terbium group, and the ytterbium group. One of the metals in the alloy of the patent must be a rare-earth metal, and by the language of his specifications the patentee states that for the purposes of this invention the presence of the cerium is relied on as essential. Therefore although there may be a mixture of rare-earth metals in the one element of the combination, cerium or at least a metal of the cerium group must be present. The testimony shows that an alloy composed solely of rare-earth metals will not produce the pyrophoric alloy desired; the patent indicates this. The presence of one or more of the non-rare-earth metals is essential. The specification states that the rare-earth metal cerium becomes pyrophoric if alloyed with certain other metals, in particular iron. It indicates that with about thirty per cent. of iron the alloy attains its maximum of pyrophoric energy; also that the iron can be partially replaced by nickel or cobalt, but if entirely replaced by these the pyrophoric property is considerably diminished. The first claim reads: 1. A pyrophoric alloy, containing cerium alloyed with iron; substantially as and for the purposes described. The only other claim is identical except that the iron is stated as being thirty per cent. of the compound. As defendant's compound consists of cerium with from eleven to fifteen per cent. of magnesium, the first claim only is declared upon. Judge Hough, discussing the most pertinent references in the prior art, found that the patentee— taught how certainly and knowingly to produce that (a compound usefully pyrophoric) which had been observed indeed, but not understood. We fully concur in this finding and in the conclusion that this Welsbach patent covers a pioneer invention and is entitled to that liberal application of the doctrine of equivalents which is usually accorded to such patents. In defense it is contended that defendant's product, made it is said according to the process set forth in a patent to Huber (No. 967,775, issued August 16th, 1910,) is not a 'metallic alloy" at all but a chemical compound. What defendant does is first to make a metallic alloy of cerium and magnesium (in the proportions of about eightyfive to fifteen;) this alloy is then subjected to the action of hydrogen in a fire-clay muffle under a temperature of 500 degrees to 600 degrees centigrade. Changes are produced by this hydrogen treatment,the pyrophoric property of the compound is improved, possibly sufficiently to give validity to the Huber patent-and there is a conflict between the experts as to whether the resultant product has become a chemical compound or still remains a metallic alloy saturated with hydrogen. We concur in Judge Hough's finding that the weight of testimony supports the latter conclusion. The claim in suit mentions only iron as the non-rare-earth metal, but multitudinous authorities support the proposition that in construing a pioneer patent such as this "iron" should be held to mean iron or its equivalent." In the specification two other metals, nickel and cobalt, are expressly referred to as equivalents and defendant concedes that a metallic alloy in which these, or even manganese, which like the other three belongs to a group known as the “heavy” metals, have been substituted for the iron would infringe. But the doctrine of equivalents does not confine a patentee to equivalents which he has expressly referred to. Numerous authorities sustain the proposition that when, as here, a pinoeer patentee claims an alloy of one or more rare-earth metals with one or more non-rare-earth metals, he is not restricted to named varieties of either, unless he has himself restricted his claim by something in his specification, as Welsbach did, on the rare-earth side of the combination by the statement that in his alloy cerium is an essential. (Winans v. Denmead, 15 How., 330.) Welsbach nowhere intimates that iron is essential, on the contrary he states his invention is the alloy of cerium "with certain other metals, in particular iron." We are satisfied that the "equivalency" of other metals with iron is to be found not in their chemical structure, but in their functional efficiency when combined with cerium in a metallic alloy. Cases in this circuit (Matheson v. Campbell, C. D., 1897, 390; 79 O. G., 685; 78 Fed. Rep., 910; Richards v. Du Bon, 97 Fed. Rep., 96; Panz v. Battle Island Paper Company, 138 Fed. Rep., 48) have indicated a qualification of this theory of broad equivalents, a patentee will not be allowed to maintain a claim for more than he has discovered and disclosed. In the first of these cases the claim was for a dyestuff as a new product. The patentee described a special process by which the product was obtained, using therein a specified sulfo-acid; he stated as his discovery, invention, and disclosure that any sulfo acid of any radical," when treated according to the process described, would produce the dyestuff of the patent. The testimony showed that there were over one hundred different substances in the group of “sulfo acids of any radical" and that only some of them,-disulfo-acids with which alone the patentee had experimented,-would, when treated according to the process, produce the dyestuff. The complainant contended that whenever a particular sulfo-acid, not tried before, produced the dyestuff his patent would cover it, although it did not cover sulfo-acids which would not produce the result. We held that he could not thus speculate on the equivalents of his claimed invention and thereby oblige the public to resort to experiment in order to determine the scope of the claim of his patent. In the second case above cited the claim was for an improvement in the art of treating tobacco-leaves which consisted in "applying an alkali to the leaves of the growing plant." Patentee had produced his result of applying a specified alkali to the leaves, but the broad construction of the claim covering all alkalis was held void because it would be broader than the invention, as it would cover potash, an alkali which would not accomplish the result, and the patentee had not experimented to discover what alkalis would and what would not do so. The case at bar, however, does not come within the principle laid down in these decisions. Of the forty or more non-rare-earth metals it is not shown that there is one of them which will not when alloyed with cerium produce a pyrophoric compound. Some of them will produce a less efficient one than iron does, as the patent indicates, proportions must be varied with different constituents to produce better results, but we are satisfied from the record that, (with the exception of metals found in such small quantities that they are known merely in the laboratory and so no one has experimented in combining them with cerium) each and every non-rare-earth metal is a fair equivalent of iron in the compound of this patent. The decree is affirmed with costs. [Supreme Court of the United States.] STRAUS AND STRAUS v. AMERICAN PUBLISHERS' ASSOCIATION et al. Decided December 1, 1913. 198 O. G., 495; 231 U. S., 222. 1. MONOPOLIES-ANTITRUST ACT. The Sherman Act is broadly designed to reach all combinations in unlawful restraint of trade and tending because of the agreements or combinations entered into to build up and perpetuate monopolies. The act is a limitation of rights which may be pushed to evil consequences and may therefore be restrained. (Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, C. D., 1912, 652; 184 O. G., 1074; 226 U. S., 20.) 2. SAME-SAME-RIGHTS CONFERRED BY COPYRIGHT. No more than the patent statute was the Copyright Act intended to authorize agreements in unlawful restraint of trade and tending to monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. 3. SAME-SAME-COMBINATION TO MAINTAIN PRICES ON COPYRIGHTED BOOKS. As the agreement involved in this case went beyond any fair and legal means to protect trade and prices, practically prohibited the parties thereto from selling to those it condemned, and affected commerce between the States, it was manifestly illegal under the Sherman Act and was not justified as to copyrighted books under any protection afforded by the Copyright Act. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Mr. Wallace Macfarlane and Mr. Edmond E. Wise for the plaintiffs. Mr. Stephen H. Olin and Mr. John G. Milburn for the defendants. Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, rendered on remittitur from the court of appeals, refusing to grant to the plaintiffs in error an injunction restraining any interference with their purchase and sale of copyrighted books and damages, the defendants acting under an agreement alleged to be violative of the laws of New York and the Sherman Antitrust Act. (26 Stat., 209.) The suit originated in a bill filed in the Supreme Court of the State of New York for New York county, in which the plaintiffs in error alleged that they conducted a department store in New York city, a large department of which was devoted to books, magazines, and pamphlets; that, because of their methods of business, they had been able to undersell other retail book-stores; that the defendants in error, through the American Publishers' Association and the American Booksellers' Association, and by means of resolutions and agreements, with the coöperation of the associations and their members and by the use of various practices and methods, to the end that books should be sold to the booksellers only who would maintain the retail price upon net copyrighted books for one year and who would not sell books to any one who would cut such prices, had restrained and prevented competition in the State of New York and throughout all of the United States in the supply and price of books, and that the business of the plaintiffs in error had been seriously affected, and they prayed that the combination and agreements be declared unlawful and that defendants be enjoined from acting thereunder or accomplishing the purposes thereof, and for damages. A demurrer having been interposed to the complaint and sustained by the court at special term and the interlocutory judgment there entered having been reversed upon appeal to the appellate division of the first deFartment, the court of appeals, permission having been granted to appeal and the question certified, affirmed the decision and held that, so far as the bill related to copyrighted books, the demurrer was good, but that as to uncopyrighted books the complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (177 N. Y., 473.) Amended answers having been filed, upon trial to the court without a jury, the court made findings of fact from which it appears that the material allegations of the complaint are true, as above set forth, and further that about April 1, 1904, and after the decision of the court of appeals reported in 177 N. Y. the associations amended their resolutions and agreements so as to restrict the application and operation thereof to copyrighted books only; that about January 19, 1907, the Publishers' Association revoked all its former resolutions and adopted a new resolution, but that the associations had continued the same course as to copyrighted books as was followed before the passage of such resolution. The court concluded that the resolutions and agreements, so far as they related to uncopyrighted Looks, were unlawful and contrary to the laws of New York, and to that extent granted relief by way of injunction and damages, but held that as to copyrighted books the agreements, resolutions and acts of the defendants were not unlawful, and entered an interlocutory judgment accordingly; and in its opinion the court stated that the former decision of the court of appeals in the case (177 N. Y., 473) was controlling. Plaintiffs in error excepted to the conclusions of law made by the court restricting the illegality of the combinations to uncopyrighted books and requested that certain conclusions be made and excepted to the refusal to find the conclusions submitted by them. From that part of the interlocutory judgment denying relief as to copyrighted books the plaintiffs in error appealed to the appellate division, which, also upon the authority of 177 N. Y., 473, affirmed the interlocutory judgment, and judgment of affirmance was entered in the supreme court; and, with permission, an appeal was taken to the court of appeals which answered in the negative the question certified by the appellate division as to whether plaintiffs in error, in so far as copyrighted books were concerned, were entitled to relief, adhering to its previous decision (177 N. Y., 473.) (193 N. Y., 496.) Judgment was so entered on remittitur to the supreme court. The report of the referee appointed to ascertain the amount of the damages sustained by the plaintiffs in error in the sale of uncopyrighted books having been filed and approved, final judgment was entered in the supreme court granting an injunction and damages as to uncopyrighted books only, and upon appeal to the court of appeals that court affirmed the final judgment (199 N. Y., 548) and remitted the case to the supreme court. Judgment on remittitur was accordingly entered, and this writ of error sued out to review that judgment. In this Court a motion was made to dismiss the writ of error upon the ground that it presents no Federal question so saved and brought here as to permit a review of such question. When the case was before the court of appeals, upon demurrer to the complaint (177 N. Y., 473,) that court held that the agreement, as to copyrighted books, was not illegal, because of the monopoly granted to the holder of a copyright under the statutes of the United States. The court held that the agreement, as to uncopyrighted books, however, was |