the passage of such a statute, will be of the same legal effect if performed after its passage; and the creation of a new right, by such a statute, does not modify the rights existing under the unwritten law. Negative statutes are those which, either by their words or by necessary implication, express a negative. Against such statutes the rules of the unwritten law are of no force whatever. Read Bac. Abr., Statute G. Potter's Dwarris on Stat., pp. 68-72. Sedgwick Stat. and Const. Law, pp. 38-41. § 13. Of the Interpretation and Application of Law. In the interpretation and application of a rule of law, whether written or unwritten, attention is first paid to the words of which it is composed. These words are taken in their usual popular meaning unless they are terms of art, or technical terms, when they are understood according to their acceptation in the particular trade or science to which they belong.) Where the meaning of any word or phrase is uncertain the context is consulted; and if, in another part of the same rule of law, the same word or phrase occurs, the interpretation given to it in both places ought to be the same. In like manner, where the rule itself is doubtful, the whole body of the law upon that subject is to be considered, and such construction given to the doubtful rule as brings it into harmony with other certain rules. The subject-matter, to which the rule of law relates, is also a valuable guide in exploring its significance. Every legislative power is presumed to have possessed a complete knowledge of the subject, concerning which it has prescribed a rule of law, and to have chosen its expressions with a constant reference thereto; and, therefore, in interpreting this rule, the nature of this subject-matter must be equally regarded. The effects and consequences of a rule of law also aid in ascertaining its true meaning. When, under one interpretation, these effects and consequences are absurd, unjust, or contrary to the public good, and, under another interpretation, such effects and consequences are reasonable and just, it is evident that the latter interpretation is alone correct. The reason and spirit of a rule of law, or the cause which moved the legislature to prescribe it, is another indication of its actual significance. Of every legislative act intelligent purpose can be predicated, and the end contemplated by that act, and toward which it was directed by the legislative power, must always be considered in determining the character of the act itself. Read 1 Bl. Comm., pp. 59-61. 1 Kent Comm., Lect. xx, pp. 462-465. § 14. Of the Interpretation of Statutes. In addition to these universal rules of legal interpretation, there are certain special rules applicable to the interpretation of statutes, of which the following are the most important: Declaratory statutes are limited in meaning by the true meaning of that rule of the unwritten law which they declare. Remedial statutes are to be interpreted by ascertaining the condition of the unwritten law at the time of the enactment of the statute, the mischief against which the unwritten law did not provide, and the remedy intended to be afforded by the statute; and then giving to the statute that construction, which will most fully suppress the mischief and apply the remedy. Statutes must be so interpreted as to be consistent with all constitutional provisions, and every statute, which cannot be so interpreted, is unconstitutional and void. Statutes, limiting the power of future legislatures, or commanding impossible things, are void. Statutes, which plainly contradict the unwritten law, Supersede it, and, to that extent, render it invalid. Later statutes repeal prior statutes when plainly contrary thereto, but, if such statutes can be reconciled, both must stand, and have concurrent operation. When a repealing statute is itself repealed, the old statute revives. Statutes which are in their nature contracts, and under which rights have become vested, cannot be so repealed as to divest such rights. Statutes, when reason and justice so require, may be interpreted in such a manner that acts within the letter shall be considered as without the meaning, and acts without the letter shall be considered as within the meaning. Penal statutes are construed strictly in the interest of the accused, their effect being limited by the express words employed and not extended by implication. Statutes intended to prevent frauds are construed liberally, in order that the design thereof may be accomplished. Statutes, which treat of things or persons of an inferior rank, cannot, by any general words, be extended to those of a superior. Different statutes, relating to the same subject-matter, are regarded as one statute, and each must, if possible, be so construed that full effect will be given to all. One part of a statute must be construed by another, so that, if possible, the whole may stand. A saving, or proviso, totally repugnant to the body of a statute, is void. When a statute contains a word, whose meaning is lready known to the unwritten law, the word has the Same meaning in the statute. Where words in the same statute are clearly repugnant to each other, the last will supersede the first. Words whose meaning, as to one statute, has been determined, are presumed to have the same meaning in all subsequent statutes, unless the contrary is expressed. General words, in one clause of a statute, may be limited by particular words in a subsequent clause of the same statute; but when a particular thing has been granted or limited in one clause of a statute, it cannot be taken away or altered by any subsequent general words. In construing a doubtful statute the preamble and title of the statute may be considered. The construction of a statute may be affected by long continued practice. The contemporaneous exposition of a statute, by those living at the date of its enactment, is of high authority. When a statute, already existing in one state, is adopted into the written law of another state, the construction given to the statute, in the former state, is also adopted with it. In a statute, which is intended to impose a duty, the word may is interpreted as must. Read 1 Bl. Comm., pp. 87-91. Bac. Abr., Statute I. 1 Swift Dig., pp. 11–13. Potter's Dwarris on Stat., pp. 47-51, 67, 121-146, 174-264. Sedgwick Stat. and Const. Law, pp. 225–446. § 15. Of the Object of Law. Law protects rights and redresses wrongs. The existence of a right, in one man, imposes upon every other man the duty to respect it; and law protects rights by enforcing the performance of this duty. Every wrong is thus a violation of some duty; and law redresses wrongs, either by directly punishing the wrong-doer, or by compelling him to make due satisfaction to the person wronged. Read Austin Jur., Outl., p. 34, Lect. xiv, pp. 377-381, § 16. Of Rights and Wrongs. Rights, at law, are of two kinds: Private and Public. Private rights are those rights which belong to private persons, as such, and to public bodies when acting in a private capacity. Public rights are those which the state possesses over its own subjects, and which the subjects, in their turn, possess in, or against, the state. Wrongs, at law, are also of two kinds: Private and Public. Private wrongs (known also as torts) are those whereby the rights, which belong to private persons, as such, or to public bodies acting in a private capacity, are violated. Public wrongs (known also as crimes) are those by which the rights of the state over its people, or those of the people in, or against, the state, are either diminished or destroyed. Read 1 Bl. Comm., p. 122. 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 1-3. Austin Jur., Lect. xvii, pp. 416-418. § 17. Of Natural Persons. The persons, whose rights the law protects, and whose wrongs the law redresses, are of two kinds : Natural and Artificial. Natural persons are living human beings, of whatever age, sex, or condition. The life of a human being begins, in contemplation of law, as soon as he is |