1860. LORD WARD v. LUMLEY. Mellish shewed cause (June 3).-The question turns upon the 37th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, which enacts that no "appeal shall be allowed unless notice thereof be given in writing to the opposite party or his attorney, and to one of the Masters of the Court, within four days after the decision complained of, or such further time as may be allowed by the Court or a Judge." The further time must be obtained within the four days. According to the ordinary practice in cases of arbitration, where an award is to be made on or before a certain day, or such further day as the arbitrator may enlarge the time for making his award, it has always been held that the arbitrator must enlarge the time before the expiration of the day first named. So, in cases of motions for new trials, some step must be taken within the four days. The words "further time" imply that there is to be no interval. Maude, in support of the rule.-An arbitrator has no power to act except within the period limited, which distinguishes that case from the present. The effect of this clause is, that notice of appeal shall be given within four days, and if not, the Court shall have a discretionary power as to allowing it to be afterwards given. [Bramwell, B.-The rule to extend the time would be a rule nisi, which could not be made absolute within the four days.] Bramwell, B.-We are all of opinion that the Court has power to extend the time for giving notice of appeal, though the application is not made within four days. Mr. Mellish seeks to put a restriction on the power of the Court which is not found in the statute, and suggests that it is analogous to the power to extend the time for making an award. Mr. Maude has given the true answer to that objection. His client had a right to appeal, which he lost by inadvertence. The case of Hill v. Fox (a) shews that we may order a plaintiff in error to give security for costs. The rule will, therefore, be absolute that the defendant be at liberty to give notice of appeal, all proceedings to be stayed until security for costs is given, the costs of the rule to be plaintiff's costs of the appeal. 1860. LORD WARD v. LUMLEY. CHANNELL, B., concurred. (a) 3 H. & N. 547. Rule accordingly. HOMER V. TAUNTON. May 8. LIBEL.-The first count of the declaration stated that In an action the plaintiff, before and at the time of the committing of the grievances, &c. carried on the business of a manufac for a libel imputing to that he was a the plaintiff that there being no innuendo of the word: Held, that word was not although the to be found in any English dictionary, yet, as it was composed of two well known turer of hosiery and the trade of a grocer in the parish of "truckmaster," East Shilton, and near the parish of Hinkley, and before the committing the said grievances the plaintiff, in his said business of a manufacturer of hosiery, employed divers framework knitters and other workmen. And the defendant thereupon falsely and maliciously printed and published of the plaintiff, as such manufacturer and grocer, in a newspaper called, to wit, The Midland Express, the false and malicious words following, that is to say, (The declaration then set out the libel, which contained the following passages)" It is again our painful duty to announce to the public that the conduct of Messrs. Homer" (meaning the plaintiff) "and Everard, of East Shilton has compelled their workpeople to cease from labour and appeal for support to the working classes of the district, and, in fact, to the workmen of other districts, and to all who have any sympathy with the poor and the oppressed. The district of Hinkley English words, the plaintiff was not bound to give evi dence of its meaning, nor the Judge to explain it to the jury; but that it was properly left to them to say whether, under all the circum stances, it was used in a de famatory sense. 1860. HOMER 17. TAUNTON. has long been known for the extreme propriety of the framework knitters, and when we state that the wages of the above class of operatives do not average more than three shillings or six shillings per week, and that men with families cannot earn more than six or eight shillings per week, clear from deductions; it will be seen how cruel and heartless those" (meaning the plaintiff and the said Everard) "must be who attempt to reduce their wages still further, &c. It is, therefore, the duty of the men to resist the encroachments of Messrs. Homer" (meaning the plaintiff) "and Everard, and to maintain the present rate of wages. Mr. Homer" (meaning the plaintiff) "who is a truckmaster should, from his position, have been one of the last to have excited the ill-will of his workmen, and we hope he will see the necessity of beating a speedy retreat from his present dishonourable course." There was a second count, setting out another libel, in which was the following passage:-"Oh, dear reader, how unfortunate it is that Mr. Homer" (meaning the plaintiff), "who is a respectable gentleman hosier truckmaster, is not an absolute monarch on the throne of some eastern empire." The declaration concluded with the usual allegation that, by means of the committing of the grievances, the plaintiff hath been and is greatly injured. Pleas. First: Not guilty. Secondly: That the alleged libels were and are true.-Issues thereon. At the trial, before Pollock, C. B., at the London Sittings after last Michaelmas Term, it appeared that the plaintiff was a manufacturer of hosiery at East Shilton; and he also kept a grocer's shop, at which the workmen in a neighbouring factory were accustomed to buy provisions. The defendant had published the libels complained of in a newspaper called "The Midland Express." The plaintiff's counsel mainly relied on the imputation that the plaintiff was a "truckmaster," but he called no witnesses to explain the meaning of that word. Evidence was adduced on the part of the defendant to prove that the plaintiff had been guilty of offences within the Truck Act, 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 37. The learned Judge left the case to the jury, pointing out to them that there was no evidence to explain the meaning of the word "truckmaster," and telling them that the word was not to be found in any English dictionary; but was a coined word manufactured in particular districts, and which had arisen out of a particular state of circumstances. That being so, he was not bound to instruct the jury as to its meaning or application; that looking at the context and the whole evidence, they must judge for themselves what was the meaning of the word, and whether it was used in the sense of disparagement. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with 57. damages. Edwin James, in last Hilary Term, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, in this, that there was no evidence to prove the meaning of the word "truckmaster," and that its meaning should either have been explained by the Judge or by evidence (a), against which Mundell showed cause in the present Term (April 24).— It was properly left to the jury to say whether the word "truckmaster" was used in a libellous sense. That word has a well known meaning. It is composed of two words the meaning of which is also well known. If a word is (a) The rule was also in the alternative, to arrest the judgment on the ground that the word "truckmaster" was not actionable per se; but this part of the rule was abandoned on the 1860. HOMER t. TAUNTON. 1860. HOMER v. TAUNTON. unintelligible the Judge is not bound to explain it to the jury, but its meaning should be shewn by evidence: Daines v. Hartley (a). If the meaning of the word is well ascertained it is not necessary for the Judge to explain it, for the jury are bound to know it like any other word in the English language. Here there was abundant evidence from which the jury might ascertain the meaning of the word "truckmaster." [Martin, B.-The 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 37, is commonly called the "Truck Act:" Ingram v. Barnes (b), Riley v. Warden (c). Pollock, C. B.-There is no ambiguity in the word "truckmaster." The word "shipmaster" might mean the owner of a ship, or the master of a 'ship, or a person who constructs ships.] The word "truckmaster" does not require an innuendo to explain its meaning, as the word "black-sheep:” M'Gregor v. Gregory (d). Edwin James and H. James in support of the rule.The meaning of the word "truck master" should not only have been explained by innuendo, but evidence should have been adduced to shew that it cast an imputation on the plaintiff's character. The word per se may be an innocent expression; and there was nothing to shew that it implied anything which subjected him to punishment or social degradation. The calling a person a lotterymaster does not necessarily convey an imputation in respect of which the jury are bound to give damages. [Martin, B., referred to 1 Roll. Abridg. tit. "Action sur Case," 55, pl. 17, Com. Dig. tit. "Action upon the Case for Defamation" (D. 24).] In Richardson's Dictionary the word "truck" is defined as to "barter or exchange." The word "truckmaster" requires evidence to explain its mean (a) 3 Exch. 200. (c) 2 Exch. 59. |