ment, for that purpose, of men who are never assembled, or words, spoken or written but not published, are not of themselves treasonable acts, though they become so if done in execution of a common purpose, which finds expression in an overt act of treason, or if they are committed in the attempt to aid the public enemy. Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 79, 80. Broom Comm., pp. 903, 904. § 404. Of Alienage as Affecting Treason As treason is the breach of allegiance, so there can be no treason where there is no allegiance. Under the English law a resident alien, owing a local allegiance to the state, could be guilty of this crime. It has been contended, however, in this country, that only a citizen can commit a treasonable act. Read 4 Bl. Comm., p. 74. Broom Comm., pp. 898, 899. 2 Whart. C. L., § 2735. 2 Bish. C. L., § 1235. Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet., p. 261. § 405. Of Misprision of Treason. Misprision of treason is the wilful concealment of a known treason, by a person who neither assents to nor takes part in the same. This crime is committed as well by neglect ing to give information of a treasonable act about to be performed, as by concealing the actor or the act, after it has been done. Read 4 Bl. Comm., p. 120. 1 H. P. C., pp. 371–375. 2 Arch. Cr. Pr., p. 884. CHAPTER IV. OF FELONIES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS. § 406. Of Murder. The Person Killing. Felonies, at common law, against the persons of individuals are three: Murder; Manslaughter; and Rape. Murder is the unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought. An ancient definition, and the one commonly taken as the basis of treatises upon this crime, describes it as "where a person, of sound memory and discretion, unlawfully kills a reasonable creature, in being and in the peace, with malice aforethought either express or implied." This definition presents five topics for discussion: (1) The person killing; (2) The person killed; (3) The act of killing; (4) The unlawfulness of the killing; and (5) The malice aforethought. The person killing must be a person of sound memory and discretion. This is a simple repetition of the rule, applicable to all crime, that the criminal actor must be of sane mind, over seven years of age, and if under fourteen, proved to be capable of criminal intent. Read 4 Bl. Comm., p. 195. 1 H. P. C., p. 434. 3 Chitty C. L., pp. 723-725. 1 Russ. Cr., pp. 484, 485. 1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 831, 832. 2 Whart. C. L., § 930. 3 Greenleaf Ev., § 130. § 407. Of Murder. The Person Killed. person killed must be a reasonable creature, in being A reasonable creature is a human being, The and in the peace. as distinguished from an irrational animal, and from those abnormal products of the human species which are known as monsters. Such reasonable creature is in being when alive and full born. An infant, in the womb of its mother, is not a subject of murder, nor is it when delivered, unless its connection with the mother is so far severed, that its own independent life has actually begun. But if an infant, before birth, receive an injury, from which, after being fully born alive, it dies, its death is that of a creature in being. and the act which produces it, if the other elements of the crime be present, will be murder. A reasonable creature is in the peace whenever he is not a rebel, or a public enemy engaged in actual battle. Read 4 Bl. Comm., p. 198. 3 Chitty C. L., p. 727. 1 Russ. Cr., pp. 485–487. 1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 835–844. § 408. Of Murder. The Act of Killing. (The act of killing must be an act producing corporal injury, and must result in death within a year and a day from the date of its commission.) Mere threats, or other representations, either by word or act, which operate only upon the mind, and, through the terror or anxiety which they engender, cause disease and death without the intervention of any physical injury, are not such killing as is necessary to constitute murder. But if a person, through such terror or anxiety, sustains an immediate physical injury, either as the result of his own desperate act or through an accident occasioned by his disturbed state of mind, the person, by whose threats or representations such terror or anxiety is caused, is guilty of a killing. Although a killing thus implies a physical injury, it is not necessary that it be occasioned by any personal violence, on the part of the actor. To leave poison where it is likely to be taken, to permit ferocious animals to go at large, to ride a kicking horse among a crowd of people, to leave a child or sick person exposed to danger from the want of proper care or food, or to do any other act calculated to endanger life or to produce serious bodily harm, is killing, if death actually result therefrom. Death is conclusively presumed by law to have been produced by natural causes, unless it occurs within a year and a day from the infliction of the injury. In the computation of this period, the day, on which the injury was committed, is reckoned as the first. Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 196, 197. 1 H. P. C., pp. 424-432. 3 Chitty C. L., pp. 725, 726. 1 Russ. Cr., pp. 488-509. 1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 751-762, 832–835. 2 Whart. C. L., §§ 941, 941 a. 2 Bish. C. L., §§ 635-641. 3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 134–142. 409. Of Murder. Justifiable and Excusable Killing. The act of killing is unlawful in every case, where it is not expressly justified or excused by law. The law justifies the killing of another in the following cases: (1) In self-defence, that is, where a felony, attended with force or great atrocity, is actually attempted against the person, habitation, or property of a man, or of some one whom he is under legal obligation to defend, and no other means of preventing such felony being at hand, he kills the felon; (2) Where an officer takes life in pursuance of a legal warrant of execution commanding him so to do; (3) Where a |