1860. CORNWALL v. BENNETT. not sufficient to dispense with proof that the call was made, the question being whether there was evidence of a MINING CO. call, I think that there was no such proof as to satisfy the requirements of the Articles. The minutes of the first meeting were not signed, and although there is a signature to the minutes of the second meeting, those minutes are only hearsay evidence of what passed at the prior meeting. The plaintiffs not desiring a new trial, the rule will be absolute for a nonsuit. Rule absolute. Feb. 14, 15. B. having become bank. rupt in 1823, while the 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, was in force, an assignee was PLANT and Another v. COTTERILL, STYCHE and CLIFFT. DETINUE for the title deeds of a messuage and land at Pleas by the defendants Styche and Clifft.-First, not guilty. Secondly, that the deeds were not the plaintiffs'. appointed who Thirdly, that the causes of action did not accrue within six before the commencement of the suit. died in 1840. In 1844, and after the passing of the 1 Wm. 4, c. 56, certain lands came to the bankrupt by descent which. he conveyed to the defendants in the following year. The bankrupt died in 1853 with years The defendant Cotterill pleaded similar pleas, and, in addition, a plea that he did what was complained of by the plaintiffs' leave. Issues were joined upon the pleas. At the trial, before Bramwell, B., at the London sittings after last Michaelmas Term, it appeared that in 1823 one William Brown became bankrupt. At that time an asobtained a signee was appointed, who died in the year 1840. In 1844, out ever having certificate. In 1858 the plain tiffs were appointed assignees under the bankruptcy, and recovered the land in question by ejectment. In detinue for the title deeds :-Held, first, that by the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, (12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, ss. 4. 142,) on the appointment of the plaintiffs as assignees, the property in the land and deeds relating to it vested in them. Secondly, that, inasmuch as until the appointment of the plaintiffs as assignees there was no detention of the deeds adversely to them, the Statute of Limitations was no answer to the plaintiffs' claim. the bankrupt, on the death of his sister,.became entitled as heir at law to some freehold land at Great Wyrley in the parish of Cannock, to which the title deeds sought to be recovered in this action related. On the 12th May, 1845, the bankrupt executed a voluntary conveyance of the property to trustees, viz. the defendant Cotterill and one John Brown, for the benefit of his children. John Brown having been removed from the trust, the defendants Styche and Clifft were appointed new trustees in his stead, jointly with the defendant Cotterill. In 1858 the plaintiffs were appointed assignees under the bankruptcy of William Brown, and shortly afterwards recovered judgment in an action of ejectment against a tenant of part of the land. The plaintiffs then caused to be served on the defendants a written notice signed by the plaintiffs, that they disaffirmed and disagreed to the title of the bankrupt and all persons claiming through or under him, to all real and personal effects which belonged to the bankrupt at the time of his bankruptcy, or descended or came to him subsequently thereto, and that they had obtained judgment in an action of ejectment for the recovery of the said lands, and that they required the defendants to deliver up all deeds, muniments and writings in their custody relating to the title to the said lands. The defendants refused to give up the deeds. The bankrupt, who died in 1853, never obtained a certificate. On this evidence the defendants' counsel objected, first, that it was not shewn that the plaintiffs had any property in the title deeds in question; and, secondly, that their right, if any, was barred by the Statute of Limitations. The learned Judge directed a verdict to be entered for the plaintiffs, reserving leave to the defendants to move to enter a verdict for them. Lush, for the defendant Cotterill, and Collier, for the de 1860. PLANT v. COTTERILL. 1860. PLANT v. COTTERILL. fendants Styche and Clifft, in Hilary Term, obtained rules to entera nonsuit or verdict for the defendants, on the grounds that the title of the plaintiffs had no relation back so as to vest the property in the title deeds in them; secondly, that the action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Montague Smith and Gray now shewed cause.-Formerly, in order to vest the bankrupt's real property in his assignees, it was necessary that an assignment or bargain and sale should be executed. The 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, was the Bankrupt Act in force at the time of William Brown's bankruptcy. By the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, s. 64, it was provided that the "Commissioners shall, by deed indented and enrolled &c., convey to the assignees, for the benefit of the creditors, all lands, tenements and hereditaments, except copyhold or customary-hold &c., to which any bankrupt is entitled, and all interest to which such bankrupt is entitled in any of such lands &c., and all such lands &c. as he shall purchase, or shall descend, be devised, revert to or come to such bankrupt before he shall have obtained his certificate, and all deeds, papers and writings respecting the same; and every such deed shall be valid against the bankrupt and against all persons claiming under him." By the 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 56, s. 26, it was enacted that "where any person shall have been adjudged a bankrupt all such present and future real estate of such bankrupt &c. as by the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, is directed to be conveyed by the Commissioners to the assignees, shall vest in such bankrupt's assignee or assignees for the time being by virtue of his or their appointment, without any deed of conveyance for that purpose; and as often as any such assignee or assignees shall die &c., and a new assignee or assignees shall be duly appointed, such of the aforesaid real estate as shall remain unsold or unconveyed shall by virtue of such appointment vest in the new assignee or assignees, either alone or jointly with the existing assignees, as the case may require, without any conveyance for that purpose.' That section, which applied to past as well as future bankruptcies, for the first time dispensed with the necessity of a fresh assignment to vest the bankrupt's after-acquired real property in his assignees. The 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106 repealed the former Acts, and, by section 4, it is enacted that "all proceedings in bankruptcy depending at the commencement of that Act" shall be "proceeded in and brought to a conclusion under the provisions of that Act:" provided that "nothing in that Act contained shall render invalid any proceedings in bankruptcy," or "lessen or affect any right, title, claim, demand or remedy which any person now has or hereafter may have under or by virtue thereof." The 142nd section provides that "when any person shall have been adjudged a bankrupt, all lands &c., except copyhold or customary-hold &c., to which any bankrupt is entitled, and all interest to which such bankrupt is entitled in any of such lands &c., and of which he might &c. have disposed &c., and all such lands &c. as he shall purchase, or shall descend, be devised, revert to, or come to such bankrupt before he shall have obtained his certificate, and all deeds, papers and writings respecting the same, shall become absolutely vested in the assignees for the time being &c.; by virtue of their appointment, without any deed of conveyance for that purpose; and as often as any such assignee shall die &c., such of the real estate as shall remain unsold &c. shall vest in the new assignee." Young v. Rishworth (a) shews that the 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, has a retrospective operation, so that an assignee appointed under that Act takes all the property which might have been conveyed to an assignee under the old Acts. Here, while the bankrupt was uncertificated, property descended to him which, under the (a) 8 A. & E. 470. 1860. PLANT v. COTTERILL. 1860. PLANT t. COTTERILL. 1 & 2 Wm. 4, c. 56, s. 26, vested in the then assignee. It therefore vested in the plaintiffs as soon as they were appointed assignees. As to the Statute of Limitations. From 1840, when there was no assignee, till 1858, when the plaintiffs were appointed assignees, the bankrupt or those claiming under him were justified in holding the deeds; but on the plaintiffs' appointment as assignees the right of the defendants to hold them ceased, and on the refusal of the defendants to give them up a right of action in detinue accrued to the plaintiffs. The deeds are part of the estate, and as a general rule go with it. Kingdon, for the defendant Cotterill, argued in support of the rule. The bankrupt was dead at the time when the present assignees were appointed. In his lifetime he conveyed the property to which the title deeds relate to trustees, John Brown and the defendant Cotterill. If that conveyance was inoperative the estate vested in the bankrupt's heir at law. It never vested in any assignee during the life of the bankrupt, and it was divested from the bankrupt before any assignee was appointed. [Pollock, C. B.—Could the Commissioners, under the statutes formerly in force, have conveyed the property by bargain and sale to the assignees after the death of the bankrupt?] It is submitted that they could not. [Pollock, C. B.-Probably the bankrupt was no more than a trustee for the creditors. Could he convey any larger interest than that to the defendants?] No provision has been made in any of the statutes for the death of a bankrupt; and in case of a bankrupt's death there is nothing which gives to an assignee subsequently appointed any property which never vested in the old assignee. The 142nd section of the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106 only provides for the passing of future property, that is, property coming |