whole approach to the drug field. That is an area where in my opinion we should be doing some experimenting with some new approaches. We are, in effect, keeping the peddler in business because the higher we make the penalties and the more law enforcement we throw at the drug traffic, the more helpless the addict is, the higher prices are driven, and then the addict is forced to go out and commit more crimes to pay for his habit. That is an area that in a total overview must be kept front and center and watched continuously.

Finally, I think that any approach to breaking up the whole of organized crime must focus, among other things, on the relation between criminal activities and public officials, and calls for measures like a more rigid campaign fund disclosure law, more rigid supervision as to where some of the money for political activities comes from, particularly down at the county courthouse level, and more rigid exposure of the vulnerable relationships between the organized crime operator who has bushels of money and the public official who has to have large amounts to survive. That is a part of the picture that, as a generalization, should be considered and studied, carefully, and a place where controls should possibly be tightened up a good deal.

Senator, I apologize. I had more ground to cover than I thought, and I have taken more time than I expected.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Well, that is all right. Your presentation is very interesting and it will be helpful. We cannot cover everything in this one bill, but I am sure we will include things other than what are in it now. But, I think it is important that we get on and agree on some of these things and enact the legislation and then keep working. Four years ago when I requested that this subcommittee be appointed, I thought it would serve temporarily to handle particular legislation that had been introduced at that time, but it looks to me like it will be a continuing committee. The problem of trying to do something about crime is not going to be quickly solved and our work is not going to be completed in one package of legislation or in one bill. We have to keep working at it maybe each year, and in each session of Congress. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Mr. Diuguid, will you come around please, sir. Will you identify yourself, please.

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. DIUGUID, COUNSEL FOR THE ASSOCIATION OF FEDERAL INVESTIGATORS

Mr. DIUGUID. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I am John P. Diuguid. Senator MCCLELLAN. How do you pronounce that?

Mr. DIUGUID. Diuguid, as if were D-o-g-i-d.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Fine. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DIUGUID. I am General Counsel of the Association of Federal Investigators.

Mr. Chairman, I have filed a formal statement with the committee and I have a shorter summarizing statement which I would like to read.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Very well. You may highlight it and the entire statement will be printed in the record. I thought I was accommodating you people as well as the committee, in proceeding to try to conclude.

Mr. DIUGUID. Thank you, I appreciate it as it is very helpful to me. We would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today and express the association's great interest in combatting organized crime in America.

As its name implies, the Association of Federal Investigators is an association of persons employed within the Federal Government in investigative and related activities. The association draws its membership from the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Customs, the Secret Service, the Post Office Department, the Department of Labor, and the 25 or more other Federal agencies and departments charged with responsibilities for investigating and dealing with organized crime in the United States. I might add that I began my legal career in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department of Justice under the Attorney General's honor graduate recruitment program. I remained there for over 5 years. In addition, I am director and general counsel of the purchasing practices and procedures commission established by the joint committee on government and finance of the West Virginia Legislature, which is charged with investigating corruption within the executive branch of that State. It is my sincere hope that my testimony will be helpful to this distinguished subcommittee in the task it has before it.

There have been many attempts to define what is meant by "organized crime." "The Mafia," "the syndicate," "La Cosa Nostra," all of these terms have been used to denote organized crime. In its "Task Force Report: Organized Crime," the President's Commission on L. w Enforcement and Administration of Justice defined the subject of its study in the following language:

Organized crime is a society that seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their governments. It involves thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of any large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but rather the result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over many years and aimed at gaining control over whole fields of activity in order to amass huge profits.1

In its report entitled "Federal Efforts Against Organized Crime: Report of Agency Operations," the House Committee on Government Operations stated:

The Department of Justice, in its operations, considers organized crime to be twofold: first, a criminal syndicate consisting of families operating as criminal cartels in large cities across the Nation, banded together in an organization with what corresponds to a board of directors at the top to settle problems, such as jurisdictional disputes, and to enforce discipline; and second, and large continuous criminal conspiracy which has significant impact upon a community, a region or an area of our country.

No matter how you define it, organized crime is unquestionably one of the greatest problems facing America today.

The experience of our membership indicates that there are approximately 5,000 individuals participating in this conspiracy. The prin

1 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, "Task Force Report: Organized Crime," at 1 (1967), hereinafter called the President's Crime Commission.

Twenty-Eighth Report by the House Committee on Government Operations. "Federal Effort Against Organized Crime," H. Rept. 1574, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1968), hereinafter cited as H. Rept. 1574.

cipal areas in which organized crime is involved are: gambling, loan sharking, narcotics traffic, extortion, labor racketeering, and the corruption of public officials.

The mainstay of organized crime in America is gambling. Revenues from illegal gambling alone, as you know, have been estimated to net the Cosa Nostra from $7 to $50 billion per year.3 It is the tremendous sums of money obtained from gambling which serve to underwrite the activities of organized crime in all other areas of its activity. Authorities differ as to whether the syndicate's second greatest source of illegal income is from loan sharking or its traffic in narcotics. The Intelligence Bureau of the Internal Revenue Service estimates the yield from each of these activities to be approximately $350 million per year. In the experience of our membership, traffic in narcotics is the more dangerous since a great portion of the violent crime in our larger cities is attributable to drug addicts attempting to meet the ever increasing costs of their habits. Extortion and labor racketeering are closely aligned. In both cases, violence or the threat of violence is used by organized crime to coerce law abiding citizens to pay tribute to the syndicate. Finally, the large sums of money which flow into the coffers of the Cosa Nostra are used for the corruption of public officials, without which many of the other illegal activities could not flourish.

In the face of such widespread and well-organized criminal activities, it is astounding that this Government has tolerated this situation for so long. Perhaps the greatest reason organized crime has not been checked in America is a lack of commitment on the part of all concerned. As stated by the President's Crime Commission:

Investigation and prosecution of organized criminal groups in the 20th century has seldom proceeded on a continuous, institutional basis. Public interest and demands for action have reached high levels sporadically; but, until recently, spurts of concentrated law enforcement activity have been followed by decreasing interest and application of resources."

In the view of the association, the time for an all-out assault on the forces of organized crime in America is long overdue. On behalf of the association I would like to urge the subcommittee to make a firm, unequivocal commitment to stamp out organized crime in America.

Last year the Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The association actively supported that legislation and applauded its enactment. Nevertheless, there remains a great deal to be done if we are to begin winning the war against organized crime.

Obviouslly, most importantly, the budgets of the various Federal agencies and departments charged with responsibility in combating organized crime must be increased substantially.

While law enforcement is primarily the responsibility of State and local governments, the Federal Government can serve as a moving force and focal point for the war against organized crime. However, in order for it to do so, funds available to the principal crime fighting agencies and departments of the Federal Government must be aug

3 Ibid.

Compare H. Rept. 1574 at 4 with the President's Crime Commission at 3 and American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, "Electronic Surveillance," at 36 (1968).

mented substantially. In particular, I am referring to the Department of Justice's organized crime and racketeering section, the various U.S. attorneys offices affected, investigators from the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Bureau of Customs, the U.S. Secret Service, the Department of Labor and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These are the agencies which are involved in the imaginative "strike force" concept being employed very effectively by the Justice Department at the present time. Headway against organized crime is beginning to be made; but more funds must be committed to provide the additional manpower, training, research and development that is necessary for the elimination of organized crime in this country. I urge the members of this honorable subcommittee to use their influence in the support of legislation to provide the additional funds needed.

In the view of the association, there are other areas of legislation which well deserve the support of this subcommittee. The measures to which I refer are detailed below.

The association strongly supports the many provisions of S. 30, the "Organized Crime Control Act of 1969," which was introduced by the honorable chairman of this subcommittee on January 15, 1969, and was at that time cosponsored by the honorable Senators Hruska and Ervin. We note with pleasure that this bill has now received the support of a number of other Senators.

As investigators, our members have found, of course, that cases against those involved in organized crime cannot be made without witnesses. Because of the ever present threat of violence, persons who are willing to testify against members of the Cosa Nostra are few and far between.

The distinguished chairman of this subcommittee addressed himself to this point on Tuesday, March 11, 1969, when he stated:

[W]itnesses in organized crime cases simply do not volunteer to testify or to ture over relevant books and records. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testified in 1965 that, even after the cases had been developed, it was necessary to forego prosecution hundreds of times because key witnesses would not testify for fear of being murdered. Indeed, the Attorney General indicated that such fear was not unjustified; he testified that the Department lost more than 25 informants in the period of time between 1961 and 1965.*

Thus we heartily support the provisions of title VI of S. 30 which would authorize the Attorney General to provide secure housing facilities for Government witnesses in organized crime investigations and prosecutions on both the State and Federal levels. We assume that the provisions of title VI are sufficiently flexible to protect Government witnesses against the multitude of harms which might befall them. I note that we have some trouble with the word "facilities," in that we do not contemplate nor anticipate the need for the creation of Federal encampments for witnesses. In the past, Federal law enforcement officials have been able to protect the witnesses involved in organized crime cases quite adequately. The fact that we have not been able to protect all such witnesses stems primarily from the lack of sufficient funds to do so. If sufficient funds are made available to this important task, we believe that the Federal Government has sufficient initiative

Speech of the Honorable Senator John L. McClellan, "Organized Crime in the United States," Congressional Record, March 11, 1969.

to develop means to provide protection to all of those who have the courage to come forward to testify against members of the syndicate. In 1968, the President's Crime Commission recommended enactment of a general witness immunity statute sufficiently broad to insure compulsion of testimony at both Federal and State levels. As investigators, we regard enactment of such a provision as indispensable to any concerted effort against organized crime. Accordingly, we support the provisions of title II dealing with such immunity.

Similarly, the provisions of title III concerning the court's ability to punish for contempt when a witness refuses to testify and of title IV eliminating the rigid two-witness and direct-evidence rules in certain prosecutions would be of great assistance to us in our efforts to obtain witnesses against organized crime, and we strongly urge enactment of such provisions.

Title VII, with one clarifying exception, merely codifies the existing law with regard to the admissability of the revelations of one coconspirator against a fellow coconspirator. Insofar as title VII makes clear to the Supreme Court the determination of the legislative and executive branches to utilize the conspiracy concept against the Cosa Nostra, we favor its enactment.

I return now to the provision of title I, concerning the grand jury. As investigators, we have found the grand jury to be an invaluable tool in the fight against organized crime. Nevertheless, the grand jury must be strengthened and must be given the flexibility required to maximize its effectiveness against the type of continuing criminal activity which is associated with the Cosa Nostra. In our view, the provisions of title I permitting the grand jury to be called into session in each jurisdiction once every 18 months with the right, at 6-month intervals, to extend its existence up to 36 months, is a significant step forward. We also applaud the provision granting the grand jury the right to make formal reports or presentments to the court, which we believe will prove useful in providing the public with the "whole picture" regarding the activities of organized crime within the jurisdiction. Adequate safeguards will, of course, be needed to guarantee that such reports do not become vehicles for the slandering of innocent persons. We feel confident that such safeguards will be included and therefore strongly endorse the provisions of title I.

In summary, we applaud the provisions of S. 30 as a significant step forward in the war against organized crime in America. We strongly urge that it be given serious consideration and that it be promptly enacted.

There are a number of other legislative proposals in support of which the association would like to testify.

It is our understanding that legislation will soon be introduced to rehabilitate the wagering tax laws which were destroyed in the Marchetti and Grosso cases. The wagering tax statutes were a vital weapon and must be returned to the all too limited arsenal of those waging the war against organized crime. Consequently, we recommend that such legislation be given serious consideration by this subcommittee.

8 Marchetti v. United States, 350 U.S. 39 (1968). Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).