produce abounds, it is sold at a low price, then the producer gains less. If all producers are in the same situation, they are all miserable; it is their abundance which ruins society. And as all conviction seems to be embodied in fact, it is seen that in most countries the laws of men are opposed to the abundance of things. This sophism, if clothed in a general form, would, perhaps, make little impression; but applied to a particular order of facts, to such or such branch of industry, to any given class of producers, it is extremely specious, which may be thus explained. It is a syllogism, not false, but incomplete. But whatever there may be which is true in a syllogism, is always and necessarily present to the mind. On the other hand, incompleteness is a negative quality, an absent datum, which it is very possible, and even very easy, to hold of no account. Man produces in order to consume. He is at the same time a producer and a consumer. The reasoning which I have just established considers him only under the first of these points of view. Under the second, we should have arrived at an opposite conclusion. Might it not in truth be said,—the consumer is inasmuch more rich, as he buys all things cheaper; he buys things cheaper in proportion to their abundance; their abundance enriches him; and this reasoning, extended to all consumers, would conduct to the theory of abundance. It is the imperfectly comprehended notion of exchange which produces these illusions. If we consult our personal interest, we distinctly recognise that it is two-fold. As sellers, we are interested in the dearness of the article, and by consequence in its rarity; as buyers, in a cheap market, or, what is the same, in the abundance of things." We have extracted the last paragraph from the articles on scarcity and abundance, in Mr. Potter's clever translation of M. Bastiat's "Sophismes Economiques;" and we regret that our space does not allow us to give more of that article. We will therefore merely add Mr. Potter's note on the same:"The error into which the author has here allowed himself to fall, is beginning to be understood in England, where large profits are made by means of low prices. It is found that greater gains are made by catering for the million, than by providing for the demands of the affluent. Weekly journals, which if sold at prices until lately general, would certainly not pay their expenses, are made to yield handsome incomes to all connected with them, when sold at prices that bring them within the reach of the many. For the extensive application of this discovery, which is not now confined to matters of literature, but is fast being extended to a great variety of objects, in a way that adds most importantly to the comfort and enjoyment of the labouring classes, we are under much obligation to the Messrs. Chambers, of Edinburgh, and to the able and ingenious publisher of the 'Penny Magazine.'" Mr. Potter further says, in his note:-"We cannot simplify and cheapen any article of use or consumption without adding to the sum of human enjoyment. Even in the case, if any such case can be found, of articles, the use of which cannot be increased by making them cheaper, the consumer will, when they shall be cheaper, have greater means left at his disposal for procuring other objects of desire, while the capital of the producer will be in part set free, and will be employed for the preparation of the increased quantities of objects so demanded."* 144. Right of levying Taxes vested in the House of Commons. According to this principle the House of Commons possesses entirely the means of granting supplies for the public service; and from this important privilege a truly gigantic power is intrusted to them (on which, indeed, hangs the great balance of the constitution,)—the sole right of levying taxes, and supplying subsidies to the executive. It is known that every bill, whether private or public, which has for its object the raising of money, must originate in the House of Commons; and whatever bills of this nature are sent up to the House of Lords, the Lords are only allowed simply to reject or to pass them. This power has come to be invested in the Commons, not from abstract theory, or by the abgregation of reason, a priori; for it is very difficult, indeed, to show its consistency with the general principles of the law of nature, or with the deductions of reason; but it has intermixed with the constitution in the course of its experimental working. It cannot arise from the circumstance, that the money is voted by the Commons independent of the Lords; for the taxes are supplied from the whole property of the kingdom. The Commons do not furnish the supplies, and have no power whatever to collect them: this rests with the executive; but it has been found expedient, in the practice of government, that the power of measuring the expenses of the * We beg the reader will decide whether it is better to have cheap or dear productions, as we are not convinced by either of the arguments. 324 NOTES, COMMENTARIES, ETC. state, and voting the amount proper for sustaining the different branches of public management, should rest in one assembly, in order that no dissension may arise on a subject which might clog the wheels of government by delay. No question can arise with the Sovereign or Lords as to the supply being too much or too little; the vote of the House of Commons at once decides the amount; and thus the money transactions of the state proceed with regularity and despatch. This high trust has been confided to the House of Commons undoubtedly for the benefit of the whole nation, and not for the purpose of being converted into an engine of destruction to the other branches of government. In confiding this trust, the constitution has not left it with them to decide as to whether there shall or shall not be a supply, but, generally, to say what shall be the amount of that supply. This power is very properly vested in the elective body of the legislature, because it represents all the interests of the community, and must be supposed to have the closest sympathy with the various classes of society, and not so easily to be influenced by private motives: but, though the elective body be thus distinguished, it has no legal warrant or moral power, by the exercise of it, to contravene the laws of the constitution under which they have been elected. They have no more power to refuse all supplies than they have to declare the constitution to be at an end. They are the assessors, in many cases, within certain limits, and, under particular statutes, of the compensations and payments to be awarded and paid to public functionaries, in order that the existing authorities may not lack the immediate means of carrying on the affairs of the country to the country's honour: but to refuse any part of these means, for the purpose of coercing the constituted authorities into measures in no way connected with the monetary affairs of the state, would be a high crime and misdemeanor in law, and a gross fraud and malversation of authority in conscience, 145. Burden shaken from one to another. If this hypothesis be true, it is not astonishing that most of the aristocracy are conservatives; but a recent case has proved that their resistance to all great measures for the welfare of the state is very moderate, even if such measures have not won their approbation. They hate disunion and political changes, and therefore yield when necessity requires. BOOK V. 146. Revenue of the Church. 325 We beg to refer our readers to some former notes on this subject 147. Subjection of all Ranks to Taxes. Some examples in executions for poor-rate prove that persons of the highest rank are subjected to that rule. 148. Proportion of Taxes. The proposition of Amund seems at first sight somewhat paradoxical, as the state needs in time of war greater sacrifices than in time of peace; and were that not the case, the national debts of most countries would not be so augmented as they actually are. But probably he set out from the principle, that in time of war the incomes of individuals are considerably less than in time of peace; and on that account the equilibrium which a man can bear is re-established. We are, however, very glad that Amund is satisfied with the twentieth, and, at most, the tenth part of the public income; for if we calculate all the direct taxes that every man is obliged to pay to the state by indirect ones, (which it would be superfluous to enumerate,) we can boldly assert that he pays to the state half his income. There would be no harm in it if those forced gifts were only well employed. But as it is, we are reminded of the paternal Chinese imperial edict, which says "That the taxes should be paid at the term, and a man should not want to be urged; then you may take what is over and nourish your parents, complete the marriage ceremonies of your sons and daughters, satisfy your morning and evening wants, and prepare for the annual feasts and sacrifices." In the amplification of that maxim in the sacred edict, the matter is not more plausibly explained :-"It is necessary that you first complete the payment of your taxes, and with the little money which you have over you may buy some good things, by which to manifest filial piety to your parents, the authors of your life; and to show your affection to your brothers and sisters, who lay in the same womb, and sucked the same breasts. Again, you may also be able to complete the great things, viz. the marriage of your daughters and sons; your own daily food and clothing, and the [ceremonies of the] times and seasons. All these you may be able by degrees duly to regulate." Englishmen pay taxes, and then take what is over! 326 NOTES, COMMENTARIES, ETC. 149. Illusive freedom. "The free German [the descendant of the German] will not be bound." He consequently likes to bear iron fetters enveloped in flowers. He willingly gives, and more than he ought, to society, imagining that he is free; and if this illusion makes him happy, why should we deprive him of it? 150. Foundation of the British Constitution. We have in a former note already explained the basis and most important pillars of the British constitution, which consist in the application of that principle. 151. Reforms in Legislation. About the end of the last century, Romilly, Bentham, Mackintosh, Michael Angelo Taylor, and other reformers, proved that the laws of England were not what they assumed to be. In 1828, Lord Brougham, in a masterly address, brought the subject of legal abuses before parliament; and that extraordinary effort of luminous and convincing eloquence proved not wholly fruitless to the nation. The author lived from that time mostly in England, and what he saw, heard, and experienced in law matters, has convinced him that nothing essential has been done in the way of reform. Certainly, if a foreigner, after reading Blackstone, was informed that the judges of England met together on certain occasions, to discuss questions so difficult, as to be reserved for their united wisdom, he would form to himself a notion of all that was most wise, venerable, and imposing. At such a gathering of sages, he would naturally think must be congregated all that practical wisdom, the fruit of grey experience and exact theory, the result of long and intimate acquaintance with the treasured wisdom of ages, that could bear upon the conflicting and shifting phenomena of life. At such a meeting, all the great doctrines upon which the fabric of society, whatever be its form, must ultimately rest, must needs be sifted, examined, and illustrated. But great would be the disappointment of the stranger when he learned that the time of so august an appeal has been wasted in discussions of trifling objects in the form, and not in the spirit of the law. The new example of late court-sittings attests what an uncertain lottery the British judicature is; how the innocent may be punished, and the guilty escape, under favour of a system, in which the worst precedent often overrules all reason, and retards all justice. But cruelty, delay, and uncertainty, are not the only public |