States who have not prohibited it by municipal acts and treaties. It is not piracy unless made so by the treaties or statutes of the nation to which the party belongs. It is true that it was at one time held in one of the United States Circuit Courts, and maintained very learnedly, that this traffic was a violation of the law of nations,1 but this was overruled by the Supreme Court; 2 and that case, with the decisions of Lord Stowell, and Bailey, J., and Best, J., in England, has been considered as settling the question. How far these rulings are overturned by the recent abolition of slavery has not yet been judicially determined.5 But the question, so far as it municipally concerns England and the United States, is of no moment, since by both of those powers the slave-trade is made piracy. It is also made piracy by the treaty of 1841 between England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 1 U. S. v. La Jeune Eugenie, 2 Mason, 409. 2 The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, per Marshall, C. J. 8 Le Louis, 2 Dodson, 210. 614 4 Madrazo v. Willes, 3 B. & Ald. 353. 5 See Whart. Confl. of L., Introduction; R. v. Zulueta, 1 C. & K. 215. Not nec essary to prove char ter of com pany. § 1894. UNDER the federal Act of 1804,1 on an indictment for destroying a vessel with intent to prejudice the underwriters, it is sufficient to show the existence of an association actually carrying on the business of insurance, by whose known officers de facto the policy was executed, and to prejudice whom the vessel insured was destroyed, without proving the existence of a legal corporation authorized to insure, or a compliance on the part of such corporation with the terms of its charter, or the validity of the policy of insurance.2 The act applies to our internal as well as to our for- Statutes eign commerce.3 § 1895. Under the Act of 1823, any combination of two or more persons to destroy the vessel or cargo consummates the offence under the law, though in point of fact neither the vessel nor the cargo was at the time insured.4 apply to internal commerce. Combina tion, to be proved inferentially. The testimony to show the unlawful combination does not end at the destruction of the boat. After as well as before that 1 Rev. Stat. U. S. §§ 5364-6. 2 U. S. v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392; 6 Cond. Rep. 362. Supra, §§ 716, 741, 816. See, however, U. S. v. Johns, 1 Wash. C. C. 363; S. C., 4 Dall. 412. 8 U. S. v. Cole, 5 McLean, 513. 4 Ibid. See supra, § 185. The burning of the vessel is not punishable under the act of Congress, but it operates as evidence against the defendants. Ibid. 514. event, the acts of the confederates may be examined to show their guilt.1 But under the Act of 1844, which does not make it an offence in the owner to destroy his vessel to the prejudice of the underwriters on the cargo, no evidence can be given to establish charges against the defendant for such destruction to the prejudice of the underwriters on the cargo, even if the indictment contain such a charge. Evidence of the value of the property insured may be given, to show inducements to destroy or preserve it.2 means to unfit for service. § 1896. The meaning of the term "destroy," by the act of "Destroy" Congress, is to unfit the vessel for service beyond the hope of recovery by ordinary means. This, as to the extent of the injury, is synonymous with "cast away." Both mean such an act as causes the vessel to perish and to be lost, or to be irrecoverable by ordinary means.3 § 1897. Under the English statute, where the intent is to prejIntent is udice the underwriters, the policy must be proved,* and material. the sailing of the vessel.5 Under our own statutes, the intent is material and must be averred.6 The intent may be stated in different ways." 1 Ibid. 513. See U. S. v. Lockman, 1 Law Rep. (N. S.) 151. 2 U. S. v. Johns, 1 Wash. C. C. 363. 8 Ibid. 4 R. v. Gilson, R. & R. 138. of indictment see Wh. Prec. 575; U. Archbold's C. P. 304. As to form R. v. Newill, 1 Mood. C. C. 458; R. v. Phillip, Ibid. 263. 616 PART VI. OFFENCES AGAINST FOREIGN NATIONS. CHAPTER XLVIII. VIOLENCE TO FOREIGN MINISTERS. ministers § 1899. It is provided in the United States, by statute, that "every person who violates any safe conduct or pass- Violence to port duly obtained or issued under authority of the foreign United States; or who assaults, wounds, imprisons, or an offence. in any other manner offers violence to the person of a public minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned for not more than three years, and fined at the discretion of the court." The statute makes penal something more than an assault, which the state courts could punish as an ordinary misdemeanor; and which; as a municipal offence, would not, apart from the official character of the person assaulted, be within the range of federal legislation. Not only are the federal courts authorized to take jurisdiction of the assault, when so aimed, but a new offence is established for their cognizance: viz., offering violence to the person, "in violation of the law of nations." Under this clause a threat of violence would become indictable.2 But be this as it may, of assaults on ministers of foreign states the federal courts have frequently taken cognizance; 3 and it is 1 Rev. Stat. U. S. § 4062; Act of April 30, 1799, c. 9, § 28. By subsequent sections process against foreign ministers and their domestics is void under certain limitations, and penalties are imposed for suing out such process. Similar statutes exist in England. Steph. Dig. Cr. L. art. 96; 2 U. S. v. Jeffers, 4 Cr. C. C. 704. 8 U. S. v. Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205; U. S. v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531; U. S. v. Hand, 2 Wash. C. C. 435; U. S. v. Benner, Bald. C. C. 234; 5 Opin. Atty. Gen. 69. clear that in such cases the federal Circuit Courts have jurisdiction. The property of a foreign minister, it is also held, is identified by the law of nations with his person; and under the act of Congress, an attack on his property is an assault on himself; though to convey to the offence this particular character, the defendant must have known the official character of the owner of the property.2 But there can be no conviction if it appear that the defendant in making the assault was acting in self-defence.3 A secretary of the legation, a chargé d'affaires,5 an attaché,6 and domestic servants, are within the statute. But the privilege does not extend to persons accredited from foreign revolutionary governments not recognized by the United States.8 Privilege from arrest is considered in another work.9 The state courts in such cases have jurisdiction,10 though on the question of privilege they are bound by federal legislation.11 1 U. S. v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467. 2 U. S. v. Jeffers, 4 Cr. C. C. 704; U. S. v. Hand. 2 Wash. C. C. 435. 8 Supra, § 87; U. S. v. Liddle, 2 Wash. C. C. 205; U. S. v. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. 531. 4 Cabrera, ex parte, 1 Wash. C. C. 232; Resp. v. Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111. 5 U. S. v. Ortega, ut supra. 618 U. S. v. Benner, Bald. C. C. 234. 7 U. S. v. Lafontaine, 4 Cr. C. C. 173. 8 U. S. v. Skinner, 2 Wheel. Cr. C. 232. 9 Wh. Cr. Pl. & Pr. § 59. 10 Resp. v. Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111. 11 Cabrera, ex parte, 1 Wash. C. C. 232. |