Winchester v. Jackson. 3 C.
Campbell, for the defendants in error, prayed that the dismissal might be with costs, the original defendants being also defendants in
The clerk stated that the practice had heretofore been to dismiss without costs, where the dismission was for want of jurisdiction.
THE COURT directed it to be dismissed with costs.
ABANDONMENT.
INSURANCE, 4.
ASSUMPSIT; BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 1. 2-10; CONFISCATION; CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 10; DEBT; FRAUD; PRESIDENT.
1. An information in the district court to enforce the forfeiture of a vessel for export-
ing arms and ammunition contrary to the act of May 22, 1794, (1 Stats. at Large,
369,) is a civil cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and not to be tried
by a jury. United States v. La Vengeance, 230.
2. So the admiralty has jurisdiction over a question of forfeiture arising under the act
of March 22d, 1794, (1 Stats. at Large, 347,) prohibiting the slave-trade. United
States v. Schooner Sally, 513.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 6. 27; EVIDENCE, 2; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2;
PRACTICE, 3; PRIZE; SALVAGE.
1. A lease to S. D., secretary of war, and his successors, containing covenants for him-
self and his successors, being a contract which he had authority to make in behalf
of the government, does not bind S. D. personally. Hodgson v. Dexter, 423.
2. Where consignees had been accustomed to insure the property of the consignor only
when ordered to do so by letter, a promise by an agent of the consignees to write to
them to obtain insurance, which he failed to do, does not render the consignees liable
for not insuring. Randolph v. Ware, 650.
3. An agent to collect debts, merely, is not a factor. Hopkirk v. Bell, 640.
CONTRACT, 3. 5; PRIVATEER; PRIZE, 1.
AMENDMENT.
WRIT OF ERROR, 13. 14.
1. A decree for a sale under a mortgage is such a final decree as may be appealed from,
Ray v. Law, 553.
2. A citation is not necessary, if an appeal be taken during the same term at which the
final decree is made. Reilly v. Lamar, 495.
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 2-6. 8. 9. 11; PRIZE, 2. 3.
APPEARANCE.
PRACTICE, 2. 3.
1. Assumpsit will not lie upon a policy of insurance under seal. Marine Insurance Co.
of Alexandria v. Young, 421.
2. If goods are sold and delivered on the faith of a promise in writing by a third per-
son to become security for the payment of their price, an action of assumpsit will
lie on the promise, though not originally made to any particular person. Lawrason
v. Mason, 647.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE, &c. 1.
H. having been originally admitted as an attorney of this court, on motion, his name
was taken from the roll of attorneys and placed upon the list of counsellors, and he
was qualified de novo, as counsellor. Ex parte Hallowell, 290.
DEPOSITION, 1-3; PRACTICE, 2.
A prisoner committed by a district judge, on a charge of treason, admitted to bail.
United States v. Hamilton, 76.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. By the law of Virginia, no promise is implied in favor of an indorsee, by any but
his immediate indorser; an action of assumpsit does not lie by an indorsee against a
remote indorser, founded on the indorsement. Mandeville v. Riddle, 412.
2. Under the Virginia act of 1775, the actual consideration, though different from that
stated on the face of the bill, governs, and the jury having found that to be such as to
take the case out of the statute, the statement on the face of the bill is immaterial.
Brown v. Barry, 261.
3. If the jury find specially the value of foreign money, the want of an averment of
the value in the declaration is cured. lb.
4. In such a case a declaration in the debet is not erroneous.
5. In a count against the drawer for non-payment, it is not necessary to aver that the
bill was accepted, or if not accepted that it was protested for non-acceptance. Ib.
6. When the action is founded on non-payment of bills of exchange, it is not necessary
to produce protests for non-acceptance. Clarke v. Russell, 295.
7. If the vendee of goods indorse to the vendor a negotiable note of a third person, as
a conditional payment for the goods, and the vendee uses due diligence to obtain
payment of the note from the maker, he may then sue the vendee on the original
contract of sale. Clark v. Young, 392.
8. It is not necessary first to tender the note to the vendor. Ib.
9. Nor is a judgment in favor of the indorser, in an action by the indorsee, a bar to an
action on the contract of sale. Ib.
10. If a negotiable note has been received as a conditional payment, and has been passed
to, and is owned by a third person, the creditor cannot sue on the original contract.
Harris v. Johnston, 592.
COURTS OF UNITED STATES, 13; DEBT; PLEADING, 1; PRACTICE, 7.
1. The real intent, and not the literal meaning of a condition, is to govern.
Graham's Adm. 565.
2. A departure from prison rules, under the authority of a judgment of a competent
tribunal, obtained by the fraud of the debtor alone — his sureties being innocent-
is not a breach of a bond conditioned that he would not depart until discharged by
due course of law. Simms v. Slacum, 587.
3. To raise a presumption of payment of a bond, twenty years must have elapsed ex-
clusive of the period of the plaintiff's disability. Dunlop v. Ball, 468.
4. The 6th section of the act of the 29th of April, 1802, (2 Stats. at Large, 163,) trans-
ferred the jurisdiction over forthcoming bonds given in suits pending in the courts
abolished by that act. Stuart v. Laird, 414.
5. Where a forthcoming bond taken upon an execution, recited the aggregate sum of
the execution correctly, but stated one of the items at $20.33 instead of $12.33,
it was held correct in substance. The judgment of the court below thereon for the
plaintiff was affirmed with ten per cent. damages and costs. Williams v. Lyles,
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 20. 21; PLEADING, 3; REVENUE LAWS, 1 2
LIMITATIONS OF ACTION, 2. TREATIES, 3.
1. The capture of a vessel of a country at peace with the United States, made by a
vessel fitted out in one of our ports, and commanded by one of our citizens, is ille-
gal, and if the captured vessel is brought within our jurisdiction, the district courts,
upon a libel for a tortious seizure, may inquire into the facts, and decree restitution,
and if a privateer, duly commissioned by a belligerent, collude with a vessel so fitted
out and commanded, to cover her prizes and share with her their proceeds, such
collusion is a fraud on the law of nations, and the claim of the belligerent will be
rejected. Talbot v. Janson, 128.
2. Damages for the tortious seizure, as well as restitution, decreed. Ib.
3. In 1799, there was a limited state of hostilities between this country and France,
and the capture of a private armed vessel, officered and manned by Frenchmen, and
sailing under the French flag, was lawful, though the vessel was the property of a
neutral, from whom the French possessors had captured her. Taltot v. Seeman,
4. If a vessel has a Spanish register, and sails under Spanish colors, and has on board
accounts describing her as Spanish property, there is probable cause for seizing her
as belonging to Spanish subjects. The right to seize, and send in for further exa-
mination, is not the right to spoliate and injure the property captured; for any
damage, or spoliation, the captors are answerable to the owners, if the property be
not condemned as prize. Del Col v. Arnold, 248.
5. If an unlawful seizure is made by a public armed vessel upon the high seas, without
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