on August 3, 1903. The debt was one provable in the bankruptcy proceeding and, it is conceded, would be barred by the discharge were it not that there had been a prior proceeding in bankruptcy in another District Court, which, it is contended, had the effect of exempting the debt from the operation of the discharge. In the year 1900 Jones filed his petition in bankruptcy in the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Bluthenthal & Bickart, the plaintiffs in error, objected to the discharge in that proceeding, and it was refused on December 3, 1900. Bluthenthal & Bickart, at the time of the first proceeding, were creditors of Jones in respect of what may be assumed, for the purposes of this case, to be the same indebtedness now in question. The ground of the refusal does not appear. It may be assumed to have been, however, one of the two grounds specified in § 14 of the bankruptcy act before it was amended by the act of February 5, 1903; that is to say, either that the bankrupt has committed an offense punishable by imprisonment or, with fraudulent intent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books of accounts. Though Bluthenthal & Bickart were notified of the proceedings on the second petition in bankruptcy and their debt was scheduled, they did not prove their claim or participate in any way in those proceedings. They now claim that their debt was not affected by the discharge on account of the adjudication in the previous proceedings.

Section 1 of the bankruptcy act defines a discharge as "the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by this act." Section 14 of the amended act, which was applicable to the second proceedings, provides that after due hearing the court. shall discharge the bankrupt, unless he has committed one of the six acts specified in that section. Section 17 of the amended act provides that a discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, with four specified exceptions, which do not cover this case. The discharge apVOL. CCVIII-5

pears to have been regularly granted, and as the debt due to Bluthenthal & Bickart is not one of the debts which, by the terms of the statute, are excepted from its operation, on the face of the statute the bankrupt was discharged from the debt due to them. There is no reason shown in this record why the discharge did not have the effect which it purported to have. Undoubtedly, as in all other judicial proceedings, an adjudication refusing a discharge in bankruptcy, finally determines, for all time and in all courts, as between those parties or privies to it, the facts upon which the refusal was based. But courts are not bound to search the records of other courts and give effect to their judgments. If there has been a conclusive adjudication of a subject in some other court, it is the duty of him who relies upon it to plead it or in some manner bring it to the attention of the court in which it is sought to be enforced. Plaintiffs in error failed to do this. When an application was made by the bankrupt in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the judge of that court was, by the terms of the statute, bound to grant it, unless upon investigation it appeared that the bankrupt had committed one of the six offenses which are specified in § 14 of the bankruptcy act as amended. An objecting creditor might have proved upon that application that the bankrupt had committed one of the acts which barred his discharge, either by the production of evidence or by showing that in a previous bankruptcy proceeding it had been conclusively adjudicated, as between him and the bankrupt, that the bankrupt had committed one of such offenses. If that adjudication had been proved it would have taken the place of other evidence and have been final upon the parties to it. But nothing of this kind took place. Bluthenthal & Bickart intentionally remained away from the court and allowed the discharge to be granted without objection.

Since the debt due to the plaintiffs in error was a debt. provable in the proceedings before the District Court of Florida and was not one of the debts exempted by the statute from

the operation of the discharge, it was barred by that discharge. The Supreme Court of the State of Florida so held, and its judgment must be

PROSSER v. FINN.

Affirmed.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.

No. 64. Submitted December 4, 1907.-Decided January 13, 1908.

If an entryman's entry is good when made and the Land Department, by error of law, adjudges the land to belong to another, a court of equity will convert the latter into a trustee for the former and compel him to convey the legal title.

Continued occupation of public land by one not entitled to enter after the disability has been removed is not equivalent to a new entry. The entryman's rights are determined by the validity of the original entry when made.

An erroneous interpretation of a statute by the Commissioner of the Department to which it applies, does not confer any legal rights on one acting in conformity with such interpretation, in opposition to the express terms of the statute.

Congress having said without qualification, by § 452, Rev. Stat., that employés in the General Land Office shall not, while in the service of that office, purchase, or become interested directly or indirectly in the purchase of, public lands, this prohibition applies to special agents of that office and renders an entry made by a special agent under the Timber Culture Act void, leaving the land open to entry, notwithstanding that such agent made the same in good faith when there was a ruling of the Commissioner that § 452 did not apply to special agents, and that he complied with the requirements of the act and continued in occupation after he had ceased to be a special agent.

41 Washington, 604, affirmed.

FINN, the defendant in error, holds a patent from the United States for certain lands in Yakima County, State of Washington, for which Prosser, the plaintiff in error, had previously made an entry under what is known as the timber-culture statutes.

Asserting that in virtue of such entry he was entitled, under the acts of Congress, to a patent from the United States, Prosser brought the present suit against Finn in one of the courts of Washington, the relief asked being a decree declaring his right to the lands and requiring the defendant to convey the legal title to him.

The court of original jurisdiction sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and dismissed the suit; and that decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington.

The plaintiff in error contends, as he did in the state courts, that the decision that he was not entitled under the statutes of the United States to a patent denied to him a right given by those statutes. The defendant contends that in view of his official relations to the General Land Office at the time of his entry Prosser could not legally acquire an interest in these lands.

The case made by the complaint is substantially as follows: On the eighteenth day of October, 1882, Prosser made a timber-culture entry at the proper local land office for the lands in question, and thereafter duly planted trees and by cultivation in good faith improved the lands at great labor and expense. His entry complied in all respects with the statutes. 17 Stat. 605, c. 277; 18 Stat. 21, c. 55.

More than five years after that entry, on August 30, 1888, one Grandy filed an affidavit of contest on the ground of noncompliance with the statute. But the contestant failed to prosecute his claim, and at the hearing that contest was dismissed.

Subsequently, October 28, 1889, one Walker filed against Prosser's entry an affidavit of contest. In that affidavit various grounds of contest were specified, each of which alleged non-compliance with the provisions of the statute in respect of the planting of trees. The affidavit was afterwards amended December 1, 1889, so as to embrace the charge that Prosser, at the time of his entry, was an acting United States Timber Inspector, and that as such inspector he was prohibited by

law from making said entry; also, that the land was then settled upon and cultivated as required by law. The relief sought by the contestant Walker was the cancellation of Prosser's entry and its forfeiture to the United States.

The local land office sustained Walker's contest and gave a decision against Prosser's entry, based upon his incompetency as inspector to make it. In the opinion of the Register it was said: "It appears from the testimony adduced at the hearing that Mr. Prosser was appointed special agent of the General Land Office, July 26, 1880, and was performing the duties as such agent at the time of initiating the entry. He was charged with the duty of caring for and protecting the interests of the Government in the disposal of its public lands. His duties afforded an opportunity of gaining information of the public domain not extended to the ordinary settler. As a result of this superior advantage he selected a very desirable tract bordering upon the Yakima River at a point where there are falls well adapted to the production of power for running machinery, etc., which rendered the land more valuable than ordinary agricultural tracts. Bad faith cannot in any wise be imputed to the entryman, for it appears that he has expended considerable time and money attempting to grow timber on the land, but with meager results. It is situated in a dry, arid section of country, where little or no vegetation will grow without irrigation. The repeated efforts to grow trees evince good faith in an honest endeavor to faithfully comply with the law." Referring, however, to a letter addressed by the Commissioner to the local land officers, under date of July 22, 1882, and which directed that Prosser be allowed to make payment for the lands entered by him-in which letter the Commissioner held that a special agent did not come within the inhibition contained in § 452, Rev. Stat.-the Register (the Receiver concurring), said: "We are inclined to the opinion that the Commissioner erred in stating that a special agent does not come within the prohibition of the statute prohibiting employés of the Land Department from entering lands within