not give his approval unless he finds that such contract or arrangement will not prejudicially affect the interests of the public or of the employee or employees involved, and he may at any time retract such approval, first giving the employer not less than thirty days' notice in writing. None of the provisions of this act (chapter, etc.) shall [affect the right of any employer under lawful contract to retain part of the compensation of any employee for the purpose of affording such employee insurance, or hospital, sick, or other similar relief; nor shall any of said provisions] diminish or enlarge the right of any person to assert and enforce a lawful set-off or counter-claim or to attach, take, reach, or apply an employee's compensation on due legal process.

Commentary on Section 10.-The first sentence might be rhetorically strengthened by saying in so many words that contracts of this sort are null and void, or even by making it a misdemeanor to attempt to form such a contract or make such an arrangement. But a similarly worded clause has proved adequate in Massachusetts, substantially the only difference in phraseology being the substitution here of the word "may for "shall" in the Massachusetts form. On the whole the draftsmen doubt whether the rhetorical strengthening would add much to the actual strength of the section. The provision for the commissioner's approval seems desirable as giving the statute reasonable elasticity and thus obviating the necessity of elaborate legislation as to peculiar cases. The draftsmen are very doubtful about the wisdom of inserting the words included in square brackets. They know the story of the camel who got his nose inside the tent door, and fear that this part of the section might turn out to be a legal camel.

SEC. 11. Despite any determination that any provision, or any application of any provision, or any particular method of enforcing any provision, of this act (chapter, etc.) is unconstitutional, the remaining provisions and applications and methods of enforcement shall be unaffected and shall remain in full force and effect.

Commentary on Section 11.-In view of existing decisions respecting the constitutionality of such legislation this seems the most apt wording for a clause intended to accomplish the purpose of sustaining and holding together as many provisions as possible. The draftsmen wish to state that no conventional provision has been inserted in the model statute without careful weighing of precedents and that no novel provision has been inserted without a belief that the chances are in favor of its being declared constitutional. One favorite punitive provision-that imposing in one form or another a cumulative daily penalty for delay in payment of wages-the draftsmen have intentionally omitted. This provision, where it becomes severe enough to accomplish results, is very likely to be declared unconstitutional. Also it contains a " get rich quick without any work" flavor which is undesirable. SEC. 12. Repeal, etc.

Commentary on Section 12.-Since the object of this draft is to present a smooth, compact, and comprehensive statute, it is almost certain that any state enacting legislation based upon the draft would have to do a certain amount of repealing. For example, in Ferry vs. Kinsley Iron & Machine Company, the Massachusetts case described in the commentary on Section 3, it appears that the statute book contained a provision laying down certain requirements of mutuality with respect to agreements between employer and employee for advance notice of intention to discharge or to leave employment. The court very properly said that this constituted an implied recognition of the validity of these contracts.

REPORT

OF THE

COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS

TO THE BAR.

To The American Bar Association:

At the annual meeting of the Association in Cincinnati in 1921, a resolution was adopted fixing certain standards, compliance with which is considered essential for persons seeking admission to the Bar. That resolution directed the President of the Association and the Council on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, to cooperate with the state and local bar associations, and to urge upon the duly constituted authorities of the several states the adoption of the requirements fixed by the resolution.

While the Council is gratified by the disposition of the law schools to comply with the standards fixed, its efforts to bring about the adoption of the rule by the duly constituted authorities of the several states have not met with the success that was expected by the members of the Association at the time the standards were fixed. It is believed by the Council that this failure is due not so much to the apathy and indifference of the bar associations throughout the country as it is to the resistance of the authorities of the several states, who do not fully understand the purposes of the rule and the salutary influence it will have upon the practice of the law as well as the protection of the public.

Appended hereto as Appendix A is a list of law schools which have complied with the requirements of the resolution.

The original list of law schools complying with the standards, which was published in 1924, contained 43 law schools in the so-called Class A list and 15 law schools in the Class B list. The latter list comprising schools which had announced their intention of complying with the standards of the Association within the next two years. Class B list has been abolished by the Council as it seemed no longer necessary. The Council has now approved 65 law schools, located in 37 states and the District of Columbia. Of the 11 states not represented, 6 have no degree-conferring law schools within their boundaries.

At the time of the adoption of the rule by the Association in no jurisdiction were applicants required to have more than a

high school education. At present the states of Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, New York, Ohio, West Virginia and Wisconsin either now require, or have announced the intention of requiring all applicants for admission to the Bar to have completed two years of college work, or its equivalent, before they may be admitted to practice.

West Virginia, by rule effective July 1, 1928, most nearly meets the requirements of the Association's recommendations. In addition to two years of college work the applicant must have studied three years in a law school which is certified by the Association of American Law Schools as complying with the standards which are practically identical with those of The American Bar Association.

The requirements in effect in Illinois, Kansas and those which will shortly become effective in Colorado, Ohio and Wisconsin, are much the same. Speaking generally, these states require an applicant to have completed the equivalent of two years of college work prior to beginning the study of the law and to have studied law either three or four years in a law school or law office, depending upon whether or not the entire time of the applicant is devoted to his studies.

The New York Court of Appeals on June 7th announced that the rules for admission to practice in that state are amended so as to require from students beginning the study of law on or after October 15, 1928, the completion of one year of college work or its equivalent prior to the beginning of his law study. For those beginning the study on and after October 15, 1929, two years of college work or its equivalent will be required. This change was the result of an application made to the Court of Appeals by various bar associations in New York State, and a hearing before the court on the subject. The Council on Legal Education cooperated with the bar associations which made this application, and also presented directly to the Court of Appeals, the recommendations of The American Bar Association.

Montana requires an applicant to possess the equivalent of two years of college work and to have studied law for a period of two years but the general education need not be completed before the law school studies are begun.

The remaining jurisdictions have about the same requirements for admission to the Bar as they had in 1921. Some of them, notably the District of Columbia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, and New Mexico, have tightened their requirements so that they are much more effective than they were before the standards were fixed by the Association.

Attached hereto as Appendix B is a list of the requirements of the several states respecting general education and law study.