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hardships resulting from the retention of old laws, usages, forms, and obsolete or questionable institutes. Other evils, moral as well as legal, flow from the same deleterious source. Oath-making, affidavit-making, solemn affirmations of religious belief, declaration against bribery at elections, or on the property qualification of members of parliament, against corruption in the disposal of civil offices of East India patronage, against the supremacy of the pope, and in favour of the Protestant succession and the Protestant Church establishment,—all these, in many cases, are held to be forms only, but they are pernicious forms, the superfluous observance of which has tended to undermine the security of public and private transactions, and impair immeasurably the general integrity and veracity of the community. We therefore heartily wish that Amund's observation may be appreciated by those whose occupation it is to give laws to the country.

152. Obedience to the Laws.

We are convinced that there is no country in the world where the prescription of the laws in general are more obeyed and considered than in England. The great number of criminals must here be set aside, and cannot be opposed to our observation, which concerns civil rights and peaceable men, who acknowledge their laws are made to be obeyed; while in other countries they are partly considered as having been made to be evaded: and it is the more astonishing, since most of the inhabitants of Great Britain confess that the existing laws are not satisfactory, and their application still less so. The middle classes, who often speak "wie ihnen der Schnabel gewachsen ist," say, "I don't like law; I hate lawyers, &c." because they know but too well the abuses of the law, and have not judgment enough to have the inner conviction that the "laws are also salutary to the individual bound by them."

153. Men should moderate their desires.

It is very difficult to convince man that "the fulfilment of his desires will but make him unhappy." Many philosophers pretend that men in a state of nature are inclined to evil. Others, that they are timid; and others again, like Hobbes, that their natural state is that of war, and that they are inclined to subject each other. It is only by education that they can be brought to conquer their passions; and to attain this, the most effectual education is that which Rousseau has employed in his "Emile"-experience. It is only

by experience, and sometimes by very hard experience, that man learns that "the fulfilment of his desires will but make him unhappy."

154. Punishments must be mild but inevitable.

How can the punishment be inevitable when the conclusion of law-suits are enigmas, even to the most experienced men? The punishment for capital crimes is known by all; but those of a lesser degree vary in countries where no positive code exists, as we have already mentioned, according as the case may be considered by the judges. As concerns the mildness of punishments, we have already given our opinion in a former note.

155. Public Appointments obtained by favour.

We here perceive that liberties, privileges, and licenses could only be obtained by the commoners; but as appointments are granted by the crown, and most of its officers, that law is paralyzed; and we boldly ask, whether favour does not often displace merit? To give examples of this is not our task.

The British constitution itself possesses a remedy in the stipulation that the sovereign may create new offices, and affix new titles to them, but cannot create new fees for their support; nor can the crown annex new fees to old offices, as this would be a tax on the subject, which cannot be imposed but by parliament.

156. Privy Council.

The sovereign of Great Britain is assisted by the privy council, of which the number in ancient times was limited to twelve; afterwards it increased to so large a number that it was found inconvenient; and in the reign of Charles II. its number was limited to thirty; but since that time the number has been gradually augmented, and now continues indefinite.

As it is evident that among so many secrecy and despatch could not always be secured, nor responsibility effectually exacted, the sovereign is advised and attended by another council, the members of which, ex officio, are members of the privy council, and which is "THE CABINET COUNCIL." The eminent individuals who compose this council are intrusted with all the important affairs of government, both domestic and foreign, and with the highest administrative power in the state: hence, with their colleagues in office, it is called

"THE ADMINISTRATION."

The members of this council receive their appointment from the prime minister, who is selected by the sovereign, and empowered by royal authority to form the council and the whole administration, by choosing such individuals as coincide with him in principle, and who are likely to co-operate with him in carrying out the system of government which he has adopted.

157. Surveyance over Counsellors.

This surveyance over the counsellors of the king is not always effectual in its practice, as they seldom render an account of their actions until it is too late to repair them; and the representatives of the people must very often be satisfied with being informed that the matter is not ripe for communication: but even that responsibility is a check to their unbridled will, and, in some cases, does not fail in its result.

158. Voice of the People.

It is very difficult for the sovereign to discover what the "voice of the people" really signifies. Public addresses to the monarch or his government are for the most part constructed by some leader, bearing the signatures of a great number of individuals, who cannot be considered as competent in the matter, and with whom quantity cannot replace quality. But it is, at the same time, very unpopular to ridicule such addresses, even if they are 66 monstrous." The right of openly speaking and petitioning should never be oppressed, not even in a critical moment. Speaking, though ever so free, is not a crime, unless accompanied by action. "Les paroles," says Montesquieu, "ne forment point un corps de délit, elles ne restent que dans l'idée. La plupart du temps elles ne signifient point par elle-mêmes, mais par le ton dont on les dit. Souvent,` en redisant les mêmes paroles, on ne rend pas le même sens : le sens depend de la liaison qu'elles ont avec d'autres choses. Quelquefois le silence exprime plus que tous les discours. Il n'y a rien de si équivoque que tout cela. Comment donc en faire un crime de lese-majesté? Partout où cette loi est établie, nonseulement la liberté n'est plus, mais son ombre même." actions ne sont pas de tous les jours, bien des gens peuvent les remarquer; une fausse accusation sur des faits peut être aisément éclaircie. Les paroles qui sont jointes à une action prennent la nature de cette action. Ainsi un homme qui va dans la place publique exhorter les sujets à la revolte, devient coupable de lêse-majesté, parce que les paroles sont

"Les

jointes à l'action et y participent. Ce ne sont point les paroles que l'on punit, mais une action commise, dans laquelle on emploie les paroles. Elles ne deviennent des crimes que lorsqu'elles préparent, qu'elles accompagnent ou qu'elles suivent une action criminelle. On renverse tout, si l'on fait des paroles un crime capital, au lieu de les regarder comme le signe d'un crime capital."

"Les écrits contiennent quelqe chose de plus permanent que les paroles; mais, lorsqu'ils ne préparent pas au crime de lèse-majesté ils ne sont point une matière de lèse-majesté."

Satirical writings and caricatures, even if personal, are not considered as libels in England, for the political motive, that they are usually directed against the powerful, that they flatter general malignity, comfort the discontented, lessen the desire for high offices, and impart such patience to the people as to make them laugh at their own sufferings.

159. Use of the rejecting power of a King.

This right has lately been used (or abused) by an European monarch; and although it may be contrary to the opinion of philanthropists and philosophers, we wish that this remedy, perhaps an evil of itself, would be sanctioned by success in appeasing the disordered states of Germany, and the remainder of Europe. But monarchs and ministers have no right to oppress liberty, even for the purpose of maintaining peace and preventing anarchy. All good-hearted men will, however, rather suppress their feelings and give up some of their privileges than favour the latter.

160. Influence practised on Electors.

We do not see how this can be prevented, since the speeches and letters of candidates to electoral bodies are so very frequent and lead to so many abuses. They flatter the electors, confess principles which their hearts are not at all disposed to follow; and if they happen to be at the same time members of the government, they promise heaven and earth, golden mountains, and arcadian felicity; and, after all, generally "strive more after their own aggrandizement than that of their country."

161. Such an honest Man, who supports with patience the loss of the esteem of his Party, exists even now.

The deputies of our time do, for the most part, the contrary to that which Alfred feared. Their electors have little power over them, and they strive more after the

applause of the premier than after that of the people. But modern history has shown to us in other countries many "honest men who opposed themselves to the imprudent will of the misled people," and to them may be attributed the restoration of peace.

162. Do Representatives strive to increase their power? This also took place lately in other countries, where the constitutions were but shortly established. The young deputies were not cool enough for their functions, and lost their newly acquired right by requiring too much. The British representatives consequently keep to the opposite extreme, and require too little.

163. Mischief caused by the power of the People.

Example: The 1st of June, 1848, in Paris; Rome in 1849; and the errors and crimes recently committed in many other cities and countries.

164. Deputies and their Electors.

The "honourable member for -" is an expression adopted in parliamentary debates, instead of the personal name of the member, which should be abolished, because it is quite useless to remind a deputy at every opportunity that he has been elected for such a county, town, or borough, as he is considered more as the representative and defender of the rights of the nation, than of those who elected him. Once elected, the power of the electors is no more until a new election takes place: this point of view, which we think is the right one, cannot be brought too often before the notice of the members and the electors.

165. Members of the Opposition.

The opposition is generally composed of troublesome citizens, whose motives we may, however, consider as very laudable, when they only "disdain the good because it is not the best." Such men should not be morally killed by sarcasm, even if they do not succeed, and are overpowered by the majority. Great Britain possesses two of them at present, of whom one has acquired an undoubted claim to our esteem by his seniority, and the other, although somewhat of a charlatan, has still done much good.

British tyranny, to which we have alluded in Note 129, has adopted a bad system: it does not wait until a man has spoken, in order to oppose and ridicule his speech, but does

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