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While there have been but few decisions bearing directly upon the question, the following sustain the constitutionality of such legislation: Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Massachusetts, 383; Wenham v. State, 65 Nebraska, 394, 400, 406; State v. Buchanan, 29 Washington, 602; Commonwealth v. Beatty, 15 Pa. Sup. Ct. 5, 17; against them is the case of Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 98.

The legislation and opinions referred to in the margin may not be, technically speaking, authorities, and in them is little or no discussion of the constitutional question presented to us for determination, yet they are significant of a widespread belief that woman's physical structure, and the functions she performs in consequence thereof, justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil. Constitutional questions, it is true, are not settled by even a consensus of present public opinion, for it is the peculiar value of a written constitution that it places in unchanging form limitations upon legislative action, and thus gives a permanence and stability to popular government which otherwise would be lacking. At the same time, when a question of fact is debated and debatable, and the extent to

of Glarus, 1848; Federal Law 1877, art. 2, § 1. Austria, 1855; Acts 1897, art. 96a, §§ 1-3. Holland, 1889; art. 5, § 1. Italy, June 19, 1902, art. 7. Germany, Laws 1891.

Then follow extracts from over ninety reports of committees, bureaus of statistics, commissioners of hygiene, inspectors of. factories, both in this country and in Europe, to the effect that long hours of labor are dangerous for women, primarily because of their special physical organization. The matter is discussed in these reports in different aspects, but all agree as to the danger. It would of course take too much space to give these reports in detail. Following them are extracts from similar reports discussing the general benefits of short hours from an economic aspect of the question. In many of these reports individual instances are given tending to support the general conclusion. Perhaps the general scope and character of all these reports may be summed up in what an inspector for Hanover says: "The reasons for the reduction of the working day to ten hours-(a) the physical organization of women, (b) her maternal functions, (c) the rearing and education of the children, (d) the maintenance of the home-are all so important and so far reaching that the need for such reduction need hardly be discussed."

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which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long continued belief concerning it is worthy of consideration. We take judicial cognizance of all matters of general knowledge.

It is undoubtedly true, as more than once declared by this court, that the general right to contract in relation to one's business is part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; yet it is equally well settled that this liberty is not absolute and extending to all contracts, and that a State may, without conflicting with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, restrict in many respects the individual's power of contract. Without stopping to discuss at length the extent to which a State may act in this respect, we refer to the following cases in which the question has been considered: Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45.

That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical wellbeing of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.

Still again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man. He established his control at the outset by superior physical strength, and this control in various forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. As minors, though not to the same extent, she has been looked upon in the courts as needing especial care, that her rights may be preserved. Education was long denied her, and while now the doors of the school room are opened and her opportunities for acquiring knowledge are great, yet even with that and the

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consequent increase of capacity for business affairs it is still true that in the struggle for subsistence she is not an equal competitor with her brother. Though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may be removed by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of life which will operate against a full assertion of those rights. She will still.. be where some legislation to protect her seems necessary. to secure a real equality of right. Doubtless there are individual exceptions, and there are many respects in which she has an advantage over him; but looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort to maintain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality. Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained. It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him. Even though all restrictions on political, personal and contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal functions-having in view not merely her own health, but the well-being of the racejustify legislation to protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man. The limitations which this statute places upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree with her employer as to the time she shall labor, are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all. Many words cannot make this plainer. The two sexes differ in struc- · ture of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the selfreliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference

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justifies a difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.

We have not referred in this discussion to the denial of the elective franchise in the State of Oregon, for while it may disclose a lack of political equality in all things with her brother, that is not of itself decisive. The reason runs deeper, and rests in the inherent difference between the two sexes, and in the different functions in life which they perform.

For these reasons, and without questioning in any respect the decision in Lochner v. New York, we are of the opinion that it cannot be adjudged that the act in question is in conflict with the Federal Constitution, so far as it respects the work of a female in a laundry, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon is

Affirmed.

BIEN v. ROBINSON, RECEIVER OF HAIGHT & FREESE COMPANY.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 135. Submitted January 27, 1908.-Decided February 24, 1908.

Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is questioned merely in respect to its general authority as a judicial tribunal to entertain a summary proceeding to compel repayment of assets wrongfully withheld from a receiver appointed by it, its power as a court of the United States as such is not questioned and the case cannot be certified directly to this court under the jurisdiction clause of § 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1891. Where no sufficient reason is stated warranting this court in deciding that the Circuit Court acted without jurisdiction, this court will assume that the Circuit Court acted rightfully in appointing receivers and issuing an injunction against disposition of assets.

The delivery of a check is not the equivalent of payment of the money dered by the check to be paid, and in this case, the check not having been

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cashed until after receivers had been appointed, the payee, who had knowledge of their appointment and the issuing of an injunction order, was required to repay the amount.

A court of equity has power by summary process, after due notice and opportunity to be heard, to compel one who, in violation of an injunction order of which he had knowledge, has taken assets of a corporation in payment of indebtedness, to repay the same to the receiver.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Albert I. Sire for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Roger Foster, Mr. Frederick J. Moses and Mr. G. Thomas Dunlop for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

By a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, James D. Colt was appointed receiver of the property and assets of the Haight & Freese Company, a New York corporation, then ostensibly engaged in business as stockbrokers in New York, Boston, Philadelphia and other cities. Subsequently, and on May 9, 1905, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, upon a bill filed on behalf of one Ridgway Bowker against the said Haight & Freese Company and others, Colt and one Edmonds were appointed temporary receivers of the same corporation, "both original and as ancillary to said decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts." The order appointing receivers also contained a clause enjoining the defendants, various other named persons and corporations, and all persons and corporations generally, from paying over or transferring any of the money, property, effects or assets of the corporation to any person other than the receivers. On the same day that the receivers were appointed, but before the filing of the bill of complaint, an officer of the Haight & Freese Company gave to Franklin Bien, an attorney at law, a check drawn on the Colonial Bank of the city

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