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Opinion of the Court.

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Yet writs of error, accompanied with citations, have uniformly issued for the removal of judgments in favor of the United States into a superior court. It has never been suggested that such writ of error was a suit against the United States, and, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of the appellate court."

After thus showing by incontestable argument that a writ of error to a judgment recovered by a State, in which the State is necessarily the defendant in error, is not a suit commenced or prosecuted against a State in the sense of the amendment, he added, that if the court were mistaken in this, its error did not affect that case, because the writ of error therein was not prosecuted by "a citizen of another State" or "of any foreign state," and so was not affected by the amendment; but was governed by the general grant of judicial power, as extending "to all cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, without respect to parties." p. 412.

It must be conceded that the last observation of the Chief Justice does favor the argument of the plaintiff. But the observation was unnecessary to the decision, and in that sense extra judicial, and though made by one who seldom used words without due reflection, ought not to outweigh the important considerations referred to which lead to a different conclusion. With regard to the question then before the court, it may be observed, that writs of error to judgments in favor of the crown, or of the State, had been known to the law from time immemorial; and had never been considered as exceptions to the rule, that an action does not lie against the sovereign.

To avoid misapprehension it may be proper to add that, although the obligations of a State rest for their performance upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made the subjects of judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued, or comes itself into court; yet where property or rights are enjoyed under a grant or contract made by a State, they cannot wantonly be invaded. Whilst the State cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its con

Opinion of the Court.

tracts, may be judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment.

It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the reason or expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign State from prosecution in a court of justice at the suit of individuals. This is fully discussed by writers on public law. It is enough for us to declare its existence. The legislative department of a State represents its polity and its will; and is called upon by the highest demands of natural and political law to preserve justice and judgment, and to hold inviolate the public obligations. Any departure from this rule, except for reasons most cogent, (of which the legis lature, and not the courts, is the judge,) never fails in the end to incur the odium of the world, and to bring lasting injury upon the State itself. But to deprive the legislature of the power of judging what the honor and safety of the State may require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to discharge the public debts, would be attended with greater evils than such failure can cause.

The judgment of the Circuit Court is

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concurring.

Affirmed.

States extends, unless the Upon this ground alone I cannot give my assent to The comments made upon

I concur with the court in holding that a suit directly against a State by one of its own citizens is not one to which the judicial power of the United State itself consents to be sued. assent to the judgment. But I many things said in the opinion. the decision in Chisholm v. Georgia do not meet my approval. They are not necessary to the determination of the present case. Besides, I am of opinion that the decision in that case was based upon a sound interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was.

Statement of the Case.

NORTH CAROLINA v. TEMPLE.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA.

No. 392. Argued January 22, 23, 1890. — Decided March 3, 1890.

This suit was commenced against the State of North Carolina and against the auditor of that State, as defendants, to compel the levying of a special tax for the benefit of certain holders of its bonds; Held,

(1) That the suit against the auditor was, under the circumstances, virtually a suit against the State;

(2) That, on the authority of Hans v. Louisiana, ante, 1, the suit could not be maintained against the State.

THIS suit was commenced in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina by bill in equity filed by Alfred H. Temple, a citizen of North Carolina, on behalf of himself and other bondholders in like interest, against the State of North Carolina and William P. Roberts, the auditor of said state. The object of the bill was to compel said state and its officials, including the auditor, to execute and carry into effect a certain statute of the State, passed January 29, 1869, which provided for raising taxes to pay the interest on certain bonds of the state, called "special tax bonds of the state of North Carolina," Laws of 1868-1869, 67, c. 21, issued under the provisions of said act, and held by the plaintiff and others. In other words, it was a suit, in the nature of a bill for a specific performance of a contract, brought to compel the State of North Carolina to raise a tax for the payment of the arrears of interest due on the state bonds held by the plaintiff and others.

The act referred to authorized a subscription on the part of the State of $4,000,000 of the capital stock of The Wilmington, Charlotte and Rutherford Railroad Company, and the issue of state bonds for the payment thereof, payable thirty years after date, with interest at six per cent per annum, payable semi-annually, to be represented by coupons. The subscription was made and 3000 of the bonds, for $1000 each,

Statement of the Case.

were issued, of which the bonds of the plaintiff, which constitute the ground of the present suit, are a part.

By the sixth section of the act it was provided as follows: "SEC. 6. For the purpose of providing for the payment of the interest upon the bonds hereby authorized and the principal at its maturity, an annual tax of one-eighth of one per cent is hereby imposed upon all the taxable property of the state, which shall be levied, collected, and paid into the state treasury as other public taxes, and the surplus, after paying the interest, shall be invested in securities of the United States or other safe securities and kept as a sinking fund for the payment of the principal money at maturity."

The bill alleged that the plaintiff was the bona fide holder of ten of said bonds, (giving their numbers,) and that the overdue coupons attached thereto, unpaid, amounted to $9900; that in the year 1869 the collection of the special tax was duly made, and a portion of the coupons was paid; but that in the month of January, 1870, and while large amounts of money arising from the collection of the special tax aforesaid remained in the hands of the state treasurer, applicable to the payment of said coupons, the State of North Carolina, in violation of the Constitution of the United States, did by legislative resolution direct the appropriation of the said moneys then in the hands of the treasurer to other purposes; and that, after all of said 3000 bonds had been issued according to law, the State of North Carolina undertook to impair the obligation of the contract, and to that end, on the 20th of January, 1870, formally enacted the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the treasurer be instructed and directed not to pay any more interest on the special tax bonds until authorized and directed so to do by this general assembly."

That to the same end, upon the 8th of March, 1870, Laws of 1869-1870, 119, c. 71, the State also passed an act declaring as follows:

"SECTION 1. The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact, That all acts passed at the last session of this legislature making appropriations to railroad companies be, and the same are hereby, repealed; that all bonds of the State which

Statement of the Case.

have been issued under the said acts now in the hands of any president or other officer of the corporation be immediately returned to the treasurer.

"SEC. 2. The moneys in the state treasury which were levied and collected under the provisions of the acts mentioned in section one of this act are hereby appropriated to the use of the state government, and shall be credited to the counties of the State upon the tax to be assessed for the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy, in proportion to the amounts collected from them, respectively."

That with the same view, upon the 23d of November, 1874, Laws of 1874-1875, 2, c. 2, the general assembly passed an act containing the following provisions:

"SEC. 2. That the treasurer shall not pay or discharge any claim for interest upon any portion of the bonded debt of this State, except as hereinafter provided for by law.

"SEC. 3. That the auditor shall not audit or recognize any claim for principal or interest upon any portion of the bonded debt of this State heretofore made or pretended to be made by authority of this State, except as hereafter provided for by law.

"SEC. 4. That any money in or which may be paid into the treasury on account of special taxes heretofore levied for the payment of the interest on bonds or pretended bonds of this state is hereby transferred and appropriated to the general fund."

That in like connection, on the third day of November, 1880, the following constitutional amendment was adopted by the State:

"Nor shall the general assembly assume or pay or authorize the collection of any tax to pay, either directly or indirectly, expressed or implied, any debt or bond incurred or issued by authority of the convention of the year 1868, or any debt or bond incurred or issued by the legislature of the year 1868, at its special session of 1868, and at its regular session of 1868 and 1869 and 1870, except the bonds issued to fund the interest of the public debt, unless the purposing to pay the same shall have been submitted to the people or by them ratified, by the vote

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