$77. Of Uses. Although many of the rules of law, by which corporeal real property is governed, originated in this theory of seisin and in the character of the act by which it was transferred, the necessity of actual livery of seisin was destroyed by the interpretation given to a statute passed in the year 27 Henry VIII. (A. D. 1535), and called the statute of uses. Prior to this statute, many acts of parliament had been enacted, to prevent the accumulation of real property in the hands of corporations. These acts were called acts of mortmain, and usually provided that all grants to such corporations should be void. The force of these acts was, however, easily evaded by granting land and making livery of seisin to some person, who could lawfully receive it, and directing him to hold it for the use and benefit of the corporate body. A grant so made vested the estate and seisin in the actual grantee, who, in a court of law, was thenceforth recognized as the sole owner of the land. But courts of equity, regarding only the intent of the grantor to confer the beneficial interest on the corporation, compelled the legal owner to account to it for all the profits of the land. By this method the corporation, though by law forbidden to take or hold the lands, was treated in equity as their true owner, and ultimately reIceived the entire benefits of the estate. Read 2 Bl. Comm., pp. 268-273. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. i, § 41; Tit. xi, Ch. i, § 5. 2 Kent Comm., Lect. xxxiii, p. 282. 4 Kent Comm., Lect. lxi, pp. 289–293. Will. R. P., pp. 144, 145. 2 Wash. R. P., B. ii, Ch. ii, Sec. 1, §§ 2-5. § 78. Of the Statute of Uses. The Statute of Uses was intended to correct this method of evading the acts of mortmain. It provided that whereever the use of land vested, there the seisin, by operation of law, should also vest. The seisin was thus made to follow the use into any person to whom the use might at any time be transferred; and if the use were given to one, who could not legally receive the seisin, the transfer of the use itself was void, and both the legal and the equitable estates remained in the grantor. Before the passage of this statute, a grant to A., to the use of B., with livery of seisin made to A., conferred on A. the entire legal estate, leaving B. to compel him to account in equity for all benefits derived therefrom. After the passage of this statute, a grant to A., for the use of B., with livery of seisin made to A., conferred on B. the legal as well as the equitable estate; and if B. were forbidden by law to receive the legal estate, the whole grant was void. Read 2 Bl. Comm., pp. 327–335. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. xi, Ch. iii, §§ 3-5, 40, 41. 2 Wash. R. P., B. ii, Ch. ii, Sec. 2, §§ 1–4. § 79. Of Trusts. For a short time the purposes of this statute seemed to be accomplished. The courts of law, however, having declared that a use could not be limited upon a use; i. e. that in a grant to A., to the use of B., to the use of C., the use to C. was void and the entire seisin and estate vested and remained in B.; the courts of equity embraced the opportunity to carry out the supposed intention of the grantor, by holding that the use to C., though void at law, was good in equity, and by compelling B. to account to C. for all the benefits of the estate. This second use in C. was called a trust, and the separation of the legal from the equitable estate thus became as easy and effective, as it had been before the statute was adopted. Read 2 Bl. Comm., pp. 335–337. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. xii, Ch. i, §§ 1–5. 2 Wash. R. P., B. ii, Ch. ii, Sec. 2, § 5; Ch. iii, Walker Am. Law, §§ 150-153. § 80. Of the Effect of the Statute of Uses on Livery of Seisin. The creation of an estate of freehold by livery of seisin was an open and public act. The declaration or bestowal of a use was, on the contrary, often a secret act; and in some cases, without any act whatever, the vesting of a use was implied by law. Thus, on the granting of an estate to A. with livery of seisin, a verbal direction to him, to account to B. for the profits thereof, was sufficient to confer the use on B. Or if the owner of land, by a mere oral contract, agreed to sell the land to B. and actually received his price, however small that price might be, a use was immediately implied in B. Hence, when the Statute of Uses was passed, vesting the seisin in whomsoever had the use, livery of seisin was no longer necessary, and the mere oral declaration of a use, or a parol bargain to convey, was sufficient to transfer both the seisin and estate. And although, since the statute of frauds (29 Charles II.), no freehold interest in lands can be created or transferred except in writing, yet the operation of the Statute of Uses still remains the same, and seisin passes now without other formalities than such as are legally necessary to create the estate. Read 2 Bl. Comm., pp. 330, 331, 337–339. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. xi, Ch. i, § 4; Ch. iv, §§ 11-15. 4 Cruise Dig., Tit. xxxii, Ch. ix, §§ 1–5. 4 Kent Comm., Lect. lxi, p. 291; Lect. lxvii, pp. 495, 496. Will. R. P., pp. 147, 167, 168. 2 Wash. R. P., B. ii, Ch. ii, Sec. 2, §§ 31-38. § 81. Of the Effect of the Statute of Uses on Freeholds in Futuro. The creation of a freehold estate to commence in futuro also became possible under the same statute. The present act of livery of seisin being no longer indispensable, and seisin ever following the use, it was only necessary to create a use to spring up in futuro, and, when the use arose, the seisin vested with it in the one to whom the use was given. A grant of land to A., to the use of B. from and after a certain future event, causes the use to spring up in B. whenever that event occurs; and the law, thereupon, without further act of any person, regards the seisin also as in B. Read 2 Bl. Comm., pp. 334, 335. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. xi, Ch. ii, §§ 28, 29. Will. R. P., pp. 267–271. 2 Wash. R. P., B. ii, Ch. ii, Sec. 2, §§ 23, 24. § 82. Of "Livery" and "Grant." Seisin is predicable only of corporeal real property. As incorporeal property cannot be physically possessed, it cannot be created by any act conferring physical possession, but only by some contract or agreement, called a grant. Hence corporeal real property is often said to lie in livery, and incorporeal to lie in grant. Read 2 Bl. Comm., p. 317. 4 Cruise Dig., Tit. xxxii, Ch. iv, §§ 38-40. 4 Kent Comm., Lect. lxvii, p. 490. Will. R. P., p. 220. 1 Wash. R. P., B. i, Ch. i, § 38. § 83. Of the Possession of Estates Less than Freehold. Of personal estates in corporeal real property there can also be no seisin. All such estates are carved out of some freehold, and although actual possession is essential to render the owner's interest complete, yet even during such possession the tenant has the occupation only, while the seisin still remains in the freeholder under whom he claims. Read 2 Bl. Comm., p. 144. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. viii, Ch. i, §§ 12–15. 4 Kent Comm., Lect. lvi, pp. 94, 95; Lect. lxv, p. 386. Will. R. P., p. 364. 1 Wash. R. P., B. i, Ch. x, Sec. 1, §§ 7, 8. § 84. Of Entry. The act, by which the owner of an estate in corporeal real property takes physical possession of the same, is known as entry. If his estate is created by actual livery of seisin, his reception of the seisin on the land, from the grantor, constitutes his entry. If his estate is otherwise created, or if it descends to him from a deceased ancestor, or if, once having had possession, he has been disseised, or if estates, whose possession takes precedence of his own, have been determined, his entry consists in going on the land and |