which tends to disgrace or degrade a person, or to render him ridiculous, is libellous matter. If it be expressed either by printing, writing, signs, effigies, or pictures, it is libellous in form. Sending or exhibiting such libellous matter to any third person, or printing it in a book, newspaper, or handbill, which is intended for general circulation, is a sufficient publication. Malice is presumed from the fact of publication, but this presumption may be rebutted by showing that the publisher acted in good faith and upon lawful occasion. All persons concerned in the publication are participators in the wrong. Read 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 125, 126. Bac. Abr., Libel. 1 Hill. Torts, Ch. vii, §§ 2, 11, 13, 14; Ch. ix, §§ 2, 7; Ch. xi-xiv. 2 Addison Torts, §§ 1087-1115, 1140, 1147, 1148, 1157. Cooley Torts, pp. 193-195, 204–221. Bigelow L. C. Torts, pp. 90-99, 107-121, 151–177. § 217. Of Slander. Slander is the wilful and malicious publication, by spoken words, of some matter tending to injure the reputation of another. Slanderous words are of two kinds: (1) Words from which the law implies damage, called words actionable per se; (2) Words from which the law does not imply damage, called words not actionable per se. Words actionable per se are of four kinds: (1) Words which charge a crime; (2) Words which impute an infectious disease; (3) Words derogatory to a person in his trade or profession; (4) Words derogatory to a person in his official character. Words not actionable per se become actionable when they are maliciously spoken, and produce actual damage. Malice is implied by law from the utterance of the words, unless the circumstances of the speaking are such as to show that the speaker did not intend to attack the reputation of the person spoken of. This presumption of malice may be rebutted by proof that the occasion justified the speaking, or that the words themselves were true. Read 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 123–125. Bac. Abr., Slander. 1 Hill. Torts, Ch. vii-xiv. 2 Addison Torts, §§ 1116-1137, 1157. Bigelow L. C. Torts, pp. 73-177. § 218. Of Malicious Prosecution. Malicious prosecution consists in the malicious preferment of a groundless criminal charge against another, without probable cause, and to his actual damage. The falsehood of a criminal charge is established by the determination of criminal proceedings in favor of the accused, either by a verdict of acquittal, or by the voluntary act of the public prosecutor. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonable and prudent man to believe in the guilt of the accused. Malice may be presumed from the want of probable cause, but the presumption may be rebutted by showing that the accuser acted in good faith, and in the reasonable belief that the charge was true. Actual damage to person, property, or reputation, must result from the preferment of the charge, for the law does not imply damage either from its malice, falsehood, or want of probable cause. The preferment of a true charge, however malicious, is no wrong. Read 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 126, 127. 1 Hill Torts, Ch. xvi. 2 Addison Torts, §§ 852-860, 880, 882. Bigelow L. C. Torts, pp. 178–206. § 219. Of False Imprisonment The wrong, by which the right of personal liberty is violated, is that of False Imprisonment. False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another. Every confinement or restraint of the person of another, in any place, in any manner, and for any period of time whatever, if unlawful, is a false imprisonment. Such confinement or restraint is unlawful in every case where it is not expressly authorized by law, and, even where so authorized, it is unlawful unless it be in the mode, in the place, and at the time, prescribed by law. All persons voluntarily aiding and assisting in a false imprisonment are responsible for the wrong committed thereby. Read 3 Bl. Comm., p. 127. 1 Hill. Torts, Ch. vi, §§ 1-2 a, 6, 7, 9–29. 2 Addison Torts, §§ 798-819. Cooley Torts, pp. 169–180. Bigelow L. C. Torts, pp. 235-285. CHAPTER II. OF WRONGS WHICH VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY. § 220. Of Disseisin. Wrongs, which violate the right of private property, are those whereby the owner of such property is disturbed in the lawful use, enjoyment, or disposal thereof. The wrongs, by which the owner of estates in real property may be thus disturbed, either deprive him of the possession of such property, or destroy or decrease the value of his estate therein without disturbing the possession. Wrongs involving dispossession are of two kinds: (1) Those which consist in the entering of one person into lands already in the lawful occupation of another, and the excluding that other from the enjoyment of the same; (2) Those which consist in the exclusion, from the possession of lands, of a person who has the right of enjoyment, but has never had the actual enjoyment thereof. The former of these wrongs is called disseisin. Disseisin is the privation of seisin. It takes the seisin of the estate from one man and places it in another. To constitute it there must not only be an entry upon lands, but the entry must be open, adverse, and unlawful, and with intent to exclude, and actual exclusion of, the lawful owner. It may be committed either by a stranger against the tenant, or by one of several tenants in common against his co-tenants. By it the disseisor acquires a right to the land, as against all persons except the lawful owner, and, if his disseisin continue for a sufficient period, he gains a title by possession. Read 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 167, 169–171, 188, 189, 196, 198, 199. Bac. Abr., Disseisin. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. i, §§ 33–35. § 221. Of Abatement, Intrusion, Discontinuance, and Deforcement. The wrongs, which consist in the exclusion from possession of a lawful owner who never had possession, are of four kinds: Abatement; Intrusion; Discontinuance; and Deforcement. Abatement is the unlawful entry of a stranger into lands held in fee, after the death of the tenant in fee, and before the entry of the heir or devisee. Intrusion is the unlawful entry of a stranger, into lands held in remainder or reversion, after the determination of the particular estate, and before the entry of the remainderman or reversioner. Discontinuance is the occupation of lands held in fee-tail, after the death of a tenant-in-tail, by a person to whom such tenant-in-tail has granted an estate for a longer period than during the life of such tenant-in-tail. Deforcement is any exclusion, from the possession of lands, of a lawful owner never in possession, otherwise than by abatement, intrusion, and discontinuance. Withholding her dower from a widow, the retention of possession by a grantor, or by a tenant upon condition subsequent after the condition is fulfilled, are instances of deforcement. Read 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 168, 169, 171–174. Bac. Abr., Discontinuance. 1 Cruise Dig., Tit. i, §§ 31, 32; Tit. ii, Ch. ii, §§ 7-9. |