60TH CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. REPORT 2d Session.

No. 1943

CONDEMNED CANNON TO STATE OF IOWA.

JANUARY 26, 1909.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. HULL, of Iowa, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT.

[To accompany H. R. 27051.]

The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred House bill 27051, having considered the same, report thereon with a recommendation that it do pass.

Your committee believe that, as the War Department have a number of these condemned cannon on hand, and as they are of no value except as old material, the bill should pass.

O

60TH CONGRESS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 2d Session.

TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY OF SIGNAL CORPS OF ARMY.

JANUARY 26, 1909.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. HULL, of Iowa, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT.

[To accompany H. R. 12890.]

The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 12890) to increase the efficiency of the Signal Corps of the Army, having considered the same, report thereon with a recommendation that it do pass with the following amendments:

In line 4, page 1, strike out the word "four" and insert the word "three."

In line 5, page 1, strike out the word "four" and insert the word "three."

In line 5, page 1, strike out the word "twelve" and insert the word "nine."

In line 10, page 1, strike out the word "forty-eight" and insert the word "twenty-four."

In line 11, page 1, strike out the word "blacksmiths" and insert the words "twenty-four horseshoers." And insert the word "and" at the end of line 11.

In lines 12 and 13, strike out the words "and one band, as now authorized by law for bands of cavalry regiments."

In line 7, page 2, strike out the words "or the grade below," and as thus amended the committee recommend that the bill do pass.

The committee respectfully refers and makes a part of this report a letter from Luke E. Wright, Secretary of War, under date of January 25, 1909, and also a letter from Hon. Wm. H. Taft, under date of February 22, 1908, and accompanying papers, with the letter from Secretary Taft.

The committee also submits some extracts from reports from the chief umpire, on summer maneuvers of 1908, and believes that no more important legislation for the effective organization of the army can. possibly be enacted than this increase of the Signal Corps.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, January 25, 1909.

SIR: I have the honor to invite attention to House bill No. 12890, entitled "A bill to increase the efficiency of the Signal Corps of the army.'

On January 22, 1908, this bill was returned to you by the then Secretary of War, the Hon. William H. Taft. A copy of his letter is attached. It is recommended that this bill receive favorable consideration.

Very respectfully,

LUKE E. WRIGHT,

Secretary of War.

House of Representatives.

CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, January 22, 1908.

SIR: I have the honor to return herewith House bill No. 12890, entitled "A bill to increase the efficiency of the Signal Corps of the army."

There are submitted herewith extracts from a special report to the War Department on this subject by the Lieutenant-General of the army, dated August 27, 1907; from the annual report of the Chief of Staff of the army, dated August 31, 1907; from the annual report of the commandant of the service schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., dated August 31, 1907, and from the annual report of the Chief Signal Officer of the army, dated August 1, 1907.

It will be observed that these reports concur in recommending an increase of the Signal Corps of the army, substantially according to the provisions of this bill. It is recommended that this bill receive favorable consideration.

Very respectfully,

CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,

WM. H. TAFT, Secretary of War. House of Representatives.

Letter of the honorable the Secretary of War, dated January 22, 1908, returning to the Chairman Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, H. R. 12890, entitled "A bill to increase the efficiency of the Signal Corps of the army."

CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington January 22, 1908.

House of Representatives.

SIR: I have the honor to return herewith House bill No. 12890, entitled "A bill to increase the efficiency of the Signal Corps of the Army."

There are submitted herewith extracts from a special report to the War Department on this subject by the Lieutenant-General of the Army, dated August 27, 19 7; from the annual report of the Chief of Staff of the Army, dated August 31, 1907; from the annual report of the commandant of the service schools at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., dated August 31, 1907, and from the annual report of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, dated August 1, 1907.

It will be observed that these reports concur in recommending an increase of the Signal Corps of the Army, substantially according to the provisions of this bill. It is recommended that this bill receive favorable consideration.

Very respectfully,

WM. H. TAFT, Secretary of War.

Memorandum in the matter of reorganizing and enlarging the Signal Corps of the Army. The SECRETARY OF WAR:

1. The most recent experience has demonstrated that efficient service of military lines of information is indispensable to successful strategic and tactical operations. The organization charged with this service has become so intimately associated with strategic marches and tactical movements on the battlefield that it must in the future be regarded as an integral part of the combatant force-a fourth arm, so to speakand as such its organization becomes a matter of quite as much concern as that of infantry, cavalry, or field artillery.

2. In the United States Army the service of military lines of information is intrusted to the Signal Corps, which is also charged with the construction, maintenance, and operation of extensive land and cable telegraph lines. The importance of these supplementary duties, or nonmilitary duties, in behalf of great national interests, even of civilization itself, can not be overestimated, but as such work has no essential connection with the field necessities of a combatant army, the cost thereof both as to personnel and material, can not properly be regarded in themselves as military expenditures, and should not be so classified in discussing the necessities of the military establishment.

3. In order, therefore, to provide adequately for these supplementary duties, and at the same time to insure an effective military organization adapted to the necessities of a field army of 100,000 men, the Signal Corps must be largely increased, and this increase must be made in view of the fact that the service of military lines of information is special and exclusive, and can not be performed by organization extemporized after war has become imminent or, as is more likely, after war has actually been declared. It is therefore essential to attach to the regular establishment a corps of sufficient size to meet all the immediate demands which would attend the mobilization of a large army.

4. Three thousand enlisted men, to consist of such numbers in each existing grade as the President may prescribe, and assembled in such organizations as the President may designate, is the minimum number suitable for this purpose. And, furthermore, this force to be excluded from the effective strength of the army, and not to be counted as part of the enlisted force authorized by law.

5. Such a corps might very properly be regarded as equivalent to a brigade of three regiments and officered accordingly, which would mean 1 brigadier-general, 3 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, 9 majors, 45 captains, 45 first lieutenants, 45 second lieutenants a total of 151 officers.

In view, however, of the special requirements of corps duty, which demand great flexibility to admit, on one hand, of wide dissemination and, on the other, of rapid reunion into strong units when necessary, it is believed a better organization would result from decreasing somewhat the junior grades and increasing moderately the senior grades. The following organization is therefore suggested: One brigadier-general, 4 colonels, 4 lieutenant-colonels, 12 majors, 36 captains, 36 first lieutenants, 36 second lieutenants-a total of 129 officers, whose aggregate salaries would be considerably less than that of the commissioned personnel first mentioned.

6. To insure its development to the full limit of usefulness it would be necessary to place this corps in the hands of a body of officers preeminently qualified for professional work. In the first place, an officer of signal troops in an establishment on the basis herein contemplated must have a comprehensive knowledge of the art of war in respect of organization, strategy, and tactics, and in addition thereto he must be qualified to conduct original, practical, and theoretical investigations in respect of the various scientific agencies employed in connection with lines of information. In time of war he must have an iron physique and be endowed with exceptional fortitude and courage. Unless most of the original vacancies incidental to reorganization can be filled with reference to these requirements, the reorganization itself had better be held in abeyance.

7. In the light of the foregoing paragraph it is therefore suggested that all original vacancies in the corps below lieutenant-colonel be filled by competitive examination of a crucial character, and that all officers of the army below the grade of lieutenantcolonel be permitted to compete for transfer to the corps, in the grade each may hold at the time of examination, or to the next higher grade, as he may elect. After the reorganization is accomplished the corps to be placed on the same footing in respect of appointments and promotions as is the Engineer Corps-that is to say, the supply of officers to be taken from the same source, the tenure to be permanent, lieutenants to be promoted to captains on fourteen years' service, and all other promotions up to the grade of colonel to be made by seniority.

8. The armies of the world, modeled by highly educated but mostly inexperienced officers, are rapidly assuming a certain pedantic uniformity. All are much alike in respect of organization, equipment, training, strategical and tactical methods.

Similar conditions existed at the beginning of the French revolution. Under the inspiration of the victories of Frederick II, and following his methods, the nations of Europe modeled their armies upon that of Prussia. Everything, therefore, at that time was especially propitious for the unexpected infusion of new and original ideas into field operations. Napoleon Bonaparte realized the possibilities of the situation and acted accordingly.

9. In our own time a view is gradually gaining currency, and is being accepted by many military critics throughout the world, to the effect that the progress of science as applied to warfare has made, or soon will make, war itself impossible. The truth

is, however, that since the time of Napoleon, conditions have never been so auspicious for decisive results in the field as at present, provided a new principle of strategical or tactical action can be developed, which is easily within the scope of possibility, or a new invention applied before the, opposing force understands or appreciates the importance thereof.

10. This view is strengthened by the recent war in Manchuria, which on both sides was conducted strictly within the limits of convention. On one side, at least, the teachings of the schools were exhaustively applied, but as there was a total absence of originality in the direction of field operations, the great battles became unlimited slaughters without any corresponding results.

11. A constructive general, assisted by a shrewd and clever general staff, never had such a scope as at present for original ingenuity in devising new methods of surprise, by which means only an army can achieve great things in the field. As a means to this end nothing can contribute more than a scientifically organized and highly educated corps to handle the lines of information.

12. Considering, then, the possibilities of the future in the light of the foregoing brief remarks, it is absolutely indispensable that prepared means adequate to the important purpose to be accomplished be incorporated into our regular establishment, and thus be made available for emergency work in the event of sudden crises. 13. An unqualified recommendation is therefore entered in behalf of the enlargement of the Signal Corps as herein set forth, or otherwise as may, after full discussion in the department, be deemed most expedient, provided only that any original vacancies created in the commissioned grades shall be filled by selection from the whole army as set forth in paragraph 7.

14. For easy reference in connection with this memorandum, extract copy of a report made in this connection in 1900 by the undersigned is respectfully attached hereto.

SIR: In reply to the desires of the Secretary of War, as expressed in your letter of July 24, 1900, I regret that it will be impossible, in view of manifold duties, to discuss in full detail the question of army organization; but several matters suggested by the experience of the past two years in these islands, the merits of which can be briefly stated, are respectfully submitted for consideration:

(5) I respectfully inclose an extract from a former report as the quickest way of expressing my views of the importance of the Signal Service. I desire to add that all subsequent experience has confirmed convictions expressed therein and to renew the recommendation then submitted for the enlargement and perfection of the Signal Corps of the Regular Establishment. The splendid service of this corps makes it a matter of regret that in operations in these islands we have not had as much force from that body as is necessary. As it is, their wire service is simply indispensable. It is not too much to say that in the absence of this efficient service, it would be impossible to hold this archipelago with less than 150,000 men, which is now well and efficiently performed by 60,000. We need wires, instruments, and operators everywhere, the more the better; it simplifies everything, makes unity of action possible, insures concentration of troops on threatened points, and altogether is of such importance that it is impossible to say too much in behalf of its indefinite extension to the limit of possible usefulness.

If the principle of expanding this corps is admitted, the proper limit for the organization must be determined by investigation in the War Department. So far as the commissioned personnel is concerned, it would seem to me that it ought to be doubled at once, perhaps trebled. This, however, is a matter for careful consideration, in the light of the whole situation.

The purpose of the present writing is to impress the department with the view that successful operations in these islands absolutely depend upon this service, in consequence of which provision therefore should be made upon a scale commensurate with the importance of the interests involved.