makes it indictable to accuse another of crime with "menaces" and "threats," with intent to extort money, it has been held that threatening to expose a clergyman charged with criminal intercourse with a woman in a house of ill-fame, in his own church and village, to his own bishop, to all the other bishops, and to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and also to publish his shame in the newspapers, is such a threat as a man of ordinary firmness cannot be expected to resist, and therefore falls within the word menaces used in the statute.1 And so, under another statute, has been held to be a letter to the effect that if money is deposited in a particular place an attack would be averted.2 A false statement that a warrant has issued to arrest A. on a criminal charge is "threatening" to accuse A. of crime.3 And so is threatening to enter a complaint; and threatening to imprison on a fictitious charge. Though it would seem not essential that the prosecutor should be actually frightened, the threat must be such as would naturally create alarm. It is immaterial, in such cases, so far as concerns the defendant's penal responsibility, whether the prosecutor was guilty or innocent; 8 but this issue may be material in considering the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, the intention of the prisoner was to extort money or merely to compound a felony.9

A letter in the defendant's own name, sent to enforce the payment of a debt, is not within the statute; 10 and it has been

many a man would have sent a bullet through him; that he was to refund £44. The judge left to the jury whether the meaning of the letters was to demand a sum of money, and to menace him with adultery, or to send the child to the prosecutor's house; and whether there was any reasonable or probable cause for the demand. The jury having found against the defendant on all these points, the conviction was sustained. R. v. Chalmers, 16 L. T. (N. S.) 363. 1 R. v. Miard, 1 Cox C. C. 22. See Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400.

2 R. v. Pickford, 4 C. & P. 227; R. v. Smith, T. & M. 214; 1 Den. C. C. 510; 2 C. & K. 882.

3 Com. v. Murphy, 12 Allen, 449. Supra, § 1151.

4 Com. v. Carpenter, 108 Mass. 15. 6 R. v. Robertson, L. & C. 483; 10 Cox C. C. 9.

State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 71.

7 R. v. Walton, 9 Cox C. C. 268; L. & C. 483. Compare R. v. Smith, T. & M. 214; 1 Den. C. C. 510. For requisites of indictment see Com. v. Moulton, 108 Mass. 309; Com. v. Dorus, 108 Mass. 307; State v. Young, 26 Iowa, 122; State v. Morgan, 3 Heisk. 262.

8 R. v. Cracknell, 10 Cox C. C. 408; R. v. Richards, 11 Cox C. C. 43. 9 Ibid.

10 People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427.

further held that a threatening letter, referring in its terms to such circumstances as were plainly intended to denote who the writer was, and making a demand of a sum of money in controversy between him and the prosecutor, which the latter had received, and which the former had before insisted should be accounted for to him, was not a threatening letter within 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, or 27 Geo. 2, c. 15, although the writer did not subscribe his name. 1 A letter is not regarded as anonymous when it in

dicates on its face the sender.

may be explained by parol.

§ 1665. A letter, when ambiguous, may be explained by parol proof of extraneous facts as well as by declarations Letters of the writer. The prosecutor may be asked as to what appeared to him to be the meaning of the letter.3 The meaning is for the jury if the terms be ambiguous, and is to be inferred from all the circumstances of the case; though whether a certain charge, not ambiguous, threatens a crime is for the court.6

5

Material

facts must

§ 1666. The person threatened must be averred and proved," and so must the fact of sending. The letter must be set out if obtainable.9 The venue may be laid in the place of reception.10 If inspection be desired, the court will, on motion of the prisoner's counsel, as soon as the proved.

be aver

red and

1 R. v. Heming, 2 East P. C. 1116; what constitutes "infamous crime" 1 Leach C. C. 445, n.

2 Supra, § 1660; R. v. Tucket, 1 Mood. C. C. 134; R. v. Cooper, 3 Cox C. C. 547; R. v. Hendy, 4 Cox C. C.

243.

8 R. v. Tucket, 1 Mood. C. C. 134; R. v. Hendy, 4 Cox C. C. 243.

Ibid.; R. v. Carruthers, 1 Cox C. C. 138; R. v. Cooper, 3 Cox C. C. 547.

5 R. v. Menage, 3 F. & F. 310; R. v. Coghlan, 4 F. & F. 316; R. v. Braynell, 4 Cox C. C. 402; State v. Hollyway, 41 Iowa, 200; Longley v. State, 43 Tex. 490. That proof of reception of spoils is admissible to prove intent see State v. Bruce, 24 Me. 17.

Brabham v. State, 18 Oh. St. 485; Com. v. Carpenter, 108 Mass. 15; State v. Morgan, 3 Heisk. 262. As to

under the statutes see R. v. Hickman, 1 Mood. C. C. 34; R. v. Redman, 10 Cox C. C. 159; L. R. 1 C. C. 12; Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400. See State v. Vaughan, 1 Bay (S. C.), 282. 7 R. v. Dunkley, 1 Mood. C. C. 90. 8 R. v. Jones, 2 Cox C. C. 434; 2 C. & K. 398; R. v. Paddle, R. & R. 484. A letter signed by two initials, as R. R., was held a letter without a name subscribed thereto within 9 Geo. 1, c. 22. R. v. Robinson, 2 Leach C. C. 749; 2 East P. C. 1110.

9 R. v. Hunter, 2 Leach C. C. 624; R. v. Lloyd, 2 East P. C. 1122. 10 Supra, §§ 288, 1206; R. v. Girdwood, 2 East P. C. 1120; 1 Leach C. C. 142; R. v. Essex, 2 East P. C. 1125; People v. Griffin, 2 Barb. 427.

bill is found, order that the letter be deposited with the officer of the court, that the prisoner's witnesses may inspect it.1

§ 1666 a. To prove intent, prior threats of the same kind are admissible. The sending is to be inferred from facts. It has been held that the dropping a letter in a man's way, in order that he might pick it up, was a sending of it; and it was said that there was a "sending," although the party saw the prisoner drop the letter, if the prisoner did not suppose the party knew him, and intended he should not. As will presently be seen, a letter threatening A., but directed to B., which is left at a place accessible to A., with the intention that it should reach as well A. as B., is "sent" to A.; and fastening a threatening letter on a gate in a public highway is some evidence to go to the jury of a sending thereof. A conviction, however, cannot be sustained where the only evidence against the defendant was his own statement that he should never have written it but for W. G.7 And when there is no person in existence of the precise name which the letter bears as its address, it is a question for the jury whether the party into whose hands it falls was really the one for whom it was intended. The bare delivery of a letter containing threats, though sealed, is held to be evidence of a knowledge of its contents.9

8

§ 1666 b. Letters threatening to "burn or destroy" are also made specifically indictable by statute in England.10 Under

manifest, evidence for the prosecu-
tion tending to show that the prisoner
had made a similar charge two years
before ought not to be admitted. But
this is no adequate reason for reject-
ing the evidence.

3 R. v. Wagstaff, R. & R. 398.
4 Ibid.

5 R. v. Grimwade, 1 Cox C. C. 67; 1 Den. C. C. 30; 1 C. & K. 592.

R. v. Williams, 1 Cox C. C. 16.

7 R. v. Howe, 7 C. & P. 268.

8 R. v. Carruthers, 1 Cox C. C. 138.

9 R. v. Girdwood, 1 Leach C. C. 142; 2 East P. C. 1120.

10 By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 50, "whosoever shall send, deliver, or ut

this statute, where a count charged T. with sending to V. and threatening to burn certain houses, laying them as the property of O., V.'s tenant, it was proved that T. dropped the letter in a public road near V.'s house; that A. found it and gave it to H., who opened and read it, and gave it to E., who showed it to both O. and V. It was ruled that this was a sending under the statute.1

§ 1666 c. By another statute,2 sending a letter threatening murder is made a felony. The letter, under this statute, must be construed in its natural sense, as explained by circumstances; though when necessary the indictment may explain by innuendoes and prefatory matter. To put a letter in a place where it would be likely to be seen by the person to whom it is directed is "uttering" it.4

R. v. Boucher, 4 C. & P. 562. Under similar statute see State v. Young, 26 Iowa, 122; Longley v. State, Under prior statutes we have the 43 Tex. 490; Buie v. State, 1 Tex. following rulings:

§ 1667. "EVERY one who knowingly, and with intent to save Escape is the person escaping from trial or execution, permits any person in his lawful custody to regain his liberty, otherwise than in due course of law, commits the offence of voluntary escape; and

permitting prisoner to depart

from cus

tody.

"Is guilty of high treason if the escaped prisoner was in his custody for, and was guilty of, high treason;

"Becomes an accessary after the fact to the felony of which the escaped prisoner was guilty if he was in his custody for, and was guilty of, felony; and

"Is guilty of a misdemeanor if the escaped prisoner was in his custody for, and was guilty of, a misdemeanor." 2

1 See Whart. Prec. as follows:(633.) Escape. Indictment for a conspiracy to.

(921.) Voluntary, indictment against jailer for.

(923.) Negligent, indictment against which is appended the following note:

constable for.

Hawk. P. C. 192, 196, 197; 1 Russ.