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which, under a free government, would work no public evil, might, if committed under a despotic government, convulse or overthrow the state. An act which, half a century ago, would not have resulted even in private damage, today may cause far-reaching injury and loss. With every change in society or in the forms of government, and with every development of commerce, the character and effects. of wrongs will also change, and with them must change the position of such wrongs before the law, and the methods which it uses for their prevention or redress. Hence it is true, in every case, that crimes are creatures of the law. The state is the divider of act from act, and, through its legislature and its courts, defines and specifies what wrongs are to be taken out of the great mass of private injuries, and punished as and for violations of public rights. Read 1 Bl. Comm., pp. 54, 55, 57, 58.

1 H. P. C., pp. 1, 2, 13, 14.

3 Wilson, pp. 7–12.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 209, 210, 773-785.

§ 384. Of the Definitions of Crime.

The definitions, which legal writers give of the word crime, differ according to the view they take of it, as denoting an injury to the public, or an act forbidden by the state. The following are illustrations:

"A crime is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law, either forbidding or commanding it.”

"A crime is an injury so atrocious in its nature, or so dangerous in its example, that, besides the loss that it occasions to the individual who suffers by it, it affects, in its immediate operation or in its consequences, the interest, the peace, the dignity, or the security of the public.”

A crime is a wrong "which the government notices as

injurious to the public, and punishes, in what is called a criminal proceeding, in its own name."

A crime is "an offence which is pursued by the sovereign, or by the subordinates of the sovereign."

Considered both as a wrong against the public, and an act forbidden and punished by the state, it may be thus defined: A crime is a wrong, directly or indirectly affecting the public, to the commission of which the state has annexed certain pains and penalties, and which it prosecutes and punishes in its own name.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., p. 5.

3 Wilson, p. 4.

Austin Jur., Lect. xvii.
1 Bish. C. L., § 32.

16

CHAPTER I.

OF THE ELEMENTS OF CRIME.

§ 385. Of Criminal Act and Criminal Intent.

Every crime contains two elements: The Criminal Act, and The Criminal Intent. The criminal act consists of those external actions or omissions, which the law prohibits. The criminal intent is that evil and malicious will, which finds expression in the criminal act.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 20, 21.
Broom Comm., pp. 874-880.

1 H. P. C., pp. 14, 15.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 204-208, 216–229, 285–291, 330– 334, 337-345.

§ 386. Of Specific Intent.

The law regards some acts as crimes, without reference to the purpose which they were intended to accomplish. Other acts are criminal only when performed with some particular purpose or design. In the latter cases, this design enters into the nature of the act itself, and is called the specific intent. The specific intent and the criminal intent must not be confounded with each other. They have nothing in common, except that both are mental operations. The former determines the purpose, toward the accomplishment of which the act shall be directed; the latter determines that the act, so directed, shall be done. Nothing can show this difference more clearly than the

rules, by which the proof of these intents is governed. The specific intent, as part of the criminal act, must be alleged and proved, in the same manner as any other portion of the act. The criminal intent, on the other hand, is neither alleged nor proved, but is inferred from the commission of the act; and when the act itself has been established, the law presumes it to have been the expression of this evil will.

Read Broom Comm., p. 876.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 320, 335.
3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 13-19.

§ 387. Of Drunkenness as Affecting Intent.

This difference appears still further from the modes, in which the crimes of voluntary drunkards are regarded by the law. The rule is everywhere established, that the commission of a criminal act raises the presumption of the criminal intent, notwithstanding that the criminal was drunk, when he committed it. No other rule would be consistent with the safety of society. But where the existence of a specific intent is necessary to the criminal act, a degree of drunkenness, incompatible with the formation of that intent, negatives the act, and disproves the crime.

Read Broom Comm., pp. 887, 888.

1 H. P. C., p. 32.

1 Russ. Cr., pp. 7,

8.

1 Whart. C. L., §§ 32-44.

1 Bish. C. L., §§ 397-416.

1 B. & H. L. C. C., pp. 131-145.

§388. Of Infancy as Affecting Intent.

Although the criminal intent is thus presumed from the commission of the criminal act, this presumption is not

conclusive, but may be rebutted by proof of facts which indicate the absence of a criminal intent. Such facts are: (1) That the actor acted while under a certain age; (2) That the actor acted while in a state of insanity; (3) That the actor acted under a bona fide mistake of fact; (4) That the actor acted accidentally or by chance; (5) That the actor acted from necessity; (6) That the actor acted under compulsion. The criminal act of an infant, under fourteen years of age, raises no presumption of a criminal intent. Under the age of seven years, no person can commit a crime; for, whatever be the act, the law conclusively presumes the absence of a criminal intent. But between the ages of seven and fourteen, there is no presumption. In such cases, the prosecution must establish the intent, by such distinct and substantive evidence as indicates a guilty knowledge and an evil will.

Read 4 Bl. Comm., pp. 22–24.
Broom Comm., pp. 889, 890.

1 H. P. C., pp. 16-28.

1 Russ. Cr., pp. 1-6.

1 Arch. Cr. Pr., pp. 7-14.

1 Whart. C. L., §§ 58–65.
1 Bish. C. L., §§ 367-373.
1 B. & H. L. C. C., pp. 71-80.
3 Greenleaf Ev., §§ 3, 4.

§ 389. Of Insanity as Affecting Intent.

An insane person cannot commit a crime. What constitutes insanity, in this connection, has given rise to much discussion. One of the most famous of recent cases gives the following rule: Whenever a man does not know that the act he is committing is unlawful and morally wrong, and has not reason sufficient to apply such knowl

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