Opinion of the Court.

violation of the Constitution of the United States, and is wholly void.

"And this respondent further says, that if the said order be enforced by the mandate of this court, it will take the property of this respondent against its will, without due process or any process of law, and in violation of section 1 of article 14 of the Constitution of the United States; that, if the said order of the said relators be enforced against this respondent, and if its charge be reduced to one dollar ($1.00) per car, this respondent will be thereby deprived of the ability to pay the interest upon its said bonded indebtedness, as it has, with the consent of the State of Minnesota, contracted to do, and that any law of the said State, or any order of the said relators, or any judg ment of this court, preventing the respondent from performing its said contract, when without such law, order, or judgment it might have performed the same, or might thereafter perform the same, is and will be a law, order and judgment impairing the obligation of a contract, and is and will be in violation of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, and is and will be wholly void.

"This respondent, further making return, says, that the said order of the said relators, set forth in said alternative writ, will, if enforced, deprive it of its property for the use and benefit of private citizens, without making any compensation unto it as the owner thereof, in violation of section 13 of article 1 of the constitution of the State of Minnesota, and is and will be wholly void.

"And this respondent, further making return, says that, by the provisions of section 4 of article 10 of the constitution of said State, this respondent, being a common carrier, enjoying the right of way in pursuance of the provisions of the said constitution, is bound to carry the mineral, agricultural and other productions of the people of said State on equal and reasonable terms; that it has always so carried the same whenever tendered or offered to it for that purpose; that the terms offered by it have always been equal and uniform to all persons and have always been reasonable in amount.

"And this respondent avers, that it is entitled to have and

Opinion of the Court.

receive reasonable compensation for the service it is so bound to render, and that the said order of said relators, set forth in said alternative writ, assumes to fix a grossly inadequate and unreasonable compensation therefor, is in violation of the constitutional provision last mentioned, and is wholly null and void.

"That, by reason of the matters herein before set forth, this respondent has not complied, and ought not to be by the mandate of this honorable court compelled to comply, with the requirements of the recommendation and order made on the 2d day of August, 1887, and in said alternative writ set forth.

"Wherefore this respondent prays the judgment of the court that the said alternative writ may be discharged and that this respondent may be hence dismissed."

On a hearing on the return, on the 29th of January, 1889, the company asked leave to make proof of the matters set forth in the return, at such time as the court might appoint; but the request was denied, and the company excepted. On the motion of the attorney general, judgment was then entered on the application, the alternative writ and the return, for the issuing of a peremptory writ of mandamus, to review which judgment this writ of error is sued out.

The Supreme Court rendered an opinion stating that, as the case was similar to that of The State ex rel. The Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., before decided by it, the decision would follow the decision in that case and upon the reasons stated in the opinion filed therein.

The views and considerations applicable to that case, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, which has just been decided by us, ante, 418, apply with even greater force to the present case, as appears by the return. above set forth at length.

The Minneapolis Eastern Railway company was organized as a corporation in June, 1878, under title 1, chapter 34 of the General Statutes of Minnesota. By § 2 of an act of the legislature, approved March 3, 1869, (Laws of 1869, c. 78, 95,) it was provided "that any railroad company or corporation

VOL. CXXXIV-31

Opinion of the Court.

organized under the title to which this is an amendment, may charge and receive for the transportation of passengers and freight on their road such reasonable rate as may be from time to time fixed by said corporation or prescribed by law." By § 8 of chapter 103 of the General Laws of Minnesota of 1875, it was provided as follows: "No railroad company shall charge, demand or receive from any person, company, or corporation an unreasonable price for the transportation of persons or property, or for the hauling or storing of any freight, or for the use of its cars, or for any privilege or service afforded by it in the transaction of its business as a railroad corporation." We do not perceive that these statutory provisions constitute such a contract with the corporation as to the fixing by it of its rates of charges, as to deprive the legislature of its power to regulate those charges.

The decision of the commission in the present case appears to be merely a general finding that each and every charge in excess of $1.00 per car for switching within the limits of the city of Minneapolis is an unreasonable and excessive compensation for the service performed. The commission states that it made such finding after due and careful inquiry and consideration; but it does not appear that the Minneapolis Eastern Railway Company had any prior notice of any hearing at which such finding was made, or any opportunity of being heard in regard thereto; while it does appear that it asked leave of the court to make proof of the matters so set up in its return, that its request was denied, and that it excepted to such denial; and it further appears by its return that it claimed that the rate of $1.00 per car would be so unfair, unequal, unjust and unreasonable as to take its property against its will without due process of law.

For the reasons set forth in the other case just decided, ante, 418,

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, rendered February 27, 1889, awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus against the railway company, is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with an instruction to take further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of

this court.

Statement of the Case.

UNITED STATES v. JONES.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

No. 1554. Submitted March 3, 1890.- Decided March 24, 1890.

The decision of a commissioner of a Circuit Court of the United States upon a motion for bail and the sufficiency thereof, and his decision upon a motion for a continuance of the hearing of a criminal charge, are judicial acts in the "hearing and deciding on criminal charges" within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 847, providing for a per diem compensation in such cases.

The approval of a commissioner's account by a Circuit Court of the United States is prima facie evidence of its correctness, and, in the absence of clear and unequivocal proof of mistake on the part of the court, should be conclusive.

THIS was an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of Claims against the United States in favor of Richard M. Jones, for services rendered by him as a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina.

The material facts of the case, as found by the court upon the evidence, were, that the claimant had been a commissioner of the said court from 1883 to the bringing of the action; that from December 3, 1885, to June 30, 1886, as such commissioner, he issued warrants in six cases in which issue was joined and testimony taken; in three cases in which issue was joined and no testimony was taken; and in three cases in which issue was not joined, the defendants discharged, and no testimony taken; and that he duly made his docket entries in each and all of those cases by order and authority of the court, and in the manner required by its rules.

His accounts for fees and for keeping his dockets were verified by oath, and presented to the court in the presence of the district attorney, and approved by the court in due form. For those accounts, thus approved, he was allowed a fee of three dollars in each case where issue was joined and testimony taken, two dollars where issue was joined but no testimony taken, and one dollar where issue was not joined,

Argument for Appellants.

and the defendant discharged. His account also showed charges on eleven different days from March 12, 1884, to September 15, 1887, in as many criminal cases, each of which charges was either "for hearing and deciding on criminal charges, in deciding on amount of bail and sufficiency thereof," or "for hearing and deciding on criminal charges, in hearing and deciding on motion for continuance." These charges were approved by the Circuit Court, but not paid.

The court found as a conclusion of law that the claimant was entitled to $55 for these last eleven cases, and entered a judgment in his favor for $76. From that judgment the United States brought this appeal.

The only assignment of error presented by the government in this appeal was, that the court erred in finding that claimant is entitled to $55 for hearing and deciding on amount of bail and sufficiency thereof in four cases, and for hearing and de ciding on motion for continuance in seven cases.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Cotton and Mr. F. P. Deweer for appellants.

The words "hearing and deciding on criminal charges" are plain and unequivocal in meaning and without ambiguity. The words have application to the charges made and the hearing and decision thereon. There must be a “hearing” relative to the "charges" and a "deciding" of some point. relative to the "charges." The granting of a motion for a continuance is the deferring of "hearing and deciding on criminal charges." A determination upon the sufficiency of bail is either precedent or subsequent to the "hearing and deciding on criminal charges."

The approval of a commissioner's account by a Circuit Court of the United States under the provisions of the act of February 22, 1875, 18 Stat. 333, c. 95, is not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties. It is prima facie evidence that the work was done. Turner v. United States, 19 C. Cl. 629; Wallace v. United States, 116 U. S. 398.

It is not disputed in the case at bar that continuances were.