The State of Georgia v. Brailsford. 2 D. IREDELL, J. I sat in the Circuit Court, when the judgment was rendered in the case of Brailsford and others v. * Spalding; but I shall give my opinion, on the present motion, de- [*406 ] tached from every previous consideration of the merits of the cause. The debt claimed by the plaintiffs below was, likewise, claimed by the State of Georgia. The State applied to be admitted to assert her claim, but the application was rejected; nor has any writ of error been instituted upon the judgment. These facts, however, are only mentioned to introduce this remark, that the Circuit Court could not, with propriety, sustain the application of Georgia; because, whenever a State is a party, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of the suit; and her right cannot be effectually supported, by a voluntary appearance, before any other tribunal of the Union. Not being a party, nor capable of resorting as a party, to the Circuit Court, it is very much to be questioned whether the State could bring a writ of error on the judgment there, even if her claim appeared on the record. Every principle of law, justice, and honor, however, seem to require, that the claim of the State of Georgia should not be indirectly decided or defeated, by a judgment pronounced between parties over whom she had no control, and upon a trial in which she was not allowed to be heard. If, indeed, the court could not devise a mode for admitting a fair investigation and determination upon that claim, it would be useless to grant an injunction: But I think a mode may easily be prescribed, in strict conformity with the practice and principles of equity. It was in the power of the defendant in the Circuit Court, to have filed a bill of interpleader, in order, for his own safety, to settle the rights of the contending parties; but neither in that forin, nor by instituting a suit herself, could Georgia have derived the benefit of supporting her claim in her own way, before any other than the Supreme Court. In this court, therefore, we ought now to place the State upon the same footing, as if a bill of interpleader had been regularly filed here; which can be done by sustaining the present suit; and when the parties are all before us, we may direct a proper issue to be formed, and tried at the bar. Thus, justice will be done to Georgia, and an irreparable injury may be prevented; while the adverse party, even if he ultimately succeeds, can only complain of a short delay. With this view, I think that an injunction should be awarded to stay the money in the hands of the marshal till this Court shall make a further order on the subject. BLAIR, J. The State of Georgia seems to have done all that she The State of Georgia v. Brailsford. 2 D. * could to obtain a hearing. An application was made to the Circuit Court, in the nature of a claim, to interplead; but being refused, her alternative, under all the circumstances of the case, is an [* 407 ] appeal to the equitable jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. It is true, perhaps, as the counsel has suggested, that the defendant below pleaded the Confiscation Act of Georgia in bar to the action; but it is a sufficient answer to this argument, that the State was not a party; and no right can be defeated, in law, unless the party claiming it has himself an opportunity to support it. If the State of Georgia was entitled to the bond, she is equally entitled to the money levied by the marshal in satisfaction of the bond, or rather of the judgment rendered upon it; and as the execution directs the marshal to pay the amount to the plaintiffs, below, I can perceive no other mode of preventing a compliance, while we inquire into the right of receiving the money, than that of issuing an injunction to stay it in the hands of the officer. It appears to me to be too early, likewise, to pronounce an opinion upon the titles in collision; since it is enough, on a motion of this kind, to show a colorable title. The State of Georgia has set up her Confiscation Act, which certainly is a fair foundation for future judicial investigation; and that an injury may not be done, which it may be out of our power to repair, the injunction ought, I think, to issue, till we are enabled, by a full inquiry, to decide upon the whole merits of the case. WILSON, J. I confess that I have not been able to form an opinion which is perfectly satisfactory to my own mind, upon the points that have been discussed. If Georgia has a right to the bond, it is strictly a legal right; but to enforce a strictly legal right, the present seems, at the first blush, to be an awkward and irregular proceeding. Again: Georgia had not a right, or she had a right, to be admitted to a hearing in the Circuit Court; but in the former case it would be no ground of complaint that her application was rejected, for she is bound by the law; and in the other case, she would be entitled to bring the subject before us, as a court of law, since she was refused the exercise of a legal right. It is true, that, under the Federal Constitution, an inferior tribunal cannot compel a State to appear as a party; but it is a very different proposition to say, that a State cannot, by her own consent, appear in any other court than the Supreme Court. The general rule applies among all sovereigns, who, as equals, are not amenable to courts of each other; and yet I remember an action was instituted and sustained, some years ago, in the name of Louis XVI., king of The State of Georgia v. Brailsford. 2 D. France, against Mr. Robert Morris, in the Supreme Court of Penn. sylvania. * Under these impressions, I am disposed to think that the State of Georgia ought rather to have sued out a writ of error, than to have asked for an injunction. But still, in the existing circumstances of the case, I have no objection to retain the money [ *408 ] within the power of the Court, till we can better satisfy ourselves both as to the remedy and the right. CUSHING, J. The Judicial Act expressly declares, that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law." 1 Now, if Georgia has any right to the debt in question, it is a right at law, for which, of course, the law will furnish a plain, adequate, and complete remedy. The decision of the Circuit Court, in a case to which Georgia was neither party nor privy, did not, and could not, take away either the right or the remedy of the State. Nor can Spalding, the defendant below, be made liable twice, for the same debt, without his wilful laches. For it is in his power to bring a writ of error; and then the whole merits of the claim of Georgia appearing on the record, we must decide it as a question of law, either by affirming or reversing the judgment, so as to bind us in any suit which Georgia might institute for the same cause. Besides, the State of Georgia, notwithstanding the judgment of the Circuit Court, may bring an action of indebitatus assumpsit against Brailsford, who is a man of fortune, after they have received the money, upon the principle of Moses v. Macfarlan, 2 Bur. 1005, and with stronger reason; as in that case the parties in both courts were the same; but, in the case proposed, they would be different, and one of them has never been heard. In some form, therefore, Georgia may obtain complete redress at law. I do not, upon the whole, consider the refusal of Spalding to bring a writ of error, which he is not compellable to bring, nor any other suggestion in the bill, as a sufficient foundation for exercising the equitable jurisdiction of the Court; and, consequently, I think that an injunction ought not to be awarded. JAY, C. J. My first ideas were unfavorable to the motion; but many reasons have been urged, which operate forcibly to produce a change of opinion. The great question turns on the property of a certain bond; whether it belongs to Brailsford, or to Georgia? It is put in suit by Brailsford; but if Georgia, by virtue of the Confiscation Act, is really 11 Stats. at Large, 73. Hayburn's Case. 2 D. entitled to the debt, she is entitled to the money, though the evidence of the debt happened to be in the possession of Brailsford, and though Brailsford has, by that means, obtained a judgment for the amount. Then the only point to be considered is—whether, under these circumstances, it is not equitable to stay the money in the [ *409 ] hands of the marshal, 'till the right to it is fairly decided; and so avoid the risk of putting the true owner to a suit, for the purpose of recovering it back? For my part, I think that the money should remain in the custody of the law, till the law has adjudged to whom it belongs; and therefore, I am content that the injunction issue. An injunction granted. 2 D. 419; 1 P. 110; 5 P. 284; 2 H. 9; 9 H. 10; 17 H. 478; 24 H. 66. HAYBURN'S CASE. 2 D. 409. Motion for mandamus to Circuit Court for Pennsylvania, to proceed under Pension Act. THIS was a motion for a mandamus to be directed to the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, commanding the said Court to proceed in a certain petition of William Hayburn, who had applied to be put on the pension list of the United States, as an invalid pensioner. The principal case arose upon the act of Congress passed the 23d of March, 1792. (1 U. S. St. at Large 243.) The Attorney-General, Randolph, who made the motion for the mandamus, having premised that it was done ex officio, without an application from any particular person, but with a view to procure the execution of an act of Congress, particularly interesting to a meritorious and unfortunate class of citizens, the Court declared that they entertained great doubt upon his right, under such circumstances, and in a case of this kind, to proceed ex officio; and directed him to state the principles on which he attempted to support the right. The Attorney-General, accordingly, entered into an elaborate description of the powers and duties of his office: But the Court being divided in opinion on that question, the motion, made ex officio, was not allowed. The Attorney-General then changed the ground of his interposition, declaring it to be at the instance, and on behalf of Hayburn, a party Hayburn's Case. 2 D. interested; and he entered into the merits of the case, upon the act of Congress, and the refusal of the Judges to carry it into effect. THE COURT observed, that they would hold the motion under advisement, until the next term; but no decision was ever pronounced, as the Legislature, at an intermediate session, [ *410 ] provided in another way for the relief of the pensioners.' 13 H. 40. Rule. 1 See an act passed the 28th February, 1793. (1 U. S. St. at Large 325.) As the reasons assigned by the Judges, for declining to execute the first act of Congress, involve a great Constitutional question, it will not be thought improper to subjoin them in illustration of Hayburn's case. The Circuit Court for the District of New York, consisting of Jay, Chief Justice, Cushing, Justice, and Duane, District Judge, proceeded on the 5th of April, 1791, to take into consideration the act of Congress entitled "An act to provide for the settlement of the claims of widows and orphans barred by the limitations heretofore established, and to regulate the claims to invalid pensions;" and were, thereupon, unanimously of opinion and agreed: "That by the Constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose encroachments on either. "That neither the Legislative nor the Executive branches can, constitutionally, assign to the Judicial any duties, but such as are properly judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner. "That the duties assigned to the Circuit Courts, by this act, are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate them as such; inasmuch as it subjects the decisions of these courts, made pursuant to those duties, first to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War, and then to the revision of the Legislature; whereas by the Constitution, neither the Secretary at War, nor any other Executive officer, nor even the Legislature, are authorized to sit as a Court of Errors on the judicial acts or opinions of this Court. "As therefore the business assigned to this Court, by the act, is not judicial, nor directed to be performed judicially, the act can only be considered as appointing commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it, by official, instead of personal descriptions. "That the Judges of this Court regard themselves as being the commissioners designated by the act, and therefore as being at liberty to accept or decline that office. "That as the objects of this act are exceedingly benevolent, and do real honor to the humanity and justice of Congress; and as the Judges desire to manifest, on all proper occasions and in every proper manner, their high respect for the National Legislature, they will execute this act in the capacity of commissioners. "That as the Legislature have a right to extend the session of this Court for any term, which they may think proper by law to assign, the term of five days, as directed by this act, ought to be punctually observed. "That the Judges of this Court will as usual, during the session thereof, adjourn the court from day to day, or other short periods, as circumstances may render proper, and that they will, regularly, between the adjournments, proceed as commissioners to execute the business of this act in the same court room, or chamber." The Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, consisting of Wilson, and Blair, Justices, and Peters, District Judge, made the following representation, in a letter jointly addressed to the President of the United States, on the 18th of April, 1792. |