not design to make it so broad as its terms import, enforce the order in such restricted sense, where it otherwise would not be enforceable. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 64 Fed. 723, 5 Int. Com. Rep. 146 (1894). And where the order of the Commission is based on an erroneous construction of the statute, by reason of which error it has declined adequately to find the facts, the courts will not proceed to an original investigation of the facts which should have been passed upon by the Commission, but will correct the error of law committed by that body, and, after doing, so, dismiss the application without prejudice to the right of the Commission to make a further investigation of the facts. The defendant is entitled to have its defense considered, in the first instance at least, by the Commission upon a full consideration of all the circumstances and conditions upon which a legitimate order could be founded. The question whether certain charges were reasonable or otherwise, whether certain discriminations were due or undue, are questions of fact, to be passed upon by the Commission in the light of all facts duly. alleged and supported by competent evidence; and it did not comport with the true scheme of the statute that the courts should undertake to find and pass upon such questions of fact on appeal. East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 181 U. S. 1, 45 L. Ed. 719, 21 Sup. Ct. 516 (1901).

So where the Commission has made an order upon one ground, the courts may enforce the order upon another ground. The courts are not confined to the ground alleged by the Commission. If a court finds that the forbidden practice of the carrier is in itself for any reason illegal as a violation of the act, the order might be valid and be a lawful order, although the Commission gave a wrong reason for making it. If it held the practice to be a violation of one section, the order to desist might be valid if, instead of the section named by the Commission, the court should find that the practice was a violation of another section of the act. All the facts being brought out before the Commission or the court, the court could decide whether the order was a lawful one, without being confined to the reasons stated by the Commission. Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 536, 26 Sup. Ct. 330 (1906).

In this chapter are collected representative extracts from State statutes against the charging of extortionate rates by common carriers. It is, of course, universal common law that a common carrier shall not demand unreasonable prices; and in so far as these statutes reiterate this principle, they are simply declaratory of the common law. The chief object of these clauses is to provide more adequate methods for the enforcement of this law. Thus it is not uncommon to provide for the imposition of a penalty for extortion, sometimes a very heavy one, and in some States an increasing one for successive offenses. More common still is the provision giving to the injured party the right to recover double or treble damages, and, in addition, usually, his reasonable attorney's fees.

§ 1101. Alabama.

Any person or corporation engaged in the business of transporting passengers or freights over any railroad in this State, who shall exact and receive for such transportation more than just compensation therefor, or demands more than the rates specified in any bill of lading issued for such freights, or who, for his own advantage, or for the advantage of any connecting line, or of any person or locality, shall make any unjust discrimination in such transportation, against any individual, corporation, or locality, such overcharge or discrimination to be determined by the jury, is guilty of extortion, and is liable to the party injured for double the damages sustained. [Civil Code (1896), section 3460]. In such suit, the fact that the rates or terms, in respect to which the extortion is alleged, had been previously approved by the railroad commissioners is prima facie evidence that the same were not extortionate; nor shall any rate or charge for the transportation of freight over any railroad be held or considered extortionate or excessive, if in the absence of any unjust discrimination, it appears from the evidence that the net earnings of such railroad for transporting freights on the basis of such rate or charge, together with the net earnings thereof from its passengers and other traffic does not amount to more than a fair and just return on the value of such railroad, its appurtenances and equipments. [Ibid, section 3461.]

See Mobile & O. R. R. v. Dismukes, 94 Ala. 131 (1891), pointing out that these sections cannot apply to interstate commerce.

§ 1102. Arkansas.

Sec. 6309. All charges made for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property on any railroad in this State, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, or storage, or handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just, and every unjust and

unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful. [Digest Statutes (1894), section 6309.]

Sec. 6191. The legislature may, when any such railroad shall be opened for use, from time to time, alter or reduce the rates of toll, fare, freight, or other profits upon such road, but the same shall not, without the consent of the corporation, be so reduced as to produce with said profits less than fifteen per centum on the capital actually paid in, nor unless, on an examination of the amounts received and expended, to be made by the Secretary of State, he shall ascertain that the net income divided by the company from all sources for the year then last past shall have exceeded an annual income of fifteen per cent. upon the capital of the corporation actually paid in. [Ibid, section 6191.]

The standard of reasonableness is discussed in St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Gree, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18 (1895).

1103. Florida.

From and after the taking effect of this Act, if any railroad, railroad company, or common carrier, organized, or that may be hereafter organized, or exist, in this State under any act of incorporation or general law of this State now in force, or which may hereafter be enacted, or any railroad, railroad company, or common carrier, organized, or which may be hereafter organized under the laws of any other State, and doing business in this State, shall charge, collect, demand or receive more than a fair or reasonable rate of toll or compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description, or for the use and transportation of any railroad car upon its tracks, or any of the branches thereof, or upon any railroad within this State which it has the right, license or permission to use, operate or control; the same upon conviction thereof shall be dealt with as hereinafter provided for. [Laws of 1899 (No. 39), ch. 4700, section 3.]

§ 1104. Georgia.

That from and after the passage of this Act, if any railroad corporation organized or doing business in this State under any Act of incorporation or general law of this State now in force, or which may hereafter be enacted, or any railroad corporation. organized, or which may hereafter be organized under the laws of any other State and doing business in this State, shall charge, collect, demand or receive more than a fair and reasonable rate of toll or compensation for the transportation of passengers or freight of any description, or for the use and transportation of any railroad cars upon the track or any branches thereof, or upon any railroad within this State which it has the right, licenses or permission to use, operate or control, the same shall be deemed guilty of extortion, and upon conviction thereof shall be dealt with as hereinafter provided. [Acts of 1878-79, No. 269, section iii.]

A written contract of affreightment stipulated that if the goods were loaded in a box car the rate should be so much per 100 pounds actual weight, and if loaded on a flat car so much per 100 pounds for 10,000 pounds. The actual weight of the consignment was 1,550 pounds, and the carrier loaded a part in a box car and part on a flat car, in a way to make the freight more than it would have been if the whole consignment had been loaded on either car. It was held that this was an overcharge, and that plaintiff, after paying the whole charge and complying with Civ. Code, § 2316, was entitled to recover the overcharge and the penalty prescribed by said act. Stewart v. Comer, 100 Ga. 754, 28 S. E. 461 (1897).

1105. Illinois.

If any railroad corporation, organized or doing business in this State under any Act of incorporation, or general law of this State, now in force or which may hereafter be enacted, or any railroad corporation organized or which may hereafter be organized under the laws of any other State, and doing business in this State shall charge, collect, demand or receive more than a fair and reasonable rate of toll or compensation, for the