out. The railway company calculated that the time their goods trains were detained while the train engine was occupied in uncoupling trucks ready to go in the direction in which the train was traveling, averaged per diem at Wheelock one hour, and at Malkins Bank one hour. It was held that "if the time occupied by the railway company's engine at the Salt Union's request or for their convenience in shunting the Salt Union's traffic to or from their Malkins Bank Sidings exceeds for each train twelve minutes, and to or from Wheelock sidings exceeds six minutes, that the railway company may charge the Salt Union for time over the said twelve minutes and six minutes, respectively, during which the railway company's engine is occupied in shunting such traffic at the rate of 7s. per hour."

696. Charges for service before carriage is undertaken.

It would seem that the only basis for making additional charges against the shipper would be for matters connected with the carriage which the shipper expressly or impliedly authorizes to be done in his behalf. Thus it would seem to follow that as respects services precedent or subsequent to the carriage the carrier cannot dictate, and if the shipper chooses to perform them himself or make other arrangements for their performance he should be free to do so. This is well brought out in the case of 318 1-2 Tons of Coal.3 In this libel the issue was raised whether the railroad company could compel the shipper to employ the shovellers it furnished, charging ten cents per ton for their services, when the shipper could have obtained other shovellers for eight cents per ton.

Judge Shipman held that the railroad was not justified in demanding these charges; as in his opinion he discusses the question upon fundamental principles, a considerable extract is

3 14 Blatch. 453, Fed. Cas. 14,010, B. & W. 364 (1878).

given: "A common carrier is under an obligation to accept, within reasonable limits, ordinary goods which may be tendered to him for carriage at reasonable times, for which he has accommodation. The carrier cannot generally discriminate between persons who tender freight, and exclude a particular class of customers. The railroad company could not establish the rule that it would receive coal only from certain barge owners, or from a particular class of barge captains. It carries "for all people indifferently." But, while admitting this duty, the company has declared that, for the convenience of the public, and in order to transport coal more expeditiously, and to avoid delays, it will receive such coal only, from barges at its wharf, as shall be delivered through the agency of laborers selected by the company. This rule is a restriction upon its common law obligation. The carrier, on its part, is bound to receive goods from all persons alike. The duty and the labor of delivery to the carrier is imposed upon the barge owner, who pays for the necessary labor. The service, so far as the shovelling is concerned, is performed, not upon the property of the railroad company, but upon the deck of the vessel. The company is virtually saying to the barge owner, You shall employ upon your own property, in the service which you are bound to render, and for which you must pay, only the laborers whom we designate, and, though our general duty is to receive all ordinary goods delivered at reasonable times, we will receive only those goods which may be handled by persons of our selection. The law relating to carriers has not yet permitted them to impose such limitations upon the reception or acceptance of goods."5

4 Crouch v. L. & N. W. Railway Co., 14 C. B. 255 (1858).

5 Beadell v. Eastern Counties R. Co., 2 C. B. N. S. 509 (1854).

§ 697. Freight should cover the entire carriage.

By the general principle governing this matter also, the freight rate should cover the entire carriage, taking the goods up, transporting them to their destination and setting them down. The general considerations which seem to dictate this fundamental rule are well set forth in the following quotation:

"The freight demanded covers the entire service of the carrier from depot to depot. It is in law the compensation, not only for the actual carriage, but also for the facilities furnished for loading and unloading. The service is a single one, and the compensation is likewise single. The law will not permit the charge for such single service to be divided. A carrier cannot make up its bill of charges in items, one for loading, one for carriage, one for personal service of attendants, one for delivery, etc. The freight is not an aggregate of separate charges, but a single charge. This policy of the law is not because a particular shipper might not deal with the carrier as intelligently in the case of one method as in the other, but because the public is not so likely to deal intelligently with a series of items as with a single freight rate. The shipper may be intelligent or unintelligent, ignorant or educated, accustomed to business, or inexperienced in such affairs, deliberate and careful, or hasty and uninquiring. The service of the carrier is for one as well as the other. A single charge presents to him at once the whole problem. A series of charges might confuse him, and leave uncertain what, in the end, the aggregate would be."

§ 698. No separate charge for a part of the transit

By the general principle governing this matter, the carrier, it seems, cannot divide up his route so as to make a separate charge for crossing a bridge. In the case of Southern Pacific Company v. Patterson, the railroad company had conveyed its right of

6 Grosscup, J., in Union Trust Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 64 Fed. 992 (1894).

77 Tex. Civ. App. 451, 27 S. W. 194 (1894).

way across a river to an independent bridge company, which exacted a toll of fifty cents for crossing the river. This was held to be an illegal exaction. The court seems to have thought that no separate charge could properly be made, and this, it is submitted, is the correct view. In the actual case the decision was that, whether or not a separate charge could be made, it could not at any rate exceed the maximum mileage rate imposed by law upon railroad companies.

§ 699. Charges for services during transportation.

It has been seen that in general the protection which the railroad gives to goods in transit is an integral part of an indivisible service, and it should therefore be all included in the single rate made for the carriage. But there are some extraordinary services required in the case of particular shipments which may so vary in each case that it will be plainly justifiable, if not requisite, to make separate charges for them. An illustration of this possibility seems to be the charge commonly made separately for icing at the initial point and re-icing during transit of a refrigerator car containing a shipment of perishable freight. For this is a service specially required for this class of commodities, varying for different things which require different degrees of refrigeration, definitely ascertainable so that it can be charged against the particular shipment and altogether separate therefore.

The status of the icing charge is not yet entirely determined at common law; although it would seem plain that it is so necessary a part of modern transportation that a railroad ought to see to it that refrigeration is provided at a reasonable price. In 1904 the Interstate Commerce Commission expressed its opinion upon the question in the following language: "Whether the carrier is legally compellable to furnish ice for the refrigeration

8

8 Re Transportation of Fruit, 10 I. C. C. Rep. 360 (1904). Accord Truck F. Asso. v. Northeastern Ry., 6 I. C. C. Rep. 295 (1895).

of such cars is more doubtful. In our opinion it should be. A refrigerator car is worth nothing without ice. These cars are usually employed to transport commodities to considerable distances. While the shipper might attend to the initial icing, he could not, without great difficulty, provide for re-icings en route. If the railways were to entirely withdraw from the performance of this service, and to insist that it should be done by the shipper in each instance, it would result in throwing the transportation of perishable commodities into the hands of a few large shippers who could afford to provide the necessary icing facilities."9

700. Terminal facilities usually included in the rates. The usual thing, therefore, is to assume that all use of terminal facilities in delivery of the property transported is included in the rate made for the carriage. This was squarely said by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case 10 where a railroad. had entered into an arrangement by which consignees of cattle could not get them except at an established stock-yard, the proprietors of which charged yardage for the service. Mr. Justice Harlan in delivering the opinion of the court used the following language: "The carrier must at all times be in proper condition both to receive from the shipper and to deliver to the consignee, according to the nature of the property to be transported, as well as to the necessities of the respective localities in which it is received and delivered. A carrier of live stock has no more right to make a special charge for merely receiving or merely delivering such stock, in and through stock-yards provided by iself, in order that it may properly receive and load, or unload and deliver, such stock, than a carrier of passengers may make a special charge for the use of its passenger depot by passengers

9 See, also, Georgia Peach Growers' Ass'n v. Atlantic Coast Line, 10 1. C. C. Rep. 255 (1904); Consolidated F. Co. v. So. Pac. Ry., 10 I. C. C. Rep. 590 (1904).

10 Covington Stockyards Co. v. Keith, 139 U. S. 128, 11 Sup. Ct. 461, & W. 256 (1891).

B.