tion to the laws of the State, or a combination and forcible attempt to overturn or usurp the government."1 Such was the law laid down by Durfee, C. J., in Dorr's case,2 and such is the opinion of Judge Tucker, in his Appendix to Blackstone; of Judge Sergeant, in his Treatise on Constitutional Law; of the late learned Mr. Rawle, in his Essay on the Constitution; and of Judge King, in the opinion above quoted. And the assertion of such jurisdiction in the constitutions or penal codes of by far the greater number of the particular States leaves the question practically beyond doubt. from for eign juris § 1819. From England, in this connection, we can receive no Analogies light. The British government is a centralization. Wherever the British flag waves, there the British prudence. crown nominally, and the British parliament actually, are supreme. Our government, on the other hand, is a confederation of sovereign States; a confederation, it is true, that cedes to the federal government supremacy within an orbit specifically assigned to it, but which leaves all other powers undisturbed to the States. The late civil war settled that no State has a right to withdraw from this confederation, and it led to an amendment to the Constitution conferring on the federal government certain additional powers tending to the securer extension of citizenship to the negro race. But the late civil war left untouched those important clauses of the Constitution which reserve to the several States the residuum of sovereignty after the powers of the general government are carved out. Hence it is that we are to look to the federal systems of Europe for analogies in respect to this branch of the law. Of these systems the old Germanic Empire; the German Bund of 1830; the North German Confederation; the North German Empire; the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft, present illustrations of greater or less pertinency. But whether, in confederate systems, the bonds of confederacy are loose or close, the result in this respect is the same. Treason to the sovereign of the particular State is, as an offence, as definite and as readily cognizable as is treason to the sovereign of the confederation. By the famous resolution of August 18, 1836, the North German Bund resolved that attempted subversions of its Constitution should be regarded as treason; though it was conceded on all sides that treason to the particular States making up that confederation remained a substantive offence; and no one, in the subsequent prosecutions for treason instituted by Prussia, thought of setting up as a defence that treason to the particular State was absorbed in treason to the federal head. Far closer is the fusion of the States composing the present North German Confederacy; but treasons to the sovereigns of Prussia and of Saxony, so far as such treason is aimed at them in their capacities as heads of their particular States, continue to be cognizable in the Prussian and Saxon courts. Each of the Swiss cantons is accustomed to prosecute for political crimes aimed at it individually; yet the Swiss cantons have enacted that it is also treason to aim at the subversion of the Eidgenossenschaft or Confederate League. The principle is as follows: Wherever a particular State in a confederacy has reserved to it the right of prosecuting, in its own name and as against its own peace and dignity, offences committed within its borders; there it has the juridical right to maintain its integrity by prosecuting for treason subjects who attack its political existence. If we apply this test, there can be no question that the right to prosecute for treason against themselves is reserved to the particular States of the American Union. Each of these, not only by its own constitution and laws, but in accordance with repeated recognitions of the federal Supreme Courts, prosecutes, as against its own peace and dignity, all offences except those aimed specifically at the delegated powers of the federal government. § 1820. The law as to pleading and evidence in cases of treason has been stated in the sections relating to treason against the United States. Whether there may be accessaries in such cases has been already discussed.1 CHAPTER XXXVII. OFFENCES AGAINST THE POST-OFFICE.1 I. ROBBERY OF MAIL. Robbery of the mail is where a mail carrier is robbed by force, § 1823. All concerned are principals, § 1824. "Rob" is used as at common law, § 1825. And so is "jeopardy," § 1826. II. EMBEZZLEMENT FROM MAIL. where a Letter must have been obtained from post-office, § 1827. Decoy letter is within statute, § 1828. mail carrier is I. ROBBERY OF MAIL. § 1823. THE offence of robbing the mail, under the federal Robbery of statute,2 is constituted by robbing the carrier of the the mail is mail, or other person intrusted therewith, by stopping him on the highway, and demanding the surrender of robbed by the mail, and at the same time showing weapons calculated to take his life, putting him in fear of his life, and obtaining possession of the mail by the means aforesaid, against the will of the carrier.3 force. 1 Under the Revised Statutes the following postal offences are made indictable: was recognized by Washington, J., in U. S. v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. 440, and in U. S. v. Bernard, Trenton, Enclosing letters with printed mat- 1819. See also U. S. v. Aminhisor, ter, § 3887. Detaining letters, § 3890. 5471. Robbing carrier, § 5472. 2 Rev. Stat. § 5472. 8 U. S. v. Hare, 2 Wheeler C. C. 300; 1 Cr. C. C. 82. The same law 2 Wheeler C. C. xliv. An indictment for obstructing the U. S. mail does not lie unless the mail was in transitu. U. S. v. McCracken, 3 Hughes, 645. The defendant was indicted under the act of Congress for advising, procuring, and assisting a mail carrier to rob the mail; and was found guilty. Upon this finding, the judges of the Circuit Court of North Carolina were § 1824. All persons present at the commission of the robbery, consenting thereto, aiding, assisting, or abetting therein, All conor doing any act which is a constituent of the offence, cerned are principals. are principals.1 § 1825. The word "rob," in the statute, is used in "Rob" the common law sense.2 is used as at common law. And so of § 1826. "Jeopardy," as used in the statute, means a well-grounded apprehension of danger to life, in case of "jeoprefusal to yield to threats of violence.3 II. EMBEZZLEMENT FROM MAIL.4 ardy." must Letter have been obtained from post cannot be charged to have been § 1827. To constitute the offence of embezzlement from the mail, the letter must have been obtained from the postoffice, or from a letter carrier; after a voluntary delivery to a third person, the letter is no longer under the protection of the laws of the United States; and the office. act of fraudulently obtaining it from such third person is not punishable under the statute.5 Where a letteri s delivered to an unauthorized agent, the letter divided in opinion on the question whether an indictment, founded on the statute for advising, &c., a mail carrier to rob the mail, ought to set forth or aver that the said carrier did, in fact, commit the offence of robbing the mail. The answer to this, it was said by the Supreme Court, as an abstract proposition, "must be in the affirmative. But if the question intended to be put is, whether there must be a distinctive substantive averment of that fact, it is not necessary. The indictment, in this case, sufficiently sets out that the offence has been committed by the mail carrier." U. S. v. Mills, 7 Peters, 138. Upon an indictment for robbing the mail, and putting the person having the custody of it in jeopardy, under the 19th section of the Act of April 30, 1810, c. 262, a sword, &c., in the hands of the robber, by terror of which the robbery is effected, is, with in the act, a dangerous weapon, put ting the life in jeopardy; though it be not drawn or pointed at the carrier. So a pistol in his hands, by means of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon; and it is not necessary to prove that it was charged; it is presumed to be so until the contrary is proved. U. S. v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. 440. It is not necessary to a conviction, under the 22d section of the act above given, that the carrier of the mail should have taken the oath prescribed by the second section of the Act of 1825, or that the whole mail be taken. U. S. v. Wilson, 1 Bald. C. C. 78. 1 Ibid. 2 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 4 See Rev. Stat. §§ 4046, 5467-8, 5473-7. 5 U. S. v. Parsons, 2 Blatch. 104; U. S. v. Mulvaney, 4 Parker C. R. 164. embezzled. Whether the intent necessary to embezzlement existed, the jury must determine from the evidence.1 An errand boy sent by his master for letters, and embezzling one after receiving it, cannot be convicted under this section of embezzlement. The act of Congress does not operate after a delivery has been made.2 As a general rule, the detention of a letter which came lawfully into the party's possession is not embezzlement under the act of Congress.3 If a clerk in the post-office take a letter containing money from its appropriated place of deposit in the post-office building, with intent to convert its contents to his own use, he is guilty of stealing it from the post-office, under the 22d section of the Act of 3d March, 1825, although it be not removed beyond the building containing the post-office. Under § 5467 of the Revised Statutes a letter carrier may be convicted of having embezzled a letter which was intended to be conveyed by mail and contained an article of value, which letter had been intrusted to him, and had come into his possession as a carrier.5 § 1828. A letter containing money, deposited in the mail for the purpose of ascertaining whether its contents would Decoy letter within be stolen on a particular route, and actually sent on a statute. post route, is a letter intended to be sent by post within the meaning of the Post-office Act. Letter must be § 1828 a. On a charge of stealing letters out of the mail by a postmaster or other person, it has been held that the traced into proper course is to call as witnesses the postmasters through whose offices the letters passed or were distributed. When such witnesses are not called, although there may be proof of the mailing of the letters, and that they defend ant's hands. 1 U. S. v. Sander, 6 McLean, 598; U. S. v. Mills, 7 Peters, 138. As to embezzlement generally see supra, §§ 1009 et seq. 2 U. S. v. Driscoll, 1 Low. 303; U. S. v. Parsons, 2 Blatch. 104; U. S. v. Sander, 6 McLean, 598. See U. S. v. Pond, 2 Curtis C. C. 265. 8 U. S. v. Thoma, 2 N. J. Law J. 181; 19 Alb. L. J. 482, citing U. S. v. Parsons, 2 Blatch. 104; U. S. v. Sander, 6 McLean, 598; U. S. v. Driscoll, 1 Low. 303. 4 U. S. v. Marselis, 2 Blatch. 108. 5 U. S. v. Pelletreau, 14 Blatch. 126. 6 U. S. v. Foye, 1 Curtis C. C.364; 4 Stat. at Large, 102. See supra, § 149. 7 U. S. v. Emerson, 6 McLean, 406. |