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sarily imply force. The mere lifting of a latch or of a window, the procuring of a door to be opened by craft, or by intimidation or by conspiracy, is breaking. To raise a window that is already partly open, to push back a door that already stands ajar, to walk or climb into an aperture already made, is, however, not a breaking. Breaking may be either for purposes of egress or ingress; for one who enters without breaking, in the night season, with felonious intent, completes his crime if, also in the night season, he breaks in order to go out. Breaking may be either of the outer wall of the house, or of those inner walls by which one part is separated from another.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 223, 226, 227.
Broom Comm., pp. 977, 979, 980.
1 H. P. C., pp. 551-555.

3 Chitty C. L., pp. 1093, 1094.

1 Russ. Cr., pp. 785-794.
2 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 263–277.

2 Whart. C. L., §§ 1531-1548.
2 Bish. C. L., §§ 90, 91, 96-100.
2 B. & H. L. C. C., pp. 43-66.
3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 76, 77.

$425. Of Burglary. The Entering.

Entering consists in the insertion, into the interior of the house, of the whole body of the actor, or of a part thereof, or of something which is either connected with his body, or is under his immediate control, and is intended to be used in the commission of the felony. The thrusting of the hand, or of a cane or a hook, beyond the line, which severs the inside from the outside, in order to draw out goods, or of a pistol in order to demand the money of the occupant, is as complete an entry as if the burglar were within the room. But if tools, which are intended only for the break

ing and not for the ulterior felony, fall or are thrust inside, it is no entry. The breaking and the entering must be related to each other, at least by a community of intent; for if the breaking be at one time for one purpose, and the entry be at another time and for another purpose, it is no burglary.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 226, 227.

Broom Comm., pp. 979, 980.
1 H. P. C., pp. 555, 556.
3 Chitty C. L., p. 1094.
1 Russ. Cr., pp. 794–797.
2 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 278–280.
2 Whart. C. L., §§ 1549-1553.
2 Bish. C. L., §§ 92-95.

3 Greenleaf Ev.,

§ 78.

§ 426. Of Burglary. The House.

The dwelling-house, in burglary as in arson, signifies a building, which has been actually used for human habitation, and has not been permanently abandoned by its occupant. It embraces all houses and outhouses, within or without the curtilage, which are parcel of, and in their use are subservient to, the building used as an abode. When, under the same roof, there are some apartments used for residence and others occupied for purposes entirely different, as for stores or workshops, only the portions of the building used for residence are within the dwelling-house. Where different families reside under one roof but in different portions of the building, the portion of each family being distinct and separated from the rest and with a different outward entrance, each portion of the building is by itself a dwelling-house. So suites of rooms in a college, or in an inn of court, have been held to be dwelling-houses, as also rooms or lodgings in a private house, where the

actual owner of the house does not dwell under the same roof, or where he and his lodger enter by separate doors. But if there be but one external entrance, and the owner himself dwells in any part of such building, it constitutes but one dwelling-house.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 224-226.
Broom Comm., p. 978.
1 H. P. C., pp. 556–559.
3 Chitty C. L., pp. 1090-1092.
1 Russ. Cr., pp. 797–807.
2 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 281-290.
2 Whart. C. L., §§ 1555-1575.
2 Bish. C. L., §§ 104-108.
3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 79, 80.

§ 427. Of Burglary. The Ownership of the House.

The ownership of a dwelling-house, in burglary as in arson, consists in the legal right of possession. The person who actually occupies a dwelling-house in his own right, and not as the guest or servant of another, is the owner thereof. Separate dwelling-houses under one roof are owned by those who occupy, as distinguished from the general owner of the whole; and the same is true of separate lodgings in a private house, where the general owner does not dwell therein, and where the lodgers have separate modes of entrance. The dwelling-house of a wife, who lives separated from her husband, is in the ownership of the husband.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 225, 226.

3 Chitty C. L., pp. 1096, 1097.
1 Russ. Cr., pp. 807–820.
2 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 291–306.
2 Whart. C. L., §§ 1577-1591.

2 Bish. C. P., §§ 137-139.
3 Greenleaf Ev., § 81.

§ 428. Of Burglary. The Night Season.

The night season is that period of the night, which intervenes between the total disappearance of daylight in the evening and its reappearance in the morning. Daylight is said to have disappeared when a man's face can no longer be discerned thereby. The presence or absence of moonlight is immaterial. The breaking and entering need not both be in the same night: if both are committed in the night season, and in pursuance of the same design, it is sufficient.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., p. 224.

1 H. P. C., pp. 550, 551.
3 Chitty C. L., pp. 1092, 1093.
1 Russ. Cr., pp. 820-822.
2 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 306–308.
2 Whart. C. L., §§ 1592-1597.
3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 75, 83.

§ 429. Of Burglary. The Felonious Intent.

The breaking and entering must be with intent to commit some felony within the dwelling-house. Such felony may be murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, theft, robbery, or any statute-felony. This intent is a specific intent, and must be alleged and proved as a part of the criminal act. In the absence of such intent, the breaking and entering are mere trespasses.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 227, 228.

Broom Comm., pp. 981, 982.
1 H. P. C., p. 562.

3 Chitty C. L., p. 1095.
1 Russ. Cr., pp. 822–825.
2 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 308-312.
2 Whart. C. L., §§ 1598-1606.
2 Bish. C. L., §§ 109-117.
3 Greenleaf Ev., § 82.

§ 430. Of Larceny. The Taking and Carrying Away. Theft or Larceny is the taking and carrying away of the personal property of another, with intent to steal the same. Four matters here demand attention: (1) The taking and carrying away; (2) The property; (3) Its ownership; and (4) The intent to steal. Taking is the forcible and wrongful prehension or grasping of an object. Carrying away is the wrongful removal of the object taken, from the place where it was when taken. The taking and carrying away, in larceny, are usually considered together under the name of taking, and, so considered, they consist in the forcible severance of the property, from the possession of the owner, against his will. This severance must be complete, but need be only for an instant and to the shortest distance possible; the mere lifting of an article out of its place being a taking. It must also be accomplished by some direct act of the taker, applying force to the object taken, either in the removal or reception thereof. But the degree and kind of force are immaterial; to lead or entice away a horse, or to accept a chattel which is delivered up through fear, are alike a taking. The severance must be from the possession of the owner. An article, abandoned by its owner, is not the subject of theft. But if he loses it by accident, or places it in the custody of another for a temporary purpose, it is still in his possession. Thus goods in the charge of a servant, as such, are in the possession of his master, and a taking and carrying away of them by the servant, with intent to steal, is theft. A bailment of goods by the owner, however, confers a special property therein upon the bailee, and vests the possession of them in him as against all other persons, including the bailor. A bailee, therefore, cannot steal the property of the bailor, unless by some misfeasance he first determines the bailment and, after that, takes and carries away the goods. The severance must also be invito domino, or against the owner's will. If the

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