave the workings, thus doing away with the necessity of their travelling along the haulage-ways, and providing an additional avenue of escape. in time of danger.1 The displacement of the mule by the cable car or electric motor has been the source of a new danger to the life of the miner. Many miners are killed by the running trains of coal. This is, of course, clearly the result of their own negligence: why do they travel in the haulage-way? The fact is, however, that the man-entry and track are dark from beginning to end and low, so that one would have to travel in a stooping position all the way. The track is covered with loose slate and big chunks of coal. Therefore the miners prefer the haulage entry, where there are occasional lights, a smooth path to walk, and a higher roof. Most of these risks are humanly preventable, 3 and their continuance is due to economic conditions beyond the control of the mine worker, even with a perfect command of English. The economic cause of the high rate of fatalities in American coal mines was squarely stated by Dr. J. A. Holmes, Director of the Bureau of Mines, in an address delivered at the annual meeting of the National Civic Federation in New York, November 23, 1909: There can be no permanent industry without reasonable profits. It is unjust and irrational that in this great and essential branch of industry reasonable profits or even the payment of operating expenses should be dependent upon methods involving unnecessary sacrifice of human life. . . . Ruinous competition exists not only between the operators in the same fields, but between the operators of one field as against those in another field or in another state where different mining laws and regulations are in force. This competition is . . . forcing The Engineering and Mining Journal, January 14, 1911, p. 135. 3 Ibid., p. 46. This in the opinion of the head of the bureau created for the purpose of safeguarding the Eres of the mine workers. "unnecessary samice of human e" is conditioned by competition among mine operators. According to the inspector-general of mines of Belgium (pected aborre "similar dangerous on fitions coce exsted in France and Belgaum, now the safest oral-mining countries in the world," but they were removed by stringent legislation and by an effective enforcement of the law.* La Europe wooden shafts are not permitted, the maximum amount of explosives to be used in one blast is limited by law, all machinery must be properly guarded, etc. Dr. Holmes believes that the adoption of similar regulations in the United States would prevent three fourths of the present I * Joseph A. Holmes: "Coal Mine Ardents and their Prevention.” Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Mines of the Size of Ohio, 1909, pp. 126–128. 2 Haynes, loc. cit., pp. 148. 150-151. Clarence Hat and Walter 0. Shelling: "Coal Mine Accidents: their Canses and Prevention." Bulletin of the United States Gearginal Samey, No. 333. p. 6. Eastman, loc. cit., p. 46. Hofman, loc. cit., pp. 470-477 I loss of life, which implies that "the greatest number of accidents in bituminous coal mines" (contrary to the view accepted by the Immigration Commission), do not arise from "the recklessness, ignorance, and inexperience of employees." This opinion is derived from the statistics of accidents in the United States and foreign countries. The comparative rates of fatal accidents in American and foreign coal mines are shown graphically in Diagram XXV., reproduced from XXV. Fatal accident rates in coal mines per 1000 workmen employed in the United States and foreign countries. the recent study of the Minnesota Bureau of Labor on the subject of industrial accidents.2 The rate of fatal accidents in the United States is thrice as high as in France and Belgium, which shows that two thirds of the fatal accidents in the American mines could be prevented. Considering, 2 Haynes, loc. cit., p. 140. Twelfth Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor, Industries and Commerce of the State of Minnesota,, 1909-10, p. 203. loss of 273 lives through the carelessness of "other persons," is open to question. Yet that statement of the Pennsylvania report is the only direct statistical evidence in support of the Commission's conclusion "that the responsibility for a majority of the accidents in coal mines rests with the men injured. This being the case"-continues the Commission-"it is evident that an inquiry as to the responsibility of a given race for accidents may perhaps best be answered by showing the extent to which its numbers are sufferers from accidents."2 Disinterested mining experts, however, do not accept the apologetic theory of the mine operators as an "undisputed fact." At the summer meeting of the Mining Institute of America, held in 1910, shortly after the Cherry Mine holocaust, the causes of mine fires were discussed in a paper, from which the following is quoted: In looking over the accounts of some of the mine fires which have startled the general public more than others, I was forcibly struck with three of them (Avondale, Hill Farm, and Cherry), especially in the general aspect at least of the similarity of their cause and effect, and of the cycle of years between each. The Avondale Mine was a singleshaft opening. The structural material used in the shaft lining, partitions, derrick, and breaker, was composed of wood. The fire originated at the bottom of the shaft, caused by the carelessness of the furnace man in lighting the furnace fire, thereby setting fire to the wooden partition, etc. This fire occurred in the month of September, 1869, and in it 109 lives were lost. As you remember, no adequate means were at hand with which to extinguish the fire. . . . The Cherry Mine disaster . . . originated at the No. 2 seam landing of the escapement shaft and was I 1 Dr. John Randolph Haynes, Special Commissioner on Mining Accidents of the State of California, in a paper read at the last annual meeting of the American Association for Labor Legislation, at Washington, D. C., questioned the independence of State mining inspectors: "They do not wish to lose their positions, which they are very likely to do if they annoy the owners of coal mines, who very commonly own the railroads which carry the coal, and enjoy intimate relations with banks and other corporations that exercise quiet but effective power in State politics."—"A Federal Mining Commission," American Labor Legislation Review, vol. ii, No. 1, p. 145. Ibid., p. 233. 2 |