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edge and to be controlled by it, the law will not infer from his act the existence of a criminal intent.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 24-26.
Broom Comm., pp. 881-887.
1 H. P. C., pp. 29-37.
1 Russ. Cr., pp. 6-15.
1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 15-42.
1 Whart. C. L., §§ 13-57 a.
1 Bish. C. L., §§ 374-396.
2 Bish. C. P., §§ 666-687.
1 B. & H. L. C. C., pp. 94–145.
3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 5, 6.
McFarland's Case.

§ 390. Of Mistake as Affecting Intent.

It is a necessary rule of law, that ignorance of the law excuses no man. One who commits a criminal act with criminal intent, in ignorance that the act has been made a crime, is not protected by his ignorance, even though it were wholly unavoidable. But this rule has no application to a case of ignorance of fact. Wherever a person, in good faith and upon a reasonable belief that certain things are true, does an act, which, if those things were true, would not be a crime, the doing of such act under that belief, even if those things were not true, does not raise the presumption of a criminal intent.

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§ 391. Of Accident as Affecting Intent.

An act, which in itself is lawful, but which, through misfortune or by chance, becomes a criminal act, affords no ground for the presumption of a criminal intent. But if the act be originally unlawful, the actor is responsible for its consequences, whether or not they are foreseen by him, and from the act, together with its consequences, the law presumes a criminal intent to do the wrong, which actually results.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 26, 27.

1 H. P. C., pp. 38-41.

1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 52–54.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 313-318, 323–329.

§ 392. Of Necessity as Affecting Intent.

A criminal act, if done from necessity, raises no presumption of the criminal intent. This necessity may be either actual or legal. Legal necessity is that which grows out of the obligation to perform some legal duty, as of a sheriff to execute a death-warrant, or of an officer to capture, even if he kills, an escaping felon. Actual necessity is that which grows out of the circumstances immediately attending the commission of the criminal act, as in all cases of true selfdefence. This necessity must be real and not imaginary, must not have resulted from the fault of the actor, and must be of such a character as leaves no alternative but the commission of the criminal act.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 28, 30, 31, 184-187.

Broom Comm., pp. 880, 881.

1 H. P. C., pp. 52-58.

1 Whart. C. L., §§ 90 c, 90 d.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 346-355.

§ 393. Of Compulsion as Affecting Intent.

From a criminal act, when done under compulsion, the law does not presume a criminal intent. In all such cases,

the actor is but the innocent agent of another, who is himself the criminal. Compulsion, like necessity, may be actual or legal. Actual compulsion is the illegal exercise of force, by some third party, compelling the commission of the act. Legal compulsion is that which a husband is presumed by law to exercise over his wife, when, in his presence and by his command, she commits any criminal act less than an act of treason, robbery, or murder.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 27-31.
Broom Comm., pp. 890, 891.
1 H. P. C., pp. 43–52.

1 Russ. Cr., pp. 17-24.

1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 43-47, 56, 57.
1 Whart. C. L., §§ 67-81, 90 a, 90 b.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 346–366.

1 B. & H. L. C. C., pp. 81-94.

3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 7–9.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE DEGREES OF CRIME.

§ 394. Of Treason.

The classes, or degrees, of crime are three: Treason; Felony; and Misdemeanor. Treason is not only a separate class of crime; it is the only crime of its class. It is also the worst of crimes; for it is directed, not at the person or property of the subject, or even at the public peace and order, but at the very existence of the state and of society.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 74, 75.

Broom Comm., p. 892.

1 Russ. Cr., p. 44.

1 Whart. C. L., § 1.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 598-613.

§ 395. Of Felony.

Felony embraces all the crimes, whose prosecution and punishment are governed by those rules, which, under the ancient common law, controlled the prosecution and punishment of such offences as worked a forfeiture of the criminal's estate. Under the ancient law, a person who was convicted of certain crimes, called felonies, forfeited his estate; and this forfeiture was esteemed a punishment of such severity, that the law exercised great caution in the trial of such cases, and gave to the accused the benefit of many nice distinctions and technicalities, which, in other

cases, he did not need, or of which, on account of the enormity of the offence, he was deprived. Thus there grew up a peculiar procedure, in the prosecution and punishment of this class of crimes; and though forfeiture, as then inflicted, has ceased to be a penalty for crime, that procedure still continues, and has become the characteristic by which felony is distinguished from treason on the one hand, and misdemeanor on the other.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 94-98.

Broom Comm., p. 893.

1 Russ. Cr., p. 44.

1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 1, 2.

1 Whart. C. L., § 2.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 614-619.

§ 396. Of Common Law and Statute Felonies.

Felonies are of two kinds: Felonies at common law, and Felonies by statute. Felonies at common law were formerly very numerous, nearly every important offence having been, at one time or another, proceeded against and punished as a felony. In modern times, this number has been much reduced, and there are now but seven crimes, which are generally regarded as felonies at common law. These are: (1) Murder; (2) Manslaughter; (3) Rape; (4) Arson; (5) Burglary; (6) Theft; and (7) Robbery. Felonies by statute are those crimes, not otherwise made felonies, which are declared by statute to be felonies. They differ from common law felonies only in their origin, their mode of prosecu tion and punishment being the same.

Read 1 Russ. Cr., pp. 44, 45.
1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 1, 2.
1 Whart. C. L., §§ 2, 10.
1 Bish. C. L., §§ 618-622.

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