mere technical admissions made by the demurrer. * The result is that in view of the intricate questions arising on the record, we are constrained to forbear proceeding until all the facts are before us on the evidence. Demurrer overruled, with leave to answer. [GRAY, J., took no part in the decision.] GREEN v. NEAL'S LESSEE. (Supreme Court of United States, 1832. 6 Pet. 291, 8 L. Ed. 402.) [Error to the federal Circuit Court for West Tennessee. Tennessee statute of limitations of 1797 was construed by the state courts in 1815 not to give title by seven years of adverse possession unless the occupant held under a deed connected with a grant of the land. In Patton's Lessee v. Easton, 1 Wheat. 476, 4 L. Ed. 139 (1816) these decisions were followed by the federal Supreme Court, and also in Powell's Lessee v. Harman, 2 Pet. 241, 7 L. Ed. 411 (1829). In Gray v. Darby's Lessee, Mart. & Y. (Tenn.) 396 (1825) the older Tennessee cases were overruled by the state Supreme Court, and the statute of 1797 was held not to require the occupant's deed to be connected with a grant. In a subsequent ejectment action in the federal court by Neal against Green, the federal decision upon this point was followed, and this writ of error was taken.] Mr. Justice MCLEAN. * Since this decision [Gray v. Darby's Lessee, cited above], the law has been considered as settled in Tennessee; and there has been so general an acquiescence in all the courts of the state, that the point is not now raised or discussed. This construction has become a rule of property in the state, and numerous suits involving title have been settled by it. Had this been the settled construction of these statutes when the decision was made by this court, in the case of Patton's Lessee v. Easton, there can be no doubt that that opinion would have conformed to it. But the question is now raised, whether this court will adhere to its own decision, made under the circumstances stated, or yield to that of the judicial tribunals of Tennessee. This point has never before been directly decided by this court, on a question of general importance. The cases are numerous where the court have adopted the constructions given to the statute of a state by its supreme judicial tribunal; but it has never been decided that this court will overrule their own adjudication, estabtwo states were absolutely independent nations it would be settled by treaty or by force. Neither of these ways being practicable, it must be settled by decision of this court." [The bill in the principal case was then dismissed on the merits, after an exhaustive investigation and argument.] lishing an important rule of property, where it has been founded on the construction of a statute made in conformity to the decisions of the state at the time, so as to conform to a different construction adopted afterwards by the state. This is a question of grave import, and should be approached with great deliberation. It is deeply interesting in every point of view in which it may be considered. As a rule of property it is important; and equally so, as it regards the system under which the powers of this tribunal are exercised. It may be proper to examine in what light the decisions of the state courts, in giving a construction to their own statutes, have been considered by this court. * * * The Supreme Court holds in the highest respect decisions of state courts upon local laws forming rules of property. Shipp v. Miller's Heirs, 2 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 248. In construing local statutes respecting real property, the courts of the Union are governed by the decisions of the state tribunals. Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119, 5 L. Ed. 221. The court says, in the case of Elmendorf v. Taylor et al., 10 Wheat. 152, 6 L. Ed. 289, "that the courts of the United States, in cases depending on the laws of a particular state, will, in general, adopt the construction which the courts of the state have given to those laws." "This course is founded upon the principle, supposed to be universally recognized, that the judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the legislative acts of that government." In Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 6 L. Ed. 495, the court again declares, that "the statute laws of the states must furnish the rule of decision of the federal courts, as far as they comport with the Constitution of the United States, in all cases arising within the respective states; and a fixed and received construction of their respective statute laws, in their own courts, makes a part of such statute law." The court again says, in Jackson ex dem. St. John v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 6 L. Ed. 583, "that this court adopts the local law of real property, as ascertained by the decisions of the state courts, whether these decisions are grounded on the construction of the statutes of the state, or form a part of the unwritten law of the state, which has become a fixed rule of property." Quotations might be multiplied, but the above will show that this court has uniformly adopted the decisions of the state tribunals respectively, in the construction of their statutes, [and] that this has been done as a matter of principle, in all cases where the decision of a state court has become a rule of property. In a great majority of the causes brought before the federal tribunals, they are called to enforce the laws of the states. The rights of parties are determined under those laws, and it would be a strange perversion of principle, if the judicial exposition of those laws, by the state tribunals, should be disregarded. These expositions constitute the law, and fix the rule of property. Rights are acquired under this rule, and it regulates all the transactions which come within its scope. It is admitted in the argument, that this court, in giving a construction to a local law, will be influenced by the decisions of the local tribunals; but it is contended that when such a construction shall be given in conformity to those decisions, it must be considered final. That if the state shall change the rule, it does not comport either with the consistency or dignity of this tribunal to adopt the change. Such a course, it is insisted, would recognize in the state courts a power to revise the decisions of this court, and fix the rule of property differently from its solemn adjudications. That the federal court, when sitting within a state, is the court of that state, being so constituted by the Constitution and laws of the Union; and as such, has an equal right with the state courts to fix the construction of the local law. On all questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the Union, this court may exercise a revising power, and its decisions are final and obligatory on all other judicial tribunals, state as well as federal. A state tribunal has a right to examine any such questions and to determine them, but its decisions must conform to that of the Supreme Court, or the corrective power may be exercised. But the case is very different where a question arises under a local law. The decision of this question by the highest judicial tribunal of a state should be considered as final by this court; not because the state tribunal, in such a case, has any power to bind this court; but because, in the language of the court, in the case of Shelby et al. v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361, 6 L. Ed. 495, "a fixed and received construction by a state, in its own courts, makes a part of the statute law." The same reason which influences this court to adopt the construction given to the local law, in the first instance, is not less. strong in favor of following it in the second, if the state tribunals should change the construction. A reference is here made, not to a single adjudication, but to a series of decisions which shall settle the rule. Are not the injurious effects on the interests of the citizens of a state as great in refusing to adopt the change of construction, as in refusing to adopt the first construction? A refusal in the one case as well as in the other has the effect to establish, in the state, two rules of property. Would not a change in the construction of a law of the United States, by this tribunal, be obligatory on the state courts? The statute, as last expounded, would be the law of the Union; and why may not the same effect be given to the last exposition of a HALL CASES CONST.L.-5 local law by the state court? The exposition forms a part of the local law, and is binding on all the people of the state, and its inferior judicial tribunals. It is emphatically the law of the state, which the federal court, while sitting within the state, and this court, when a case is brought before them, are called to enforce. If the rule as settled should prove inconvenient or injurious to the public interests, the legislature of the state may modify the law or repeal it. If the construction of the highest judicial tribunal of a state form a part of its statute law, as much as an enactment by the legislature, how can this court make a distinction between them? There could be no hesitation in so modifying our decisions as to conform to any legislative alteration in a statute; and why should not the same rule apply where the judicial branch of the state government, in the exercise of its acknowledged functions, should, by construction, give a different effect to a statute, from what had at first been given to it. The charge of inconsistency might be made with more force and propriety against the federal tribunals for a disregard of this rule, than by conforming to it. They profess to be bound by the local law; and yet they reject the exposition of that law which forms a part of it. It is no answer to this objection that a different exposition was formerly given to the act which was adopted by the federal court. The inquiry is, what is the settled law of the state at the time the decision is made. This constitutes the rule of property within the state, by which the rights of litigant parties must be determined. As the federal tribunals profess to be governed by this rule, they can never act inconsistently by enforcing it. If they change their decision, it is because the rule on which that decision was founded has been changed. The case under consideration illustrates the propriety and necessity of this rule. It is now the settled law of Tennessee that an adverse possession of seven years, under a deed for land that has been granted, will give a valid title. But by the decision of this court. such a possession, under such evidence of right, will not give a valid title. In addition to the above requisites, this court have decided that the tenant must connect his deed with a grant. It therefore follows that the occupant whose title is protected under the statutes before a state tribunal, is unprotected by them before the federal court. The plaintiff in ejectment, after being defeated in his action before a state court, on the above construction, to insure success has only to bring an action in the federal court. This may be easily done by a change of his residence, or a bona fide conveyance of the land. Here is a judicial conflict arising from two rules of property in the same state, and the consequences are not only deeply injurious to the citizens of the state, but calculated to engender the most lasting discontents. It is therefore essential to the interests of the country, and to the harmony of the judicial action of the federal and state governments, that there should be but one rule of property in a state. * Judgment reversed. SWIFT v. TYSON (1842) 16 Pet. 1, 16, 18, 19, 10 L. Ed. 865, Mr. Justice STORY (upholding an action brought in the New York federal court by an indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor who had been defrauded by the drawer): "In the present case, the plaintiff is a bona fide holder without notice for what the law deems a good and valid consideration, that is, for a pre-existing debt; and the only real question in the cause is, whether, under the circumstances of the present case, such a pre-existing debt constitutes a valuable consideration in the sense of the general rule applicable to negotiable instruments. We say, under the circumstances of the present case, for the acceptance having been made in New York, the argument on behalf of the defendant is, that the contract is to be treated as a New York contract, and therefore to be governed by the laws of New York, as expounded by its courts, as well upon general principles, as by the express provisions of the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. And then it is further contended that, by the law of New York, as thus expounded by its courts, a pre-existing debt does not constitute, in the sense of the general rule, a valuable consideration applicable to negotiable instruments. * * [After discussing the New York cases:] "But, admitting the doctrine to be fully settled in New York, it remains to be considered whether it is obligatory upon this court, if it differs from the principles established in the general commercial law. It is observable that the courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this point upon any local statute or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law. It is, however, contended that the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, furnishes a rule obligatory upon this court to follow the decisions of the state tribunals in all cases to which they apply. That section provides 'that the laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.' In order to maintain the argument, it is essential, therefore, to hold that the word 'laws,' in this section, includes within the scope of its meaning the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what |