the sealing of all juvenile court and police investigative and offender records at the time the youth reaches his majority, or when two years have elapsed since he has been discharged from the custody of the court. Subsequent to this expungement, all proceedings and records should be treated as though they had never occurred and the youth should reply as such to any inquiry concerning his juvenile record.

4. All police records on juveniles arrested but where no court action was taken should be systematically destroyed when the incident is no longer under active legislation.

The Task Force recommends the enactment of legislation specifically prohibiting federal agencies from requesting information relating to juvenile record expungement from employment applicants or from requesting such information from the courts or the police.

The Task Force further recommends the cessation of all federal funding for computerized systems which contain juvenile records unless it can be demonstrated that these systems provide adequate safeguards for the protection of the juvenile's right of privacy. These standards must fulfill all the requirements of the minimum standards for state legislation previously enumerated, including special provisions to strictly limit data accessibility.

ARREST RECORDS

A large percentage of arrests never result in conviction. Yet, in over half the states, arrest records of persons are open to public inspection, subjecting innocent parties to undue stigma, harrassment, and discrimination.

Persons with arrest records often find it difficult, if not impossible to secure employment or licenses. A study of employment agencies in the New York City area found that seventy-five percent would not make a referral for any applicant with an arrest record. This was true even in cases in which the arrest was not followed by a trial and conviction. This is just one example of the widespread practice of "presumption of guilt" based on the existence of an arrest record.

The Task Force holds that release of information about arrests not followed by conviction is a direct violation of the individual's right of privacy. It therefore recommends that legislative efforts be directed toward:

1. establishing minimum standards for state laws calling for the automatic sealing of all individual arrest records which were not followed by conviction and which are no longer under active investigation;

2. requiring the FBI to seal arrest records not followed by conviction; and 3. prohibiting inclusion of arrest records not followed by conviction on computerized systems involving more than one state or using federal funds.

MEDICAL RECORDS

Medical records, which contain sensitive and personal information, are especially in need of privacy safeguards to maintain basic trust in the doctorpatient relationship. Yet, development of automated data processing systems has enhanced the ability of government and private organizations to store, analyze and transfer medical records. Increasingly, this occurs without the individual's knowledge or consent. Abuse of such information systems can have a deleterious effect on doctor-patient relations.

To guarantee the privacy of medical records, the Task Force recommends that: 1. the federal government provide dollar grants and incentives to States for the voluntary adoption and execution of State plans to insure the right to privacy for computerized medical information systems. Such a plan would place principle responsibility on the States, giving the federal government the right to set minimum standards;

2. Congress review the recently enacted Professional Standards Reviews Organizations (USRO) legislation. There are increasing numbers of reports and complaints regarding Review Board uses of medical files and the threat this poses to privileged, confidential doctor-patient relationships; and

3. provisions be included in national health insurance legislation which specifically insure the individual's privacy. The institution of a national health insurance plan will create a vast medical information network which will require stringent safeguards to prevent abuses of the patient's right to privacy.

57-282-76-pt. 1-19

COMPUTER DATA BANKS

The use of the computer has brought great commercial and social benefits to modern America. Greater reliance on the computer, however, increases its integration into all aspects of daily life. The result is increased vulnerability to abuse or misuse of computerized information.

The Task Force finds that the individual possesses inadequate remedies for the correction of such abuses. In fact, the Task Force considers it probable that many abuses have gone unreported simply because the individual involved did not know of the data being collected about him.

Even if the individual is aware that data is being collected about him, he faces several obstacles if he wishes to expunge purely private information or to correct erroneous information. Among his obstacles are the following: the lack of statutory support for legal action (except in the credit reporting area), the cost of litigation, and even fear of retaliation by the company or agency being challenged.

Despite their potential for abuse, data banks remain an inescapable fact of life in a society growing more complex and more technological. The Task Force does not oppose data banks as such, but favors strong safeguards against their misuse, and recommends that:

1. rights under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 be extended to all data collection. The individual must have and be informed of his right to review information contained in any collection of data about himself (excluding national security and criminal justice files);

2. Congress establish categories (biographical, financial, medical) of information which may not be included in reports on an individual unless the individual knowingly gives his uncoerced consent;

3. limited exceptions be granted for national security and criminal justice investigations;

4. criminal and civil penalties be established for any use of statistical data (collected for collective analysis) to wrongfully acquire information on individuals;

5. transfer of personal information between governmental agencies be strictly limited;

6. the creation of a centralized Federal data bank (except for national security and criminal justice purposes) be prohibited; and

7. a federal "privacy protection agency" be established to enforce the proposed legislation.

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Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to ask unanimous consent that the Republican Task Force on Privacy Report also be submitted for the record, for in that report, put together in the previous Congress, it addressed very carefully these very points that are made by this piece of legislation.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. Without objection, we will be pleased to receive that report. [See p. 277.]

Mr. GOLDWATER. First: Watergate and related problems have clearly demonstrated that there is too much vaguely defined administrative authority within the executive branch of government in the area of surveillance.

H.R. 2604 addresses and remedies this problem by eliminating the administrative authority which can currently authorize surveillance by requiring an application for a court order and the demonstration of probable cause prior to undertaking any lawful surveillance. This is the most important element of the legislation and by itself goes a long way to redressing the imbalance that exists.

Second: By defining the term "surveillance" the legislation takes a giant step toward eliminating the confusion that has been brought on by recent court decisions and administrative interpretations. There is no doubt in my mind that much of the abuse and injury testified to before this and other congressional inquiries has been encouraged by the "gray area" between legitimate surveillance and unconstitutional intrusion into a person's privacy.

The legislation is aiming at closing loopholes and clarifying the law. We are, of course, dealing with a most difficult area. We are attempting to correctly balance the basic Constitutional rights of our citizens with the necessary investigative requirements of legitimate law enforcement and investigative activity.

Third: Mr. Chairman, this legislation carefully and deliberately avoids requiring that a court order be obtained for each individual act of surveillance. I strongly believe that the element should be retained.

I think to do more would be to adopt a legalistic and unrealistic approach.

Finally, I wish to speak to the "reports" sections found on pages 6 to 10 of H.R. 2604. These provisions should provide a knowledgeable congressional oversight. And in responding to the question put forth by Mr. Wiggins on whether it is necessary for the Congress to review, I would respond by saying that I feel, and too often this has happened, the Congress has been divorcing itself from responsibility of oversight and review of legislation it created and, therefore, I think the report section is important.

Perhaps the strictness of the reporting procedure may not be necessary. Perhaps an annual review or an annual report would suffice instead of a strict 30- or 60-day provision, that the courts and the law enforcement agencies would have to report by; but I do believe that the Congress cannot divorce itself of the review of the laws that it creates in order to see whether, in fact, those laws are effective and helpful.

I think the provisions in this report section should provide the Judiciary Committee and the Congress with a much clearer picture of the relationship between surveillance activities and crime prevention and successful prosecution. There are certain risks in this provision of reports, for these sections require the providing of names, addresses, et cetera, to all of the principals involved in surveillance.

If I read them correctly, even the name and address of the recipient of opened mail would be part of the notice report filed with the Congress. Without strong penalties and requirements for confidentiality, these provisions could cause a case to be blown, an informant to be revealed, and the morale of the law enforcement community to be broken. I fully appreciate the intent of the notice requirements. But, I believe these provisions will run a great risk of being harmful and counterproductive unless a strong set of confidentiality provisions are added. I know this is a difficult area and that it is a difficult task to strike a healthy balance. However, I also know that this committee is up to the task.

This is important landmark legislation, Mr. Chairman. It is constructive and needed. I urge this committee to make it a reality and I thank you for the opportunity to express my support for it.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. I thank the witness for his statement and commend Congressman Goldwater for his work in the field as chairman of the House Republican Task Force on Privacy. I am aware of the notable work done.

You mention the law enforcement community in your statement, but to what extent does this affect casual law enforcement at the local level? Is this not essentially a proscription of Federal and Federal agency activities in these various fields?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I feel that this legislation is somewhat experimental in that it is a new area of effort. I do not know whether this is correct or not, but recently at a seminar at Harvard, it was pointed out by local law enforcement officials from a number of communities that there is, at the local level, a greater concern and protection of the rights of the individual than may be found at the Federal level of law enforcement. I do not know if that is true or not, but I think we have a duty to start, to begin down this road, and the best place to begin is at the Federal level.

Mr. KASTEN MEIER. I think that is where the abuses that we see complained of have arisen most frequently—at the Federal level.

I take it the bill of Mr. Mosher and others, while not a product of the task force on privacy which you chaired, is, nonetheless, wholly consistent with its findings and its work. Is that correct?

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Chairman, that is true. The privacy task force. addressed itself to many areas of invasion of privacy, one being in the area of surveillance, bugging of one kind or another, and the same principles, I think, apply, that a man does have the right to be left alone, to be secure in his house and his home. And whether it be in the mere invasion of privacy involving the collection of information on a routine administrative basis, or whether it be in the area of law enforcement and upholding the laws, I think the basic tenet of the Constitution and the principles involved are the same.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Was your task force aware of the complaints that culminated in testimony before this committee that the telephone com