208 U.S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. It prohibits any combination which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the States, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty of a trader to engage in business; and this includes restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of interstate trade except on conditions that the combination imposes. A combination may be in restraint of interstate trade and within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act although the persons exercising the restraint may not themselves be engaged in interstate trade, and some of the means. employed may be acts within a State and individually beyond the scope of Federal authority, and operate to destroy intrastate trade as interstate trade, but the acts must be considered as a whole, and if the purposes are to prevent interstate transportation the plan is open to condemnation under the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890. Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375. The Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, makes no distinction between classes. Organizations of farmers and laborers were not exempted from its operation, notwithstanding the efforts which the records of Congress show were made in that direction. A combination of labor organizations and the members thereof, to compel a manufacturer whose goods are almost entirely sold in other States, to unionize his shops and on his refusal so to do to boycott his goods and prevent their sale in States other than his own until such time as the resulting damage forces him to comply with their demands, is, under the conditions of this case, a combination in restraint of interstate trade or commerce within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, and the manufacturer may maintain an action for threefold damages under § 7 of that act. THE facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. James M. Beck and Mr. Daniel Davenport for plaintiffs in error: The complaint must be considered as an entirety. A combination so great in scope, and complex in its operations necessarily contains elements, which in and by themselves are either innocent or beyond Federal jurisdiction. The complaint must stand, if, as a whole, it substantially sets forth a combination, whose purpose and effect is to restrain interstate trade. It is impossible for the plaintiffs to set forth all the defendants' secret operations with definiteness and particularity. Swift v. United States, 196 U. S. 375. The Anti-Trust Act is not limited to restraints of interstate Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 208 U. S. trade or commerce that are unreasonable in their nature, but embraces all direct restraints imposed by any combination, conspiracy or monopoly upon such trade or commerce. Northern Securities Case, 193 U. S. 197, 331. The burden is on whoever seeks to read for their own benefit an exception into this sweeping and all-comprehensive language. It matters not that the defendants were members of labor unions and were not themselves engaged in carrying on any form of interstate trade; nor that their operations also embraced restraint of trade within a State; nor that they did not, in addition to the other steps taken by them to effect their purpose, resort to the actual seizure of the plaintiffs' hats while in transit or otherwise physically obstruct their transportation; nor that they combined to restrain and destroy the plaintiffs' interstate trade as a means to compel them to "unionize" their factory, as a step in their broader conspiracy to force all hat manufacturers to do so; these circumstances were urged upon the trial court by the defendants, and it erroneously attached some importance to them in reaching its conclusion. Congress has power to declare and has declared, that all interstate trade shall be absolutely free from all direct restriction through combinations, and every such combination stands condemned in the express terms of the statute. A combination to restrain and prevent the plaintiffs from selling and disposing of their product to customers in other States and to restrain and prevent such customers in other States from buying them, is a combination in restraint of interstate trade as much as a combination to prevent by physical violence their transportation from State to State. It does not matter that it also embraces trade wholly within a State. Indeed, if the destruction of trade within a State is the means resorted to, to prevent the customers in that State from buying from the manufacturer or dealer in another State, it is prohibited by the Sherman AntiTrust law. Liability under the Anti-Trust law does not depend upon any physical obstruction of interstate transportation. Com 208 U.S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. merce is something more than mere transportation. It also consists in traffic and in that even larger field of interstate communication to which Marshall gave the all-embracing term of commercial "intercourse." The field of interstate commerce includes all essential acts antecedent to physical transportation and subsequent thereto, where necessary to preserve the free flow of such commerce. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375. It is equally well settled that the Federal power does not end with the mere physical delivery of the article transported in the State of destination. The Federal power is coextensive with the subject on which it acts and cannot be stopped at the external boundary of the State, but must enter the interior and must be capable of authorizing the disposition of those articles which it introduces, so that they may become mingled with the common mass of property within the territory entered.. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. See also Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489. In Addyston Pipe Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, an agreement which, prior to any act of transportation, limited the prices at which pipe could be sold after transportation, was held by this court to be a violation of the Anti-Trust Act. In Chattanooga Foundry Co. v. City of Atlanta, 203 U. S. 390, this court sustained a recovery under §7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust law in a suit growing out of the combination which was declared invalid in the Addyston Pipe case (supra). The court clearly recognized that to prevent a dealer from making any sale to a customer in another State, and therefore preventing altogether the possible transportation of the merchandise, was as much within the law as to enhance the price of a commodity which had actually been purchased and shipped. Similarly in the case at bar the avowed object and necessary result of the labor combination was to prevent altogether purchases from the plaintiffs by their customers in other States. The total prevention of interstate sales, whereby no act of interstate transportation takes place, is as much within the statute Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. 208 U.S. as a physical restraint of transportation when it actually com mences. In the case of Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, this court held that an obstruction to the purchase of tiles, a fact antecedent to physical transportation, was within the prohibition of the Sherman Anti-Trust law. Under the pleadings in the case at bar, the court must conclude that there was an existing interstate traffic between the plaintiff and citizens of other States and that for the direct purpose of destroying such interstate traffic the defendants combined not merely to prevent him from manufacturing articles then and there intended for transportation beyond the State, but also to prevent the vendees from either reselling the hats, which they had imported from Connecticut, or from further negotiating with the plaintiffs for the purchase and incidental transportation of such hats from Connecticut to the various places of destination. It is true that some of the means whereby the interstate traffic was to be destroyed, were, when detached, acts within a State and that some of them were in themselves and apart from their obvious purpose and necessary effect, acts beyond the scope of Federal authority. The acts must be considered as a whole and defendants' contention in this case, that because the means, which they adopted to destroy the plaintiffs' interstate traffic, operated at one end before physical transportation commenced and at the other end after physical transportation ended, is wholly unimportant, if the purposes of the combination were to prevent any interstate transportation at all. Defendants' claim is not supported by the Stock Yards cases (Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, and Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604). In those cases it was held that there was no purpose to obstruct or restrain interstate commerce, that the combination related to purely local business. The combination as an unreasonable one and criminal at common law falls under the opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in 208 U.S. Argument for Plaintiffs in Error. the Northern Securities case, which possibly foreshadows a ruling by this court that the statute extends only to those cases in which the restraint is unreasonable, or unlawful at common law. American and English Decisions in Equity, Vol. 7, page 562; Martin v. McFall, 55 Atl. Rep. 465; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540; Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310. To the same effect are Toledo A. A. & N. M. R. Co. v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 730, per TAFT, J., and the following cases: Purington v. Hinchcliff, 219 Illinois, 159, 167; Chicago W. & V. Coal Co. v. People, 214 Illinois, 421; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Illinois, 608; State v. Donaldson, 3 Vroom, 151; State v. Stewart, 59 Vermont, 293; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Massachusetts, 212; Crump v. Com., 84 Virginia, 927; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79; Gatzow v. Bruening, 106 Wisconsin, 1; Old Dominion S. S. Co. v. McKenna, 30 Fed. Rep. 48; Reg v. Rowlands, 17 A. and E. (N. S.) 671, 685; Loewe v. California State Federation of Labor, 139 Fed. Rep. 71. Members of a combination or conspiracy under the Anti-Trust law are not exempt because they are not engaged in interstate transportation. They contend that the Sherman law is inapplicable because the defendants are not themselves engaged in interstate com merce. Congress did not provide that one class in the community could combine to restrain interstate trade and another class could not. It had no respect for persons. It made no distinction between classes. It provided that "every" contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade was illegal. The legislative history of the Sherman Anti-Trust law clearly shows that its applicability to combinations of labor as well as of capital was not an oversight. After the Sherman law was enacted bills were introduced in the 52d Congress, H. R. 6,640, § 1; 55th Congress, Senate 1,546, § 8; H. R. 10,539, §7; 56th Congress, H. R. 11,667, § 7; 57th Congress, S., 649, §7; H. R. 14,947, §7, to amend the Sherman Anti-Trust law so that it would be inapplicable to labor |