The delivery of a small portion of a large mass, such as a handful of grain out of a bin full, is sometimes referred to as illustrative of symbolic delivery; likewise, the handing over of a key to a warehouse containing the goods sold. Neither, however, correctly, is symbolic delivery, since the first is, for some purposes, evidence of constructive delivery, as showing the intention of the parties, while the latter is, properly, a real or an actual delivery, since the giving up of the key places the vendee in physical control or in actual possession of the goods. In neither case is a token or a symbol, as a representative of the goods, delivered, but a part of the goods themselves, or some article, not a symbol, but a means by which the goods are brought under personal control. § 182. Constructive and symbolic delivery are questions of great importance when actual delivery is either impossible or impracticable. Although it is not accurate, in a sale, to speak of "impossible delivery," since everything that is the subject of a sale must, from the very nature of the case, be capable of some kind of delivery, nevertheless, a manual delivery may, at the time, be impracticable or impossible, and then the importance of constructive or symbolic delivery arises. Growing crops are often sold. How can they be actually delivered at the time? In no way, since delivering the land itself takes us out of the province of sales of personal property, and takes us into the consideration of sales of realty. In such cases it is difficult to provide for such a delivery as will hold against creditors. In one case (Lamson v. Patch, 5 Allen, 586) the delivery of a handful of grass was held, as against creditors, not a delivery of the grass crop. In another instance (Graff v. Fitch, 58 Ill. 373), however, part of a crop of growing corn was held to be constructively delivered by being separated from the rest of the field by a row of lopped tops. Dempsey v. Gardner, 127 Mass. 381, 34 Am. R. 388. Lake v. Morris, 30 Conn. 201. First National Bank v. Northern R. R. Co., 58 N. H. 203. Webster v. Anderson, 42 Mich. 554, 36 Am. R. 452. Campbell v. Hamilton, 63 Iowa, 293. Hight v. Harris, 56 Ark. 98, 19 S. W. R. 235. Stimson v. Wrigley, 86 N. Y. 332. Seavey v. Walker, 108 Ind. 78, 9 N. E. R. 347. Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. 300. Scranton v. Coe, 40 Conn. 159. Ricker v. Cross, 5 N. H. 570. Graff v. Fitch, 58 Ill. 373. Kellogg Co. v. Peterson, 162 Ill. 158, 44 N. E. R. 411. Yale v. Seely, 15 Vt. 221. § 183. Quantity to be Delivered: It is the duty of the vendor to deliver the exact quantity called for by the contract, when the quantity is specified. To deliver more or less is not a performance, when the contract calls for an exact amount. If, however, more or less be delivered, the vendee has an election. He may accept the amount delivered, paying for what he accepts, or he may refuse to accept at all. It surely is not a vendee's duty to pick out the goods which he has ordered, when the goods are delivered in a mixture with other goods. The effect of a breach in delivery where the contract calls for an instalment delivery, and the effect upon title in instalment deliveries and payments, have been. previously considered. Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188, 6 Sup. Ct. 12. Perry v. Mt. Hope Iron Co., 16 R. I. 318, 15 Atl. R. 87. Avery v. Wilson, 81 N. Y. 341. Brawley v. United States, 96 U. S. 168. (Order for "more or less.") Clapp v. Thayer, 112 Mass. 296. ("About so much.") § 184. Delivery F. O. B.: In a contract calling for a delivery free on board, the seller undertakes to make actual delivery of the goods to the carrier, including payment of cartage charges to the ship or car. If the buyer is to name the line of transportation, then the seller is not required to act until the buyer designates the ship or route. Bartels v. Redfield, 16 Fed. R. 387. 4. ACCEPTANCE. § 185. Correlative to the duty of the vendor to deliver is the duty of the vendee to accept and to pay. In connection with the Statute of Frauds, "acceptance" and "receipt" were both considered. It should be remembered that the two terms are not synonymous, although often so used. Acceptance is a mental act, being the assent of the buyer that the goods conform to the contract, while receipt is the buyer's taking of the goods with the consent of the seller. Both ideas are united in the general and popular use of the term "acceptance," but either may exist without the other. Receipt always presumes delivery, while acceptance may precede, be concurrent with, or may follow delivery. In this country there is no difference between the idea of acceptance as used in the Statute of Frauds and acceptance as used in the performance of the contract. Each is considered to be a final act, although the English authorities speak of acceptance under the Statute of Frauds as any act which |