pointment office, and (if the court will not judicially notice it) that the person lawfully exercising the duties of that of officer. office has authority to administer an oath in such a case.2 And the officer himself may be called to prove that he was acting as such.3 Swearing before a clerk in open court is equivalent to swearing before the court.1 one assign sufficient. § 1316. Some one or more of the assignments of perjury must be sustained by proper evidence, and the assignments Proving proved must have been material to the matter before ment is the court at the time the oath was taken.5 It is not necessary, therefore, as will be seen, to support all the assignments in any given count. The proper course of pleading is to negative specially each part of the defendant's testimony which is alleged to be false; and if any material assignment is adequately proved, it is enough to support the indictment, if falsity be satisfactorily shown.7 So on an indictment for obtaining goods on false pretences, it is sufficient to prove on trial any one of the several assignments of fraud which a given count may contain. But the attention of the jury must be called to each specific assignment as an independent issue.9 Defend § 1317. When the defendant has made two distinct statements under oath, one directly the reverse of the other, it is not enough to produce the one in evidence to prove the other to be false.10 Thus, upon an indictment for per 1 R. v. Newton, 1 C. & K. 469; R. v. Verelst, 3 Camp. 432; R. v. Howard, 1 M. & R. 187; Keator v. People, 32 Mich. 484; Whart. Crim. Ev. §§ 164, 835. Supra, § 1263. 2 Supra, § 1264; Whart. Crim. Ev. §§ 164, 835; R. v. Roberts, 14 Cox C. C. 101; State v. Hascall, 6 N. H. 352; State v. Gregory, 2 Murph. 69. 8 Ibid. Server v. State, 2 Blackf. 35. Supra, § 1287. Dodge v. State, 4 Zabr. 455. Supra, § 1301; infra, § 1322. • Lord Raymond, 886; 2 Camp. 138-9; Cro. C. C. 7th ed. 622; R. v. ant's oath trary not to the con Hemp, 5 C. & P. 468; State v. Bishop, 1 Chip. (Vt.) 120; State v. Hascall, 6 N. H. 358; Com. v. Johns, 6 Gray, 274; Com. v. McLauglin, 122 Mass. 449; Dodge v. State, 4 Zabr. 455. See Harris v. People, 64 N. Y. 148. See supra, § 1301. Whart. Crim. Ev. § 131. 7 Infra, § 1322. • Wood v. People, 59 N. Y. 117. 10 R. v. Hughes, 1 C. & K. 519; U. S. v. Mayer, Deady, 127; Schwartz v. Com. 27 Grat. 1025. Whart. Crim. Ev. § 387. sufficient jury in giving evidence before the quarter sessions, the proof of falsity. prosecutor produced the examination of the defendant before a magistrate, in which he deposed the direct negative to everything he had sworn before the court; but Gurney, B., held this not sufficient per se without other evidence to show that the statement before the court was true, and that before the magistrate false.1 So where on trial upon an indictment for perjury in swearing falsely to a deposition, the facts stated in the deposition appeared to be true, but after making the deposition, the deponent had testified on the stand that they were not true; it was held, that the prisoner in his defence was not estopped by his viva voce testimony from showing the verity of the facts stated in the deposition.2 § 1318. Evidence is admissible to show that the motives which actuated the defendant were fraudulent or corrupt; as, Facts ad infer cor missible to for instance, that his object was to coerce the settlement of a civil claim. For the same purpose it is admissible to prove other cognate perjuries.4 rupt motive. § 1319. The rule that the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient to negative the alleged false oath is not One witness not merely technical, but is founded on substantial jusenough to prove tice. There must be either two witnesses to prove such falsity. falsity, or one witness with material and independently established corroborative facts.5 Evidence confirmatory of that one witness, in some slight particular only, is not sufficient to warrant a conviction. And where perjury was assigned upon a statement made by the prisoner on oath, on a trial at nisi prius, that in June, 1851, he owed no more than one quarter's rent to his landlord, and the prosecutor swore that the prisoner owed five quarters' rent at that time, and to corroborate this a witness 1 R. v. Wheatland, 8 C. & P. 238. See Cothran v. State, 39 Miss. 541. 2 State v. J. B. 1 Tyler, 269. 8 Supra, § 1245; R. v. Munton, 3 C. & P. 498; State v. Hascall, 6 N. H. 352. State v. Raymond, 20 Iowa, 582. Wh. Cr. Ev. § 53. 5 R. v.. Gardner, 8 C. & P. 737; R. v. Boulter, 2 Den. C. C. 896; 5 Cox C. C. 543; R. v. Roberts, 3 C. & K. 607; R. v. Braithwaite, 8 Cox C. C. 254; R. v. Hook, 8 Cox C. C. 5; U. S. v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430; Crusen v. State, 10 Oh. St. 258; State v. Raymond, 20 Iowa, 582; State v. Heed, 57 Mo. 252. 6 R. v. Yates, 1 C. & M. 132; 2 Russ. on Cr. 6th Am. ed. 650; Champney's case, 2 Lewin C. C. 258; R. v. Boulter, 2 Den. C. C. 396; 5 Cox C. C. 543; State v. Buie, 43 Tex. 532. was called who proved that in August, 1850, the prisoner admitted to him that he owed his landlord three or four quarters' rent, it was held that this was not a sufficient corroboration.1 But one witness may be adequately sustained by the defendant's own letters and declarations,2 as well as by independent corroborative material facts.3 of wit § 1320. The credibility of the witnesses is for the Credibility jury. They are not to be excluded because participes nesses for criminis.1 1 R. v. Boulter, 9 Eng. L. & Eq. 537; 5 Cox C. C. 543; 3 C. & K. 236; 2 Den. C. C. 396. See also R. v. Parker, C. & M. 639. See Whart. Cr. Ev. § 387. 2 R. v. Mayhew, 6 C. & P. 315; R. v. Webster, 1 F. & F. 515; R. v. Hook, D. & B. 606; 8 Cox C. C. 5. See R. v. Champney, 2 Lew. 258; R. v. Towey, 8 Cox C. C. 328; U. S. v. Wood, 14 Peters, 430; Dodge v. State, 4 Zabr. 455; State v. Moliere, 1 Dev. 263. P., a policeman, having laid an information against a publican for keeping open his house after lawful hours, swore, on the hearing, that he knew nothing of the matter except what he had been told, and that "he did not see any person leave the defendant's house after eleven" on the night in question. P. was indicted for perjury, and the perjury was assigned on this last allegation, and the evidence to prove its falsehood was that P., when laying the information, said that "he had seen four men leave the house after eleven," and that he could swear to one as W. On two other occasions P. made a similar statement to two other witnesses, and W. and others did, in fact, leave the house after eleven o'clock on the night in question; that on the hearing P. acknowledged that he had offered to smash the case for 30s.; that he had talked, in the presence of another witness, of making the publican give him money jury. to settle it; and he had, in fact, offered to the publican to settle it for £1, and had said that he had received 10s. to smash the case, and was to have 10s. more. It was ruled that the evidence was sufficient to prove the perjury assigned, and that the conviction was right. R. v. Hook, Dears. & B. C. C. 606; 8 Cox C. C. 5. Where P. was charged with having falsely sworn that certain invoices bearing certain dates were produced by her to C., the only witness called was C., who swore that she had not produced those invoices, but that she had produced others of the dates of which he made a memorandum at the time. It was held that the memorandum was a sufficient corroboration upon which to convict. R. v. Webster, 1 F. & F. 515. 8 R. v. Lee, 2 Russ. on Cr. 545; R. v. Gardner, 2 Mood. C. C. 95; R. v. Mayhew, 6 C. & P. 315; R. v. Verrier, 12 Ad. & El. 317; R. v. Hare, 13 Cox C. C. 174; R. v. Roberts, 2 C. & K. 607; R. v. Braithwaite, 8 Cox C. C. 254; 1 F. & F. 639; R. v. Boulter, 9 Eng. L. & Eq. 537; 2 Den. C. C. 396; 5 Cox C. C. 543; Com. v. Parker, 2 Cush. 212; Com. v. Pollard, 12 Met. 225; Hendricks v. State, 26 Ind. 493; State v. Raymond, 20 Iowa, 582; Crusen v. State, 10 Oh. St. 258; State v. Hayward, 1 N. & Mc. 546. See fully Whart. Cr. Ev. § 387. ▲ Wh. Cr. Ev. § 439. § 1330. See infra, When falsity is proved, the burden is on the defendant to show that it arose from surprise, inadvertence, or mistake, and not from a corrupt motive.1 Witness may be dis pensed with when there is adequate document § 1321. The cases in which a living witness to the corpus delicti of the defendant, in a prosecution for perjury, may be dispensed with, are: in cases where a person is charged with a perjury by false swearing to a fact directly disproved by documentary or written testimony ary falsifi- springing from himself, with circumstances showing the cation. corrupt intent; in cases where the perjury charged is contradicted by a public record, proved to have been well known to the defendant when he took the oath, the oath being proved to have been taken corruptly; in cases where the party has been charged with taking an oath contrary to what he must necessarily have known to have been the truth, and the false swearing can be proved by his own letters relating to the fact sworn to, or by other written testimony existing and being found in the possession of the defendant, and which has been treated by him as containing the evidence of the fact recited in it.2 Some one should be § 1322. Where an indictment contains several assignments of perjury, it is not sufficient to disprove all of them by assignment one witness; since, in order to convict on any one asadequately signment, there must be either two witnesses, or one falsified. witness and corroborative evidence, to negative the truth of the matter contained in such assignment.3 It is not necessary, however, that every fact which goes to make up any particular assignment of perjury should be so disproved.1 There can be no statement, however false, that does not contain some element of truth. § 1323. Nor is it requisite that the false testimony set forth Necessary in the indictment should be in every point and shade only that testimony squarely negatived and falsified by the prosecution, for if so, no conviction of perjury could be had, it being tially nega- difficult to conceive, in matters of moral proof, of any should be substan tived. 1 State v. Chamberlain, 30 Vt. 559. 2 U. S. v. Wood, 14 Peters, 430. 92 Russ. on Cr. 6th Am. ed. 653; 3 Greenl. on Ev. § 198; R. v. Roberts, 2 C. & K. 607; Whart. Crim. Ev. § 387. 4 R. v. Parker, C. & M. 639; R. v. Verrier, 12 Ad. & El. 317; R. v. Yates, C. & M. 132; R. v. Mudie, 1 M. & R. 128. two propositions as exactly and absolutely opposite. It is sufficient if the effect of the defendant's testimony is shown to have been false. Thus a false statement, on an affidavit justifying bail, to the effect that the witness owned certain parcels of land, is perjury, if he did not own some of the parcels, though the value of others of the parcels, which he did own, was sufficient to cover the amount of the bail for which he offered himself.1 As has been already seen, there may be a negation of a false statement of opinion, of a false statement of an inference, and of a false statement of unreal incidents to a real fact.2 But one material and salient point, at least, assigned as perjury, must be proved to have been false.3 Where the false oath alleged was that the prisoner had sworn that he had not voted at the election, and the assignment of the perjury was that he had voted previously at said election, at the 4th Ward, "at the house of T. L. W. in said ward," without stating that he had voted before a board of officers duly constituted and authorized according to law, or that any lawful election had been appointed; it was held that the assignment was too general and uncertain, not being of a character which permitted specific proof or disproof. It was further said, that in the absence of any averment to that effect, it would not be inferred that the election was lawfully held at the place named.1 § 1324. It should not be forgotten, that as the policy of the law forbids a witness in a civil suit from being made Perjury infamous, so far as respects that suit, through a convic- not to be tion for perjury obtained upon the testimony of a party pendency to such suit, the English courts will not permit a wit- of civil suit 1 Com. v. Hatfield, 107 Mass. 227. See supra, §§ 1277, 1300. 2 Supra, § 1246 et seq.; R. v. Hook, supra, § 1319. 3 R. v. Tucker, 2 C. & P. 500. P. having sworn that he did not enter into a verbal agreement with B. and C. for them to become joint dealers and copartners in the trade or business of druggists, was indicted for perjury, and it appeared that, in fact, B. was a druggist, keeping a prosecuted during shop with which P. had nothing to do; |