gether with its contents. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show the delivery of the article to the agents of the omnibus line, and proffered in evidence a check for the baggage signed by the defendants as proprietors of the omnibus line. It was properly held that the defendants were chargeable as common carriers. The opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Caton on that point was as follows: "It is further objected that the court assumed that Parmelee was a common carrier, without proof of that fact. The proof showed that he was the owner of an omnibus line, to the agents of which the proof tended to show the trunk was delivered. The court was authorized to take notice that the owner of an omnibus line is a common carrier, just as much as the owner of a railroad or of a line of steamboats. The court will take notice of the general meaning of words; and we know that an omnibus line means a line of coaches for the carriage of passengers and their baggage. If this line was established for other purposes, that should have been shown in defense." 14 § 181. Express companies. The business of transporting small or valuable goods has come largely into the hands of express companies. So far as such companies merely transmit parcels locally in their own teams, they are evidently carriers. The more important work of the companies, however, is done in connection with the carriage of parcels over a long distance over the lines of railways or steamboats. The express company has at the place of departure a local agent who receives the parcel for transmission; it is then transported over the line of a railway or steamboat, but always 14 Acc. Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. St. 208 (1858); Dibble v. Brown, 12 Ga. 217, 56 Am. Dec. 460 (1852); Parmelee v. Lowitz, 74 Ill. 116, 24 Am. Rep. 276 (1874); Parmelee v. McNulty, 19 Ill. 556 (1858); Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 234, 32 Am. Dec. 455 (1838); Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145 (1840); Beckman v. Shouse, 5 Rawle (Penn.), 179, 28 Am. Dec. 653 (1835). in a part of the train or boat set aside for the express company, and at all times in the control and care of an agent of the company; and upon the arrival of the train or boat at the place of destination the parcel is taken by a local agent and by him delivered to the consignee. The express company in such a case claims that it is not a carrier; that it merely relieves the shipper of the labor of finding and contracting with a carrier; in short, that it is only a forwarding agent. In the leading case of Buckland v. Adams Express Company 15 this contention was made in elaborate form. It was urged that persons exercising the employment of express carriers or messengers over railroads and by steamboats cannot, from the very nature of the case, exercise any care or control over the means of transportation which they are obliged to adopt; that the carriages and boats in which the merchandise intrusted to them is placed, and the agents or servants by whom they are managed, are not selected by them nor subject to their direction or supervision; and that the rules of common law, regulating the duties and liabilities of carriers, having been adapted to a different mode of conducting business, by which the carrier was enabled to select his own servants and vehicles and to exercise a personal care and oversight of them, are wholly inapplicable to a contract of carriage by which it is understood between the parties that the service is to be performed, in part, at least, by means of agencies over which the carrier can exercise no management or control whatever. But Mr. Justice Bigelow said: "We are unable to see any valid reason for the suggestion that the defendants are not to be regarded as common carriers. The name or style under which they assume to carry on their business is wholly immaterial. The real nature of their occupation and of the legal duties and obligations which it imposes on them is to be ascertained from a consideration of the kind of service which they hold themselves 15 97 Mass. 124, 93 Am. Dec. 68, B. & W. 135 (1867). out to the public as ready to render to those who may have occasion to employ them. Upon this point there is no room for doubt. They exercise the employment of receiving, carrying, and delivering goods, wares, and merchandise for hire on behalf of all persons who may see fit to require their services. In this capacity they take property from the custody of the owner, assume entire possession and control of it, transport it from place to place, and deliver it at a point of destination to some consignee or agent there authorized to receive it. The statement embraces all the elements essential to constitute the relation of common carriers on the part of the defendants towards the persons who employ them." This case has been universally followed, and the express company held to be a common carrier of goods.16 16 United States.-Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co., 93 U. S. 174, 23 L. Ed. 872; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Dinsmore, 108 U. S. 30, 27 L. Ed. 640, 2 Sup. Ct. 9 (1884), reversing s. c. 10 Fed. 210; The Express Cases, 117 U. S. 1, 29 L. Ed. 791 (1886); Southern Exp. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & So. R. Co., 3 McCrary, 872 (1876), 10 Fed. 210, Final Decree, 10 Fed. 869 (1882); United States v. Pacific Exp. Co., 15 Fed. 867 (1883). Alabama.-Southern Express Co. v. Crook, 44 Ala. 468, 4 Am. Rep. 140 (1870); Southern Express Co. v. Hess, 53 Ala. 19 (1875). Colorado.-Overland Express Co. v. Carroll, 7 Col. 43 (1883). District of Columbia.-Galt v. Adams Express Co., MacArthur and M. 124, 48 Am. Rep. 742 (1879). Florida.-Southern Express Co. v. Van Meter, 17 Fla. 783 (1880). Georgia.-Southern Express Co. v. Newbry, 36 Ga. 635, 91 Am. Dec. 783 (1867). Illinois. Gulliver v. Adams Express Co., 38 Ill. 503 (1865); Boscowitz v. Adams Express Co., 93 Ill. 523 (1879). Indiana.-American Express Co. v. Hockett, 30 Ind. 250, 95 Am. Dec. 691 (1868); United States Express Co. v. State, 164 Ind. 196, 73 N. E. 101 (1905). Kansas.-Adams Exp. Co. v. McConnell, 27 Kans. 238 (1882). Massachusetts.-Mather v. American Express Co., 138 Mass. 55 (1884). Michigan. United States Exp. Co. v. Root, 47 Mich. 231, 10 N. W. 351 (1881). Minnesota.-Christenson v. American Express Co., 15 Minn. 270, 2 Am. Rep. 122 (1870); Bardwell v. American Express Co., 35 Minn. 344, 28 N. W. 925 (1886). 182. Dispatch companies. The same question came up several times for decision in regard to the fast freight lines or dispatch companies. These lines again claimed that they were forwarders only and not carriers at all; but the courts held consistently that as they took possession they were carriers, and that as they professed a common calling they were common carriers. One representative case where these companies were charged as common carriers will do for all--Transportation Company v. Bloch Brothers.17 In that case Mr. Justice Caldwell said: "This instruction properly treats the defendant as a common carrier. The duties which it undertakes, and which it holds itself out to the public as willing to undertake and perform, give it that character. In very many cases it has been expressly adjudged to be a common carrier, and in others such has been assumed to be its character without a discussion of the question. The text-writers say that despatch companies are common carriers, and class them with express companies because of the many points of similarity in Missouri.-Kirby v. Adams Express Co., 2 Mo. App. 369 (1876). New York. An earlier N. Y. case contra is overruled; in Hersfield v. Adams, 19 Barb. 577 (1855); Place v. Union Express Co., 2 Hilt. 19 (1858); Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166, 10 Am. Rep. 575 (1872); Landsberg v. Dinsmore, 4 Daly, 490 (1873). Ohio.-United States Express Co. v. Backman, 28 Ohio St. 144 (1875); American Express Co. v. Smith, 33 Ohio St. 511 (1878); Bernstine v. Union Exp. Co., 40 Ohio St. 451 (1884). Oregon.-Bennett v. Northern Exp. Co., 12 Ore. 49 (1885). Pennsylvania.-Grogan v. Adams Exp. Co., 114 Pa. St. 523 (1886); Union Express Co. v. Ohleman, 92 Penn. St. 323 (1879). South Carolina.-Stadhecker v. Combs, 9 Rich. Law, 193 (1856). Wisconsin.-Wells v. American Exp. Co., 55 Wis. 23, 11 N. W. 537, 12 N. W. 441 (1882). 17 86 Tenn. 392, 6 Am. St. Rep. 847, 6 S. W. 881 (1888). their business, and the fact that they alike generally use the vehicles of others in the transportation of freight." 18 § 183. Messenger companies. It would seem plain that the city messenger companies are common carriers of the letters and parcels taken by their employees for their patrons and should be held liable as such for losses, unless there is some special arrangement. As was said in a recent case: 19" In general this liability is found to attach because such companies hold themselves out as ready to conduct the business of carrying parcels, as well as letters or messages, and thus induce the public to intrust the carriage of such parcels to them. In the present case, if the defendant is to be held at all as a common carrier, it can only be because it has offered its service and held itself out as such; because there is no evidence whether or not such business is covered by its charter, and its title would seem to indicate that it was organized as a telegraph company, and not as a messenger company. It is in evidence, however, that it installs call boxes in houses and sends messenger boys, in response to calls, to carry out such errands as may be intrusted to them, and that this service frequently involves, to the knowledge of the company, the carrying of parcels. So far as appears, this service is confined to the carrying of such small parcels as can be carried by hand by a lad, and it does not appear that the defendant is equipped or prepared to carry more bulky merchandise. To the extent, then, that it offers its services to the public as a carrier, that is, so far as relates to small 18 Colorado.-Merchants Dispatch Co. v. Cornforth, 3 Colo. 280 (1877). Illinois.—Merchants Dispatch Co. v. Bolles, 80 Ill. 473 (1875); Merchants Dispatch Co. v. Leysor, 89 Ill. 43 (1878); Merchants Dispatch Co. v. Joesting, 89 Ill. 153 (1878). Iowa.-Robinson v. Merchants Dispatch Co., 45 Iowa, 470 (1877); Stewart v. Merchants Dispatch Co., 47 Iowa, 229 (1877); Wilde v. Merchants Dispatch Co., 47 Iowa, 247 (1877); Bancroft v. Merchants Dispatch Co., 47 Iowa, 262 (1877). 19 Gilman v. Postal Tel. Co., 48 Misc. (N. Y.) 372, (1905). |