But notwithstanding the rule of uniformity lying at the basis of every just system of taxation, there are doubtless many individual cases where the weight of a tax falls unequally upon the owners of the property taxed. This is almost unavoidable under every system of direct taxation. But the tax is not rendered illegal by such discrimination. Thus, every citizen is bound to pay his proportion of a school tax, though he have no children; of a police tax, though he have no buildings or personal property to be guarded; or of a road tax, though he never use the road. In other words, a general tax cannot be dissected to show that, as to certain constituent parts, the taxpayer receives no benefit. Even in case of special assessments imposed for the improvement of property within certain limits, the fact that it is extremely doubtful whether a particular lot can receive any benefit from the improvement does not invalidate the tax with respect to such lot. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78, 26 L. Ed. 658; Amesbury Nail Factory Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass. 53; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 42 L. Ed. 740, 18 Sup. Ct. 340; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430, 49 L. Ed. 819, 25 Sup. Ct. 466. Subject to these individual exceptions, the rule is that in classifying property for taxation, some benefit to the property taxed is a controlling consideration, and a plain abuse of this power will sometimes justify a judicial interference. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. Ed. 443, 19 Sup. Ct. 187. It is often said protection and payment of taxes are correlative obligations.

It is also essential to the validity of a tax that the property shall be within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing power. Not only is the operation of state laws limited to persons and property within the boundaries of the state, but property which is wholly and exclusively within the jurisdiction of another state receives. none of the protection for which the tax is supposed to be the compensation. This rule receives its most familiar illustration in the cases of land, which, to be taxable, must be within the limits of the state. Indeed, we know of no case where a legislature has assumed to impose a tax upon land within the jurisdiction of another state; much less where such action has been defended by any court. It is said by this court in the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds Case, 15 Wall. 300-319, 21 L. Ed. 179–187, that no adjudication should be necessary to establish so obvious a proposition as that property lying beyond the jurisdiction of a state is not a subject upon which her taxing power can be legitimately exercised. The argument against the taxability of land within the jurisdiction of another state applies with equal cogency to tangible personal property beyond the jurisdiction. It is not only beyond the sovereignty of the taxing state, but does not and cannot receive protection under its laws. True, a resident owner may receive an income from such property, but the same may be said of real es

tate within a foreign jurisdiction. Whatever be the rights of the state with respect to the taxation of such income, it is clearly beyond its power to tax the land from which the income is derived. As we said in Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385396, 47 L. Ed. 513-518, 23 Sup. Ct. 463: "While the mode, form, and extent of taxation are, speaking generally, limited only by the wisdom of the legislature, that power is limited by a principle inhering in the very nature of constitutional government,—namely, that the taxation imposed must have relation to a subject within the jurisdiction of the taxing government." See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316-429, 4 L. Ed. 579-607; Hays v. Pacific Mail S. S. Co., 17 How. 596-599, 15 L. Ed. 254, 255; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423, 429, 431, 20 L. Ed. 192, 194, 195; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471-476, 21 L. Ed. 303, 304.

Respecting this, there is an obvious distinction between tangible and intangible property, in the fact that the latter is held secretly; that there is no method by which its existence or ownership can be ascertained in the state of its situs except, perhaps, in the case of mortgages or shares of stock. So if the owner be discovered, there is no way by which he can be reached by process in a state other than that of his domicil, or the collection of the tax otherwise enforced. In this class of cases the tendency of modern authorities is to apply the maxim "mobilia sequuntur personam," and to hold that the property may be taxed at the domicil of the owner as the real situs of the debt, and also, more particularly in the case of mortgages, in the state where the property is retained. Such have been the repeated rulings of this court. Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 22 L. Ed. 189; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. Ed. 558; Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592, 26 L. Ed. 845; Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 29 L. Ed. 240, 5 Sup. Ct. 1014; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 47 L. Ed. 669, 23 Sup. Ct. 401; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 47 L. Ed. 439, 23 Sup. Ct. 277.

If this occasionally results in double taxation, it much oftener happens that this class of property escapes altogether. In the case of intangible property, the law does not look for absolute equality, but to the much more practical consideration of collecting the tax upon such property, either in the state of the domicil or the situs. Of course, we do not enter into a consideration of the question, so much discussed by political economists, of the double taxation involved in taxing the property from which these securities arise, and also the burdens upon such property, such as mortgages, shares of stock, and the like,-the securities themselves.

The arguments in favor of the taxation of intangible property at the domicil of the owner have no application to tangible property. The fact that such property is visible, easily found, and difficult to conceal, and the tax readily collectible, is so cogent an argument

for its taxation at its situs, that of late there is a general consensus of opinion that it is taxable in the state where it is permanently located and employed, and where it receives its entire protection, irrespective of the domicil of the owner. We have, ourselves, held in a number of cases that such property, permanently located in a state other than that of its owner, is taxable there. Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 257, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. Ed. 715, 6 Sup. Ct. 475; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. Ed. 613, 3 Interest. Com. R. 595, 11 Sup. Ct. 876. *

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[Here follows the citation of other federal cases and a discussion of various state decisions.]

But there are two recent cases in this court which we think completely cover the question under consideration, and require the reversal of the judgment of the state court. The first of these is that of the Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 47 L. Ed. 513, 23 Sup. Ct. 463. That was an action to recover certain taxes imposed upon the corporate franchise of the defendant company, which was organized to establish and maintain a ferry between Kentucky and Indiana. The defendant was also licensed by the state of Indiana. We held that the fact that such franchise had been granted by the commonwealth of Kentucky did not bring within the jurisdiction of Kentucky, for the purpose of taxation, the franchise granted to the same company by Indiana, and which we held to be an incorporeal hereditament, derived from and having its legal situs in that state. It was adjudged that such taxation amounted to a deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment; as much so as if the state taxed the land owned by that company; and that the officers of the state had exceeded their power in taxing the whole franchise without making a deduction for that obtained from Indiana, the two being distinct, "although the enjoyment of both are essential to a complete ferry right for the transportation of persons and property across the river both ways."

The other and more recent case is that of the Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 49 L. Ed. 1077, 25 Sup. Ct. 669. That was an assessment upon the capital stock of the railroad company, wherein it was contended that the assessor should have deducted from the value of such stock certain coal mined in Pennsylvania and owned by it, but stored in New York, there awaiting sale, and beyond the jurisdiction of the commonwealth at the time appraisement was made. This coal was taxable, and in fact was taxed, in the state where it rested for the purposes of sale at the time when the appraisement in question was made. Both this court and the supreme court of Pennsylvania had held that tax on the corporate stock is a tax on the assets of the corporation issuing such stock. The two courts agreed in the gen

eral proposition that tangible property permanently outside of the state, and having no situs within the state, could not be taxed. But they differed upon the question whether the coal involved was permanently outside of the state. In delivering the opinion it was said: "However temporary the stay of the coal might be in the particular foreign states where it was resting at the time of the appraisement, it was definitely and forever beyond the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania. And it was within the jurisdiction of the foreign states for purposes of taxation, and, in truth, it was there taxed. We regard this tax as, in substance and in fact, though not in form, a tax specifically levied upon the property of the corporation, and part of that property is outside and beyond the jurisdiction of the state which thus assumes to tax it." The decision in that case was really broader than the exigencies of the case under consideration require, as the tax was not upon the personal property itself, but upon the capital stock of a Pennsylvania corporation, a part of which stock was represented by the coal, the value of which was held should have been deducted.

The adoption of a general rule that tangible personal property in other states may be taxed at the domicil of the owner involves possibilities of an extremely serious character. Not only would it authorize the taxation of furniture and other property kept at country houses in other states or even in foreign countries, of stocks of goods and merchandise kept at branch establishments, when already taxed at the state of their situs, but of that enormous mass of personal property belonging to railways and other corporations, which might be taxed in the state where they are incorporated, though their charter contemplated the construction and operation of roads wholly outside the state, and sometimes across the continent; and when, in no other particular, they are subject to its laws and entitled to its protection. The propriety of such incorporations, where no business is done within the state, is open to grave doubt; but it is possible that legislation alone can furnish a remedy.

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It is unnecessary to say that this case does not involve the question of the taxation of intangible personal property, or of inheritance or succession taxes, or of questions arising between different municipalities or taxing districts within the same state, which are controlled by different considerations.

Judgment reversed.

[WHITE, J., Concurred in the result.]

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Mr. Justice HOLMES. It seems to me that the result reached by the court probably is a desirable one, but I hardly understand how it can be deduced from the fourteenth amendment; and as the CHIEF JUSTICE feels the same difficulty, I think it proper to say that my doubt has not been removed.

LOAN ASSOCIATION v. TOPEKA.

(Supreme Court of United States, 1875. 20 Wall. 655, 22 L. Ed. 455.) [Error to the federal Circuit Court for Kansas. The city of Topeka, Kansas, under statutory authority, issued $100,000 of bonds as a donation to the King Bridge Company to aid it in establishing a manufactory of iron bridges in that city. The plaintiff association of Cleveland, Ohio, sued Topeka in the federal Circuit Court for Kansas for the interest on some of these bonds owned by plaintiff. The city demurred and received judgment, and a writ of error was taken. Other facts appear in the opinion.]

Mr. Justice MILLER. * [After declining to pass upon one of the grounds urged for invalidating the bonds under the Kansas constitution:] We find ample reason to sustain the demurrer on the second ground on which it is argued by counsel and sustained by the Circuit Court. That proposition is that the act authorizes the towns and other municipalities to which it applies, by issuing bonds or loaning their credit, to take the property of the citizen under the guise of taxation to pay these bonds, and use it in aid of the enterprises of others which are not of a public character, thus perverting the right of taxation, which can only be exercised for a public use, to the aid of individual interest and personal purposes of profit and gain.

The proposition as thus broadly stated is not new, nor is the question which it raises difficult of solution. If these municipal corporations, which are in fact subdivisions of the state, and which for many reasons are vested with quasi legislative powers, have a fund or other property out of which they can pay the debts which they contract, without resort to taxation, it may be within the power of the legislature of the state to authorize them to use it in aid of projects strictly private or personal, but which would in a secondary manner contribute to the public good; or where there is property or money vested in a corporation of the kind for a particular use, as public worship or charity, the legislature may pass laws authorizing them to make contracts in reference to this property, and incur debts payable from that source.

But such instances are few and exceptional, and the proposition is a very broad one, that debts contracted by municipal corporations must be paid, if paid at all, out of taxes which they may lawfully levy, and that all contracts creating debts to be paid in future, not limited to payment from some other source, imply an obligation to pay by taxation. It follows that in this class of cases the right to contract must be limited by the right to tax, and if in the given case no tax can lawfully be levied to pay the debt, the contract itself is void for want of authority to make it. We proceed to the inquiry whether such a power exists in the

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