erty possessed by its citizens, without discrimination or partiality. We held in Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, that goods brought into a State for sale, though they thereby become a part of the mass of its property, cannot be taxed by reason of their being introduced into the State or because they are the products of another State. To tax them as such was expressly held to be unconstitutional. The tax in the present case is laid upon the gross receipts for transportation as such. Those receipts are followed and caused to be accounted for by the company, dollar for dollar. It is those specific receipts, or the amount thereof (which is the same thing), for which the company is called upon to pay the tax. They are taxed not. only because they are money, or its value, but because they were received for transportation. No doubt a ship-owner, like any other citizen, may be personally taxed for the amount of his property or estate, without regard to the source from which it was derived, whether from commerce or banking, or any other employment. But that is an entirely different thing from laying a special tax upon his receipts in a particular employment. If such a tax is laid, and the receipts taxed are those derived from transporting goods and passengers in the way of interstate or foreign commerce, no matter when the tax is exacted, whether at the time of realizing the receipts or at the end of every six months or a year, it is an exaction aimed at the commerce itself, and is a burden upon it and seriously affects it."

As there can be no doubt within the principles so clearly settled by the decided cases, to which we have referred, that the disputed tax, which the court below sustained, was a direct burden upon interstate commerce since the law of Tennessee in terms discriminated against property the product of the soil of other States brought into the State of Tennessee by exempting like property when produced from the soil of Tennessee, it follows that the court below erred in deciding the tax to be valid, without reference to the reasoning indulged in by it concerning the application of the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment below must therefore be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

SOUTHERN PINE LUMBER COMPANY v. WARD.

ERROR TO AND APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA.

No. 82. Submitted December 17, 1907.--Decided January 20, 1908.

Although the record was not docketed until more than thirty days after the appeal was allowed, as it was accomplished soon afterwards and meanwhile no motion was made to docket and dismiss under Rule 9, a motion subsequently made was denied.

Jurisdiction of this court attaches upon allowance of the appeal and proceedings are to be taken here to bring in the representative of an appellee who dies after the acceptance of service of citation.

An appellee, who has not himself appealed, cannot be heard in this court to assail the judgment below.

Nat. Live Stock Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 203 U. S. 296, 305, followed, as to when jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma is by appeal and not by writ of error. Halsell v. Renfrow, 202 U. S. 287, followed, as to when this court, in reviewing a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma, is confined to determining whether that court erred in holding that there was evidence tending to support the findings made by the trial court in a case submitted to it by stipulation, without a jury, and whether such findings sustained the judgment.

In this case this court holds that the Supreme Court of the Territory did not err in finding that there was evidence to support the findings made by the trial court and that those findings sustained the judgment.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Arthur A. Birney and Mr. Henry F. Woodard for plaintiffs in error and appellants.

Mr. John C. Moore, Mr. D. W. Buckner and Mr. George W. Buckner, for defendants in error and appellees.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

Not unmindful that upon this record we are bound by the findings of fact below made and are confined to determining whether the facts as found sustain the judgment, if there is evidence supporting the findings, and, without departing from that rule, we at the outset refer, in chronological order, to some facts which are alleged in the pleadings, which are either directly or by necessary implication established by the findings, and as to which there can be no dispute whatever. We do this in order, if possible, to dispel the obscurity resulting from the prolixity of the pleadings, the unnecessary volume and confusion of the record, and the want of accuracy manifested by some of the assignments of error relied upon.

Prior to June, 1891, two partnerships were located in Texas -one, Grigsby Brothers; the other, the Union Mills Lumber Company, sometimes called the Union Lumber Mills Company. The first (Grigsby Brothers) was composed of G. M. D. Grigsby and D. J. Grigsby; the second (Union Mills Lumber Company) of the two Grigsbys owning four-fifths interest and T. L. L. Temple, one-fifth. At the same time there was located in Arkansas a firm known as the Southern Pine Lumber Company, composed of T. L. L. Temple and Benjamin Whitaker. Prior to June, 1891, D. J. and G. M. D. Grigsby became the recorded owners of the following real estate situated in the city of Oklahoma and in the town of Guthrie, Oklahoma Territory, viz: 1st, an undivided four-fifths interest in five lots in block 60, Oklahoma City; 2d, an undivided four-fifths interest in one lot, in block 54 of the town of Guthrie proper; an undivided four-fifths interest in and to an undivided one-half interest in block 43 in the town of Guthrie, and a like undivided four-fifths interest in a one-half interest in two lots in block 43 and one lot in block 51, East Guthrie. A like one-fifth undivided interest in the same lots was simultaneously acquired and recorded in the name of T. L. L. Temple. In June, 1891, the National Bank of Jefferson, in Jefferson, Texas, discounted

for Grigsby Brothers a note of that firm for $5,000.00. The note was dated June 11, 1891; matured in ninety days; bore twelve per cent interest from maturity, and stipulated for a ten per cent attorney's fee in case of suit to collect. This note was secured by a deed of trust embracing the undivided interest of the Grigsbys in the lots above referred to. E. F. Pentecost, the trustee named in the deed, was empowered, in case of default in payment of the debt to the bank, to sell and apply the proceeds to the payment of the note. This deed was duly recorded in Oklahoma Territory. In August, 1891, the American Exchange Bank of St. Louis discounted for T. L. L. Temple a note of the Union Mills Lumber Company, drawn for it by D. J. Grigsby. This note was for $884.90, payable in ninety days; bore twelve per cent interest from maturity, and contained a ten per cent attorney's fee clause. It was indorsed by T. L. L. Temple individually and by the Southern Pine Lumber Company. This note not having been paid at maturity, the American Exchange Bank of St. Louis, in November, 1891, sued on the note in a state court at Dallas, Texas. The defendants were the two Grigsbys and Temple as partners in the Union Mills Lumber Company, the maker of the note, Temple and Whitaker as partners in the Southern Pine Lumber Company, the indorsers, and Temple individually because of his personal indorsement. Judgment was entered against all the defendants, as members of the two firms and individually, for $1,022.38, the principal, interest, and attorneys' fees. An execution was returned in February, 1892, satisfied "by collecting the full amount of principal and costs and interest of this execution from T. L. L. Temple." In September, 1892, a corporation called the Southern Pine Lumber Company was organized under the laws of Arkansas at Texarkana in that State. T. L. L. Temple was one of the incorporators and subscribed to 997 out of a total of 1,000 shares, and he became the president of the company. In October, 1893, at Texarkana, Texas, a corporation called the Southern Pine Lumber Company was organized under the laws of Texas. Temple was an

incorporator and became its president. In November, 1894, in the District Court for Logan County, Oklahoma Territory, a suit was commenced in the name of the American Exchange Bank of St. Louis against T. L. L. Temple and Benjamin Whitaker as partners in the Southern Pine Lumber Company; the Southern Pine Lumber Company, the Arkansas corporation, D. J. and G. M. D. Grigsby and T. L. L. Temple as partners of the Union Mills Lumber Company. The petition counted upon two causes of action: first, the judgment which had been rendered in the Texas state court at Dallas as if that judgment was still due the bank and had not been satisfied, and second, the sum of $294.56, which was an open account alleged to be due by the Union Mills Lumber Company and the partners thereof, the two Grigsbys and Temple, to the partnership known as the Southern Pine Lumber Company, composed of Temple and Whitaker. This open account, it was alleged, had been transferred by the partnership in 1893 to the Southern Pine Lumber Company, a corporation, which latter, it was averred, had transferred the account to the American Exchange Bank. The defendants, being all non-residents of Oklahoma, were summoned after affidavit by publication and upon affidavit attachments were issued. The undivided interest of the Grigsbys and Temple in the lots in Oklahoma and Guthrie were attached. Ultimately a judgment was rendered in favor of the American Exchange Bank and against the defendants for the amount of the Texas judgment plus the open account sued upon, with interest and costs. The liens of the attachments were recognized, and under execution the interest of the Grigsbys and Temple in the lots in Oklahoma and Guthrie were sold and bought in by "the Southern Pine Lumber Company, a corporation," for a sum less than the judgment debt. In the meanwhile the five thousand dollar note remained unpaid in the hands of the National Bank of Jefferson, the note having been extended from time to time. In 1896 that bank failed, and the note and trust deed were among the assets of the bank in the hands of the receiver appointed by the CompVOL CCVIII-9