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for the public welfare; (2) The right of eminent domain; (3) The right of taxation. The citizen is liable, at all times, to render personal service in the military or naval forces of the state, to aid in the arrest and pursuit of criminals, to render assistance to executive officers whenever legally summoned so to do, to serve on juries, and to do any other act, in the public interest, which the law may, from time to time, require. The alien, on the contrary, is usually exempt from military or naval service, from jury duty, and from any other liability, which is antagonistic to his natural allegiance.

Read Vattel, B. iii, §§ 7-10.

2 Burlamaqui, pp. 157–159.
Federalist, No. xxix.

2 Story Const., §§ 1199-1215.

371. Of Eminent Domain.

The right of eminent domain is the right of the state to take private property for public use, upon making due compensation therefor. Every species of property, except money and choses in action, is subject to this right. It can be exercised only in accordance with legislative enactment. All proceedings under it are stricti juris, and the property taken must be necessary for, and appropriated to, some public, or quasi public, use.

Read Vattel, B. i, § 244.

2 Burlamaqui, pp. 149, 150.

Cooley Const. Lim., pp. 523-571.
Cooley Const. Law, pp. 331-342.

§ 372. Of Taxes.

The right of taxation is the right of the state to impose burdens or charges upon the persons or property of its

subjects, in order to raise money for public purposes. Taxation may be either direct, as upon polls and land, or indirect, as in duties and imposts upon articles of consumption. In all cases, it must be in strict accordance with legislative authority, and for public purposes alone. The United States has no power to tax the means by which the States perform their governmental functions, and the same limitation rests upon the taxing power of States in reference to the governmental agencies of the United States. Aliens, as well as citizens, are liable to taxation, and subject to the exercise of the right of eminent domain.

Read Vattel, B. i, §§ 240-243; B. ii, § 106.
2 Burlamaqui, pp. 147–149.
Federalist, No. xxx-xxxvi.

Cooley Const. Lim., pp. 479–521.
Cooley Const. Law, pp. 54-62.
1 Story Const., §§ 906–1053.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT IN OR AGAINST THE

STATE.

$ 373. Of the Duties of States in General to their Subjects.

The rights of the subject, in or against the state, are two: Protection and Vindication. These rights are due to the subject, in return for the allegiance which binds him to the state, and constitute the obligation which the state assumed in that original compact, by which they became politically related to each other.

Read 1 Bl. Comm., pp. 233-236, 369.

Vattel, B. i, §§ 38-51.

2 Burlamaqui, pp. 97-104.

§ 374. Of Protection against Wrongs from Co-Subjects. The protection, which is due to the subject from the state, includes: (1) Protection against wrongs at the hands of co-subjects; (2) Protection against wrongs at the hands of the state itself; (3) Protection against wrongs at the hands of foreign states. The wrongs, which one co-subject can inflict upon another, are either torts or crimes. These, it is the duty of the state, as far as possible, to prevent, and this it does when it so discharges the three governmental functions as to secure the highest practicable degree of public peace and order, and, at the same time, places no unnecessary restraint upon the property or per sons of its subjects.

Read 1 Bl. Comm., pp. 125–128, 141.

2 Burlamaqui, pp. 105–107.

Walker Am. Law, §§ 78-89.

§ 375. Of Protection against Wrongs from the State.

Of wrongs, committed against the subject by the state itself, some are mere torts or crimes, others involve the usurpation and abuse of power. Most wrongs committed by executive, and some of those committed by judicial, officers are among the former; and against these the state protects the subject, in the same manner as against wrongs committed by co-subjects. Unwarrantable acts of legislation, and corruption or incompetency in the courts, lie, however, outside of the ordinary domain of wrongs. Against these the state can protect the subject, only by its constitutional safeguards, and by the restrictions which it throws around the action of its courts and legislatures.

Read 2 Hill. Torts, Ch. xxviii, xxix, xxxii.
Cooley Torts, pp. 376-425.

Cooley Const. Law, pp. 144-159.

1 Story Const., §§ 533–543.

§ 376. Of Protection against Wrongs from Foreign States.

Wrongs may be committed against the subject by a foreign state, either by its direct governmental act, or by its sanction of some wrong, done by its own subject. A tort or crime, committed against the subject of one state by the subject of another, becomes the act of that other state, if it protects the wrong-doer from punishment, or denies to the injured party his appropriate redress. In that event, it is the duty of the state, whose subject has been injured, to demand satisfaction from the state, which, first by its subject and finally by its own act, has committed the wrong. A firm and persistent policy, in thus demanding and enforcing full regard for their rights, is a duty which every state owes to its subjects, and is the only means by which

such rights can be protected against invasion at the hands of foreign states.

Read Vattel, B. ii, §§ 71-78.

2 Burlamaqui, pp. 178, 179.
1 Wilson, pp. 371, 372.
Woolsey Int. Law, § 116.

§ 377. Of the Redress of Wrongs Committed by CoSubjects.

The vindication, which is due to the subject from the state, is the complement of this protection. Entire protection of the subject, by the state, against the commission of legal wrongs, is impossible; and, when protection fails, it is the duty of the state to redress the injuries, which it could not prevent. This redress or vindication includes: (1) Redress of wrongs committed by co-subjects; (2) Redress of wrongs committed by the state itself; (3) Redress of wrongs committed by foreign states. The redress of wrongs committed by co-subjects is principally accomplished through the agency of courts. It is, therefore, the duty of the state to establish courts, and to so regulate the procedure therein, as to give redress with certainty, with justice, and without unnecessary expense or delay. It is also the duty of the state, by appropriate legislation, to provide against such fraudulent concealments of person or property as tend to defeat the ends of justice, to punish as crimes those torts which are either grievously injurious to the subject or of dangerous example, and to adopt all other measures necessary to secure that remedy for wrong, which the state, by its organization, pledges itself to afford.

Read 1 Bl. Comm., pp. 141, 142.

Vattel, B. i, §§ 158-172.

2 Burlamaqui, pp. 106, 107.
Walker Am. Law, § 88.

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