volves an assumption that when the railroad constructed its line of road, conforming to the requirements of the law as to all then existing highway crossings, it had a constitutional right, by virtue of its priority, to always afterwards operate its road unembarrassed by being required to observe like precautions with respect to highways that might be thereafter laid out across the railroad, except upon the condition that it should receive compensation, not merely for whatever of its acquired property might be taken for the other use, but also for the expense and burden of conforming its own conduct to the newlyexisting conditions of conforming to a general police regulation of the State, not before applicable. There was no such exclusive or superior right acquired by priority of charter, or of the construction of this railroad highway. It cannot be supposed that, when its franchises were granted to this relator to construct and operate this railroad, it was contemplated, either by it or by the State, that no more public highways should be laid out which should increase the number of places where the ordinary police regulations would have to be complied with by the railroad company to its inconvenience and expense. On the contrary, it must have been understood and contemplated, especially in a new State rapidly advancing in population and in the development of its resources, where new towns were springing up, and new avenues for travel and traffic were becoming necessary, that new streets and roads would be and must be laid out, and that many of these would necessarily cross existing railroad lines. We cannot resist the conclusion that, so far as concerns the matter now under consideration, the charter of the relator was taken subject to the right of the State to impose this duty whenever, by reason of the establishing of new highways, it should become necessary; and hence the relator is not entitled to compensation for obedience to this requirement. Lake Shore &c. Ry. Co. v. Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co., 30 Ohio St. 604; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Joliet &c. R. Co., 105 Illinois, 388, 400, 404; City of Hannibal v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co., 49 Missouri, 480; City of

Bridgeport v. New York & New Haven R. Co., 36 Connecticut, 255."

As the Supreme Court of Minnesota points out in the opinion in 98 Minnesota, 380, above referred to, the state courts are not altogether agreed as to the right to compel railroads, without compensation, to construct and maintain suitable crossings at streets extended over its right of way, after the construction of the railroad. The great weight of state authority is in favor of such right. (See cases cited in 98 Minnesota, 380.)

There can be no question as to the attitude of this court upon this question, as it has been uniformly held that the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one; that it cannot be contracted away, and that a requirement that a company or individual comply with reasonable police regulations without compensation is the legitimate exercise of the power and not in violation of the constitutional inhibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts. In New York & New England Railroad Company v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 576, the doctrine was thus laid down by Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the court:

"It is likewise thoroughly established in this court that the inhibitions of the Constitution of the United States upon the impairment of the obligation of contracts, or the deprivation of property without due process, or of the equal protection of the laws, by the States, are not violated by the legitimate exercise of legislative power in securing the public safety, health and morals. The governmental power of self-protection cannot be contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights granted, nor the use of property, be withdrawn from the implied liability to governmental regulations in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from injury. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Company, 115 U. S. 650; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517."

The principle was recognized and enforced in Chicago, Bur

lington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, where it was held that the expenses incurred by the railroad company in erecting gates, planking at crossings, etc., and the maintenance thereof, in order that the road might be safely operated, must be deemed to have been taken into account when the company accepted its franchise from the State, and the expenses incurred by the railroad company, though upon new streets, might be required as essential to the public safety. In Detroit Railroad Co. v. Osborne, 189 U. S. 383, it was held that the State of Michigan might compel a street railroad to install safety appliances at an expense to be divided with a steam railroad company occupying the same street, notwithstanding the steam railroad was the junior occupier of the street. The subject was further under consideration in New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Commission of New Orleans, 197 U. S. 453, where it was held, that although the gas company had permission from the city to lay its pipes under the streets, it might be required to remove the same at its own expense, in the exercise of the police power in the interest of the public, in order to make way for a system of drainage which was required, in the interest of the public health, without compensation to the gas company; and that uncompensated obedience to regulations for public safety under the police power of the State was not a taking of property without due process of law.

The same principles were recognized and the previous cases cited in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561, and again in Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364. The result of these cases is to establish the doctrine of this court to be that the exercise of the police power in the interest of public health and safety is to be maintained unhampered by contracts in private interests, and that uncompensated obedience to laws passed in its exercise is not violative of property rights protected by the Federal Constitution.

In this case the Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that

the charter of the company, as well as the common law, required the railroad, as to existing and future streets, to maintain them in safety, and to hold its charter rights subject to the exercise of the legislative power in this behalf, and that any contract which undertook to limit the exercise of this right was without consideration, against public policy and void. This doctrine is entirely consistent with the principles decided in the cases referred to in this court. But it is alleged that at the time this contract was made with the railroad company it was at least doubtful as to what the rights of the parties were, and that the contract was a legitimate compromise between the parties, which ought to be carried out. But the exercise of the police power cannot be limited by contract for reasons of public policy, nor can it be destroyed by compromise, and it is immaterial upon what consideration the contracts rest, as it is beyond the authority of the State or the municipality to abrogate this power so necessary to the public safety. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. C. v. Nebraska ex rel. Omaha, 170 U. S. 57.

We find no error in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota, holding the contract to be void and beyond the power of the city to make, and it will, therefore, be

Affirmed.

HAIRSTON v. DANVILLE AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

VIRGINIA.

No. 6. Argued January 10, 13, 1908.-Decided February 24, 1908.

Where the condemnation of land has been held by the state court to be authorized by the constitution and laws of that State this court cannot review that aspect of the decision.

Where the state law, as is the case with the law of Virginia, permits no exercise of the right of eminent domain except for public uses, a general

judgment of condemnation by the state court will be assumed to have been held to be for a public use even if there was no specific finding of that fact. While it is beyond the legislative power of a State to take, against his will, the property of one and give it to another for a private use, even if compensation be required, it is ultimately a judicial question whether the use is public or private; and, in deciding whether the state court has determined that question within the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment, this court will take into consideration the diversity of local conditions. While cases may arise in which this court will not follow the decision of the state court, up to the present time it has not condemned as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment any taking of property upheld by the state court as one for a public use in conformity with its laws. The use for which property may be required by a railroad company for increased trackage facilities is none the less a public use because the motive which dictates its location is to reach a private industry, or because the proprietors of that industry contribute to the cost; and so held that a condemnation upheld by the highest court of Virginia as being in conformity with the law of that State did not deprive the owner of the property condemned of his property without due process of law.

THIS is a writ of error to the highest court of the State of Virginia. The defendant in error is a corporation created by the State of Virginia and operating a railroad entirely within that State. Its main line runs near the town of Martinsville, and from it a branch line runs into Martinsville and there ends. The railway company began a proceeding in a circuit court of that State for the condemnation of land belonging to Miss Hairston, the plaintiff in error, for the construction of a spur track, which was alleged to be needed for the transaction of its business, for the accommodation of the public generally, and for the purpose of reaching the factory of a large shipper, the Rucker and Witten Tobacco Company. By pleadings duly filed the land owner set up the defense (inter alia) that the proposed condemnation was not for a public use, and was therefore contrary to the constitution and laws of Virginia and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Testimony was taken on this issue before the judge of the circuit court, who found against the contention, and appointed commissioners to ascertain the damage caused by the taking. The commissioners ascertained the amount of the damages.