Dissenting Opinion: Harlan, J.

thereby conferred upon these courts judicial power to enforce the obligation of contracts of a State of that value when impaired by its own laws.

V. Inasmuch as laws passed by the State of North Carolina, Resolution of Jan. 20, 1870; Act of 1870, c. 71, March 8; Act of 1874, c. 2, Nov. 23, and a constitutional amendment adopted in 1880; Const. art. 1, sec. 6; impair obligations of that State created in 1869, by issuing the coupons now in suit, and deprive the holders of such coupons of property without due process of law, the opinion of the presiding judge below was correct.

Mr. Edward L. Andrews also argued for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court..

We think it perfectly clear that the suit against the auditor in this case was virtually a suit against the State of North Carolina. In this regard it comes within the principle of the cases of Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711; Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 446; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52; and In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443. We do not think it necessary to consider that question

anew.

The other point, the suability of the State, is settled by the decision just rendered in Hans v. The State of Louisiana, ante, 1.

To the question on which the judges of the Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, our answer is in the negative, namely, that the suit could not be maintained in the Circuit Court against the State of North Carolina by the plaintiff, a citizen thereof.

The decree of the Circuit Court is

Reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to dismiss the bill of complaint.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting.

I dissent from so much of the judgment in this case as holds that this suit cannot be maintained against the auditor of

Syllabus.

the State of North Carolina. The legislation of which complaint is here made impaired the obligation of the State's contract, and was therefore unconstitutional and void. It did not, in law, affect the existence or operation of the previous statutes out of which the contract in question arose. So that the court was at liberty to compel the officer of the State to perform the duties which the statutes, constituting the contract, imposed upon him. A suit against him for such a purpose is not, in my judgment, one against the State. It is a suit to compel the performance of ministerial duties, from the performance of which the state's officer was not, and could not be, relieved by unconstitutional and void legislative enactments.

EILEN BECKER v. DISTRICT COURT OF PLYMOUTH

COUNTY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.

No. 101. Submitted January 8, 1890.

Decided March 3, 1890.

The first eight of the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States have reference only to powers exercised by the United States, and not to those exercised by the States.

The provision in Article III of the Constitution of the United States respecting the trial of crimes by jury relates to the judicial power of the United States.

Article VI of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States respecting a speedy and public trial by jury; Articles V and VI respecting the right of persons accused of crime to be confronted with the witnesses; Article VIII respecting excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments; and Article XIV respecting the abridgment of privileges, the deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, and the denial of the equal protection of the laws, are not infringed by the statutes of Iowa authorizing its courts, when a person violates an injunction restraining him from selling intoxicating liquors, to punish him as for contempt by fine or imprisonment or both.

Proceedings according to the common law for contempt of court are not subject to the right of trial by jury, and are "due process of law," within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. All the powers of courts whether at common law or in chancery may be

Opinion of the Court.

called into play by the legislature of a State, for the purpose of suppressing the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors when they are prohibited by law, and to abate a nuisance declared by law to be such; and the Constitution of the United States interposes no hindrance.

A District Court of a county in Iowa is empowered to enjoin and restrain a person from selling or keeping for sale intoxicating liquors, including ale, wine and beer, in the county, and disobedience of the order subjects the guilty party to proceedings for contempt and punishment thereunder.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. William A. McKenney for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. J. S. Struble, Mr. S. M. Marsh and Mr. A. J. Baker, attorney general of Iowa, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa.

The judgment which we are called upon to review is one affirming the judgment of the District Court of Plymouth County in that State. This judgment imposed a fine of five hundred dollars and costs on each of the six plaintiffs in error in this case, and imprisonment in the jail of Plymouth County for a period of three months, but they were to be released from confinement if the fine imposed was paid within thirty days from the date of the judgment.

This sentence was pronounced by the court as a punishment for contempt in refusing to obey a writ of injunction issued by that court, enjoining and restraining each of the defendants from selling, or keeping for sale, any intoxicating liquors, including ale, wine and beer, in Plymouth County, and the sentence was imposed upon a hearing by the court, without a jury, and upon evidence in the form of affidavits.

It appears that on the 11th day of June, 1885, separate petitions in equity were filed in the District Court of Plymouth County against each of these plaintiffs in error, praying that they should be enjoined from selling, or keeping for sale, intoxicating liquors, including ale, wine and beer, in that county. On the 6th of July the court ordered the issue of preliminary injunctions as prayed. On the 7th of July the writs were

Opinion of the Court.

served on each of the defendants in each proceeding by the sheriff of Plymouth County. On the 24th of October, complaints were filed, alleging that these plaintiffs in error had violated this injunction by selling intoxicating liquors contrary to the law and the terms of the injunction served on them, and asking that they be required to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of court. A rule was granted accordingly, and the court, having no personal knowledge of the facts charged, ordered that a hearing be had at the next term of the court, upon affidavits; and on the 8th day of March, 1886, it being at the regular term of said District Court, separate trials were had upon evidence in the form of affidavits, by the court without a jury, upon which the plaintiffs were found guilty of a violation of the writs of injunction issued in said cause, and a sentence of fine and imprisonment, as already stated, entered against them.

Each plaintiff obtained from the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, upon petition, a writ of certiorari, in which it was alleged that the District Court of Plymouth County had acted without jurisdiction and illegally in rendering this judgment, and by agreement of counsel, and with the consent of the Supreme Court of Iowa, the cases of the six appellants in this court were submitted together and tried on one transcript of record. That court affirmed the judgment of the District Court of Plymouth County, and to that judgment of affirmance this writ of error is prosecuted.

The errors assigned here are that the Supreme Court of Iowa failed to give effect to clause 3 of section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and also to the provisions of Article VI of the amendments to the Constitution, which provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.

The second assignment is, that the Supreme Court of Iowa erred in holding that plaintiffs could be fined and imprisoned without first being presented by a grand jury, and could be tried on ex parte affidavits, which decision, it is said, is in con

VOL. CXXXIV-3

Opinion of the Court.

flict with and contrary to the provisions of both Articles V and VI of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, the latter of which provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him.

The fourth assignment is, that the Supreme Court erred in not holding that section 12 of chapter 143 of the acts of the twentieth general assembly of Iowa is in conflict with Article VIII of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. These three assignments, as will be presently seen, may be disposed of together.

The third assignment is, that the Supreme Court of Iowa erred in not holding that said chapter 143 of the acts of the twentieth general assembly of Iowa, and especially section 12 of said chapter, is void, and in conflict with section 1 of Article XIV of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, in this, that it deprives persons charged with selling intoxicating liquors of the equal protection of the laws, and it prejudices the rights and privileges of that particular class of persons, and denies to them the right of trial by jury, while in all other prosecutions the accused must first be presented by indictment, and then have the benefit of trial by a jury of his peers.

The first three of these assignments of error, as we have stated them, being the first and second and fourth of the assignments as numbered in the brief of the plaintiffs in error, are disposed of at once by the principle often decided by this court, that the first eight articles of the amendments to the Constitution have reference to powers exercised by the government of the United States and not to those of the States. Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469; The Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall. 274; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252.

The limitation, therefore, of Articles V and VI and VIII